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Benedict Beckeld on Why Oikophobia, not Suicidal Empathy is Killing the West | Fireside Chat 277

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"There's a kind of ghoulish happiness about people they think are bad and dangerous being killed. They were celebrating, but they were also signalling — look at me, I'm saying the thing everyone's supposed to say."

Brian sits down with Dr Benedict Beckeld, philosopher and author of Western Self-Contempt: Oikophobia in the Decline of Civilizations, on why cultures come to hold themselves in contempt — and why he thinks it isn't new, or an excess of empathy.

Also: macro and micro monomania, his terms for reading all of history through one lens; which class the contempt starts in and how it spreads; the Canadian identity built on not being American; and whether the "weak men create hard times" idiom survives contact with the historical record.

"Nothing is more human than taking a good idea too far. Once somebody levels a good point of self-critique against his own community, the next person has to show he's even smarter, and levels a more extreme one."

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Benedict Beckeld on Why Oikophobia, not Suicidal Empathy is Killing the West | Fireside Chat 277

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Honey Badger RadioBenedict Beckeld on Why Oikophobia, not Suicidal Empathy is Killing the West | Fireside Chat 277. Machine-transcribed; use the interactive transcript above to jump the player to any line.

Good morning, good afternoon, good evening, wherever you may be, and welcome back to Honey Badger Radio. My name is Brian, and this is the Fireside Chat where we discuss interesting things with interesting people. I guess I'm just going to put it that simply. And today I have a really fascinating guest that I just happened to discover randomly. I was, you know, we on this channel, this is a men's issues channel. We usually talk about the issues facing men and boys, and that usually leads to conversations about greater, you know, sort of like philosophical concepts. And we talk a little bit about the idea of sort of hatred or disdain for your own culture. And I think that's a big problem. And I think that there is a connection there. And then I discovered this gentleman, Dr., you are a doctor, right? That's how I, okay, Dr. Benedict Beckled, and you're a Swedish American philosopher, author, and poet known for your work on Oikofobia,

which is cultural self-contempt, or a version to one's own civilization, especially in your book, Western self-contempt, Oikofobia in the decline of civilizations. You have earned a PhD in philosophy and classical philology, philology, I'm sorry, from the University of Heidelberg, taught philosophy, Greek, and Latin at institutions, including the American University of Paris, volunteered as a teacher in Nambia. And since 2014, you have focused on writing about aesthetics, political philosophy, history, and contemporary culture while living in New York. Welcome to our small channel in this corner of the internet, Dr. Benedict Beckled. Thank you so much for having me. It's a pleasure. And as you were saying just before my first live stream, so this will be exciting. Yeah, oh, so this is your first live stream. Yes. Oh, wow, okay. Yeah, so honored to be a part of that. All right, so let's just jump into it. So this channel we mainly talk about the issues

facing men and boys. This is things like boys in education, misindry, which is the hatred of men that we see in media and it's basically everywhere, academia, et cetera. So the audience doesn't really, we don't normally talk about this idea, but I do think that there is something connect, there's some connective tissue between what you talk about in your book, Western self contempt, and what we talk about. So I guess what I thought I would start with is, could you explain for people who might not know, what is oikofobia? Yeah, so oikofobia is a term that was, it's a neologism, it was coined in the 1990s by the late British philosopher Roger Scruton. And it basically means the hatred or fear of, yeah, there is, of home. So it's basically the opposite of xenophobia. Zenophobia being the hatred or fear of foreigners. Oikofobia is the hatred or fear of one's own home

or one's own culture, one's own society, sometimes one's own fellow citizens. And this is basically, as I laid out in the book that you mentioned, is that this is contrary to what most people believe, this is not some brand new thing that has been around for maybe a few decades or so. Rather, it is something that comes and goes in history, in Western history since ancient times. And I kind of explain in the book how it happens, the sociohistorical circumstances under which oikofobia emerges. And one, maybe I'll say right away, that one way in which it can connect a little bit to men's issues is that if traditional gender roles emphasize masculinity as they do, then oikofobia in trying to tear down all different kinds of traditions also tears down traditional gender roles. And so that, of course, does have an effect on the role of men in society. And so there's not just gender roles, it's religion, it's all different kinds of traditions that are being attacked by oikofobia,

but certainly it affects everyone in the society. Yeah, what is it about men? Because I think there is a strong connection between men and masculinity and a civilization. I mean, obviously we need men to sort of sustain it. But it does seem to when people are attacking or criticizing their own culture, like in the case of, let's say the UK, for example, because they're pretty far down this whole, they will shame and attack their own men. I don't know if you've noticed, but even though there are massive problems with Islamic gangs in the UK, when the media acknowledges this in any way, it's not framed as a problem because of a Middle Eastern religion or a group of people from another culture that have different values, but rather, it's just an attack on men in the broad sense. I just say, well, this is a problem of just men in general,

not these men, but men generally. And then it gets framed that way. Like there was a recent, was like a dramatic Netflix series called Adolescence. And it basically focused on this boy. And of course, the boy was a, you know, a native white English boy and he murdered a girl. And that became the entire story. And it was supposedly to address, you know, some of the, what they would call rape culture in the UK, but it was framed as just to, you know, targeting men. You know what I'm saying? Yeah, yeah. And that's, which is quite superfluous because Western men over the last half century so have already been quite domesticated. Feminism has been quite successful on that front. And so further domestication or further limitation of natural masculinity. And many other people have said this will often lead to that masculinity being expressed in more unpleasant ways.

And the thing is you're always going to have some crazy people who do horrible things. That's always true. But when you clamp down on masculinity, then all of the good men that are out there who could do something about that and punish that man or prevent it from happening in the first place protect the women in their lives. They become less capable of doing so. So you're never going to erase human depravity. That's always going to be around. But you are erasing the capability of human beings in this case of men to do something about it. So that's, yeah. Yeah. They're digging their own grave, basically, unfortunately. Yeah. So the thing that got my attention from your videos, you made a response video to Gad Sad. And Gad Sad, we have some mutual acquaintances here at Honey Bachelor Radio with Karen Straun who has appeared on Gad Sad's YouTube channel years ago. And I think he coined the term suicidal empathy.

And we took issue with it because we didn't think it was quite right. And I think you're the only other person that I've seen that's sort of like taking that same tack. So can you explain for people who might not know what is suicidal empathy? Why is it wrong? Not just wrong, but it's almost like a thought terminated in cliche that's just used to end conversation around this, which I think is important. And how it's different from Oikofobia. Yeah. Yeah. And I should say also when you say that you have some mutual acquaintances, I mean, I like Gad Sad. In general, I think he does good work on a number of fronts. But yeah, in this particular case, I have strongly disagreed with his concept here. So suicidal empathy, the way he presents it in his book of that title, suicidal empathy, is basically the idea that the West is declining because we are too empathetic toward other civilizations, including civilizations who want to hurt us. So we're too empathetic toward migrants,

from certain parts from the Middle East, mainly who want to tear down our traditions, other migrants as well. And we are too empathetic toward mother earth, for example, because by caring too much about the environment, we destroy our own economies. We're too empathetic toward black people, let's say, because we then elevate them to positions for which they're not qualified. He uses the case of the former president. Jason Ardady. I think it's a very topical right now, exactly he talks about Claude Engaille, the former president of Harvard, but it's true, it's become very topical now because of Jason Ardady. But so that's the idea of suicidal empathy. And my main critique of it is that it's this kind of behavior, which is, of course, real enough, is not based really in empathy. There are some individual cases where you can find genuine empathy. I'm not saying there's no such thing at all. But the main thing that's going on is orthophobia, this word that we used before, hatred of one's own culture,

a desire to want to tear down the traditions that have built the civilization in the first place. And so basically, it's the exact opposite of empathy. It's antipathy, a feeling, an empathy, meaning a feeling in or with someone, feeling for someone, and typathy being, of course, a feeling against something. And that's really what we're dealing with. And what's interesting, and this is, I talk about this in the video that you saw, even some of Gad Sad's very own examples clearly demonstrate that it's not actually a question of empathy, but that it is a question of antipathy because he talks one salient example is how when he talks about how texts and farmers are attacked for having lots of cows and lots of children because it destroys the environment, they still defend the behavior of the Chinese Communist Party, even though they are the greatest pollutants on the planet. And so if they genuinely cared about the environment,

they would also criticize the Chinese, but they're not. They only criticize their own people at home, people from Texas and American farmers and so on. So that shows that, sure, I'm not saying they don't care about the environment at all, no doubt they do, but it shows that the primary motivation is antipathy toward their own kind and not care, not love or passion for something else. And Gad Sad's own example, plenty of other examples as well. Gad Sad's own examples show this, which he doesn't seem to realize. And the thing is, even in those cases where there is genuine empathy, it is almost always nestled in a foundation of orcophobia, that is to say, it's nestled in an initial act of repudiation. Only after that repudiation has taken place, can there then arise a certain empathy as well for others. But the repudiation is really the initial and continuously driving force behind these actions. Right. Yeah, the impetus is to critique not necessarily

the empathy. And it's kind of, so calling it empathy is being not just inaccurate, but it's overly charitable. Yes, exactly. That's another problem because most people would say that empathy is a virtue, as I mentioned, I'm actually not one of those people. It's a whole other philosophical can of worms so I don't consider empathy a virtue. But most people do think that it's good to be empathetic. It's something that people often brag about, oh, I'm very empathetic, showing that they're really more narcissistic than empathetic. But okay, it's a common thing people like to say about themselves, that they have a lot of empathy. And so if that's the case, that we as a society, as a whole, consider empathy to be a good thing, well, then Gad Sad opens the door to people saying, okay, these people that he describes, they may be misguided, but at least they have the right motivations, at least they have good intentions. That's always something. But no, in fact, they don't have good intentions, because again, empathy is not the driving force.

So he actually, and that's almost definitely not his intention because he does spend a lot of time kind of making fun of them. I mean, there's sarcasm and humor in his book, as this is usual, Mottos operandi. And when he makes fun of them, he probably does it mean to give them an out, so to speak. But he does, because people can at least say, okay, they have good motivations. But in fact, no, they don't have good motivations. Yes, yes, exactly. And so I want to go back to, oh yeah, the other thing about empathy too. And maybe, just out of curiosity, I don't know if I'm off the mark here, but does it seem to you, because it seems to me, and I'm a layman, I don't do the, I'm not deep in the philosophy per se, I just host the show, but it does strike me as really feminine. Is that fair to say, or am I being unjust? Because we talked, you just mentioned that men have been domesticated significantly. And of course, there's a push

to constantly domesticate them further and further and further and lesser than that is. So is this, isn't this concept of, it just seems to be feminine to me? Is that wrong in my off the mark? No, I think you're quite right. And I'm always a little reluctant to say yes, because it's become such a cliche to this particular issue, but it's true, I mean, it's a cliche for a good reason. Women generally are more empathetic. This is, and there's, of course, evolutionary reasons for this. Women evolved to take care of their children and to shower love upon them and to wear them and so on, whereas men were out hunting and killing prey. So they're long standing reasons for this going back to prehistory, why this is the case. And so yeah, that's definitely part of it. And it won't surprise you, therefore, to hear that part of the development of Okofobia in Western societies is also feminization. Now modern feminization is more extreme

than that which has taken place in the past. And there are reasons for why the current iteration of Okofobia is more extreme than past iterations. I explain that as well in the book, but the point is the same trend, even if less extreme, the same trend of the feminization of society has certainly taken place in the past as well, including antiquity. And so this is a repetition of the pattern. So definitely, we do become more feminine as we advance as a society. And we become more and more comfortable. Is that like a product of like the, let's say, abundance and comfort and right? Yeah, it's not exactly. And plus also women often do gain more political power. Now in antiquity or in early times, they didn't have political power in the literal sense like women couldn't vote for anything like that. But it would become more common that certain upper class women would gain an influence culturally. And more so than would be the case in earlier phases of that society. And certain experimentation with Androgyny,

the blurring of certain strict borders between male and female would also take place in the past as well. The muscular body, this is something that Camille Paulia, for example, has written a lot about the muscular male body would become less celebrated and would give way to a different look in men. So all of this has taken place before. And so yeah, no, I think you're quite right to point out that feminization is a part of this. And which is also why it's important to point out that in this particular case, what's going on is actually not this kind of feminine empathy. Or that's only the surface phenomenon. It is in fact something much more sinister. But it's not a coincidence. And in that sense, at least, gets at is right that it's often women who are leading these kinds of movements because yes, they are on at least a surface level more empathetic, yes. What I've also heard from another detractor,

I don't know the real name, but on X, they're called disaffected, I think. And they said that this is not suicidal empathy, but it's homicidal narcissism. Oh, is that, I mean, this could just be a sentiment that doesn't mean anything. Does that track? Is this the same thing? No, so yeah, I don't know about homicidal. I think suicidal is, I think that's the part of Gatsad, that's Gatsad's term that's correct. It is suicidal, what's going on. So I would probably keep the suicidal rather than the homicidal, although, well, maybe homicide toward one's fellow citizens. But when it comes to the narcissism, yes, 100% in fact, in the book I talk about how vanity, I don't use the word narcissism so much because from a... It's like a medical term, like that. Yeah, exactly. From a psychological and even psychiatric perspective that conjures up certain ideas that is... That's not really... Do not really factor in directly. It can in certain cases, but not really on a mass level. So I prefer just to use vanity as a term,

but we could use narcissism. But so that is always a motor and engine behind Okofobia, because of course, and this is also something that many people have talked about, basically virtue signaling in common parlance, the idea that one shows one's own virtue by demonstrating for foreigners or for the environment or for what have you. And so... And that is, of course, a form of vanity, because one doesn't really care so much about those other people. Really, one cares about showing off oneself how virtues and moral one is. And so that is vanity. And that kind of vanity, again, also, I keep mentioning it, take what it does, go back to antiquity, once he's clear traces in literature, from the ancient world and from 1700s, 1800s, about how this kind of vanity is really a big engine behind this sort of behavior. So I think that part is certainly true, yeah. All right, yeah, I think that's great and true. I think that virtue signaling is completely self-serving.

It has nothing to do with whatever the issue of the day is. It's just people chasing trends to like, I don't know. Just be seen as virtuous without actually practicing virtue, because virtue is sacrificial and it's not self-serving. Exactly. That's exactly, yeah, very well put. Virtue is sacrificial to a great extent, exactly. And so, yeah, they kind of betray themselves there. There you go. All right, so let's get into your book, Western Self Contempt. So in it, you describe Oikofobia as a recurring pattern that appears in the late stages of all civilizations. So how do you distinguish this from ordinary self-criticism or healthy reforms? Yeah, so there is no absolute line by which one can distinguish the one from the other and say clearly this is Oikofobia on this side and that is self-critique on the other. Where exactly that line is to be drawn is a bit subjective.

So there are certain behaviors that, for example, when tacitists criticizes the Romans as being a bunch of brutes and committing rapine and everything like this, one could say, well, he was kind of right, wasn't he? Or one could say, well, why is he turning against his own people? So it's a bit subjective exactly where one would draw the line. But there are certain behaviors, at least, that are so extreme that one could certainly any intellectually honest person would agree that this is Oikofobia. I mean, one extreme example was a few years ago during the summer of love, as I think you've domestically called it when they kept tearing down statues of our founding fathers and so on. And not just of Southern Confederate leaders or anything like that. No, no, like that. But it's an, yeah, exactly. I mean, George Floyd. Yeah, they did in the UK. They took down Winston Churchill. Exactly. And what happened didn't even happen over there. Right, exactly. So, and even right here in my own city,

even in New York, Washington Square Park defacing the statue of George Washington and so on. So that's any intellectually honest person would have to say that that is Oikofobia, because that is so far away from where one might draw a line that it's no longer subjective, I would say. Then there are the cases that are maybe a little, a little more of a gray area. So, yeah, so there's no exact line. The point really that is to be made philosophically, there is no exact line. But the point to be made historically is that even when a society develops the capacity to self-correct and to criticize itself, which is a good thing, I would agree, it sets the stage for later Oikofobia, because nothing is more human than taking a good idea too far, basically. And so the process of self-correction and self-critique is one that is never stopped, and it always goes to the point where it becomes too extreme. Because, and this is where human vanity comes in,

because if somebody has leveled a good point of self-critique against his own community, well, then the next person has to show that he is even better and even smarter than the first one. And so levels an even greater point, an even more extreme point of critique against his own community, and eventually it becomes a competition. And this is part of the reason, there are many other reasons, but this is part of the reason why academics tend to be so orcophobic, because they have to basically, everybody has to come up with the newest and most advanced theory. And that leads to degrees of outlandishness that one does not come across by a large in society as a home. So yeah, so that's, there's no exact line, but there is this development that always takes place toward ever more extreme, ever more extreme ideas of self-critique. What are some historical examples that you find most illuminating or for understanding today's, the state of oecophobia? Because you said that this has happened in Rome and Athens.

So what are some of the most illuminating examples for you? Yeah, so anybody who follows modern political discourse and modern political events, I'm sure would recognize if I take a son a very quick journey with just a few examples, there's much more of course. Yeah, correct. Yeah, but so for example, in ancient Greece, in ancient Athens, in the late fifth and early fourth century BC, they start people become more atheistic. So this is another false notion that mass atheism is something new, it's not. It's certainly, again, more extreme today than in the past, but Plato in his laws, for example, complains about there being lots of atheists around and that we have forgotten the ancient gods. This is a common complaint and in the place imported Eastern customs and Eastern cults. Again, this could be comparable to oecophobes today, having a tendency toward Buddhism, for example,

with being very popular. Yeah, more fetishizing Islam or something like that. Exactly, that's right. Not to say that Buddhism in a minute of itself, not criticizing Buddhism itself. I am criticizing Islam itself. That's a whole other story, but this idea that, okay, people may want to embrace these things, but how much is it, and this goes back to the idea of empathy, how much is it that they really love those things? And how much is it that they actually do? It's like Zenev Belia, but it's a little bit of a trendy thing. Exactly. And much of it is. And in the 60s too, that was like the love movement. Yeah, I'm sorry. Yeah, 100%. Yeah, no, absolutely, no, but the 60s is definitely a watershed in the modern development of it, no doubt about that. And much of it is, rather than being a genuine embrace of something foreign, is a repudiation of their own religion of Christianity. So that's one thing, then in Rome, we have, through the expansion of the empire, we have a lot of Greek speaking migrants, not sickly, not immigrants,

because they're technically a part of the empire, but migrants, in the sense that they move from the periphery of the empire to Rome, with different cultures, Middle Eastern culture, and Greek as their native language, and with no sense of loyalty toward the idea of Rome. And so the culture in the motherland in Italy is basically watered down. And there is no sense of national unity anymore because of these migrant waves. And then that, of course, becomes even more extreme with Germanic invasions later on. That's something else again. So that's another thing in Enlightenment France, mid 1700s, we have people like Polterre, and Hoso, and Condor Sey, there's a long list of people who repudiate Christianity, but have good things to say about Native American tribes, for example, of which they know almost nothing, but they're very ignorant when they talk about

extra-European cultures. And also a tendency toward vegetarianism, incidentally, which is another thing, an Ocofo doesn't have to be vegetarian, but vegetarianism often, there's a correlation between rising Ocofobe and rising vegetarianism, because that is once again another tradition, the tradition of meat eating, that is to be repudiated. And one sees that as well. That's interesting. Yeah, both in one sees it in Greece, in Rome, in France, Enlightenment France, it's a recurring thing. And yeah, and one thing that changes in these examples is that most of the time in the later we get in history, couple of exceptions, but the later we get in history, the bigger the phenomenon becomes. So in terms of the bigger the phenomenon, do you mean like the scale of this spread of it or the consequences of it, or? Not the consequences necessarily, but the number of people involved, number of different segments of society involved. So in ancient Athens, it's still just an elite.

And it's not even the whole elite, but it's certain segments of the intellectual elite of the Irishocracy, whereas in France, in the 1700s, it spreads to the middle class, and then in Great Britain, in the late 19th century and early 20th century, it spreads into the lower classes as well. It's still more of an elite phenomenon by and large than a middle class or lower class phenomenon, but it does become broader and broader within society and one certainly sees this in the United States today. It's certainly again, it's academics who are the biggest offenders, but one can speak to regular people and with no particular education, and many of them will be convinced that yes, of course America is terrible, and of course we're responsible for everything that's wrong with the world. So that's a common thing, and that basically happens because the reasons for it before there are why it exists, things like egalitarianism and education, and so on, they become more democratized as history goes on.

So in ancient times, there was only a very small elite that was thoroughly educated. By their standards, whereas today, there is of course, everybody should go to college and so on, which is a nonsense idea, but it's a very terrible idea. But... Absolutely. Yeah. And, but because of this, because of the democratization of these things, Okofobi as a result also becomes more widespread. Yeah, and I guess because we're able to share information so much faster, I guess it comes with a price, that this kind of stuff comes from the point. Absolutely, and that's actually, yeah, you raise a very good point because technological innovation can also contribute to it. Now, obviously, as somebody, as being against Okofobi, doesn't mean what should become a lada, it's, I think, technological innovation is a good thing. But yes, it does lead to a certain approudiness in many instances, where, and it also facilitates exposure to other cultures

and to other ways of thinking and doing things, which again can be a good thing, but which also opens the door for more self questioning, yes. Yeah, and I think there's also something really appealing for people to feel like they're part of an intellectual class, like an elite class of people. So I think that's why it's appealing to lower class people to be able to essentially repeat Okofobi statements, right, and just like say, oh, well, look at me, I'm enlightened, I understand all of our flaws that no one else, everybody takes for granted or whatever it is. And this is actually, that's exactly right. And this is also part of the reason why it's a bad idea for everybody to go to college, because genuine expertise is something that is gained only through a lifetime of study. But having spent four years in college gives the illusion of expertise. And that means that a lot of people think they know a lot more than they do, and they often know the wrong things, and it's often better to know nothing

than to know the wrong things. And so there is a certain intellectual humility, sometimes that comes with, that is destroyed by going to college. And so. So, scrutiny coined this term. But do you treat this any different or to expand on it in any way in your book? Yes, quite a lot, because otherwise, I wouldn't have written the book. So that's true. Yeah, well, although in fairness, it's still a fair question, though, because there are plenty of academics who write things that have already been written, but they write them anyway. And that's what they put their name on it. Yeah, they make money. Yeah. Exactly. So, yeah, but in this case, yes. He, scrutiny's treatment was, first of all, just in terms of amount much less. So he wrote an article in 1993, I believe it was, which was about where he introduced the term of cofobia.

And then it appears as a book chapter also in his book, England and the Need for Nations, which came out in 2004 with the second edition, 2006, I think. So he has talked about it here and there, but his treatment is basically focused on modern cofobia only. He does not conceive of it as a recurring phenomenon in history. So he describes something and his descriptions are perfectly accurate. And he describes basically, and of course, because he's British himself, his focus is more on Britain, and to some extent, on the European Union, in his writings on this subject. And he describes very accurately what cofobia, what it looks like, basically. But he does not talk so much about why it happens. And he focuses on a more descriptive analysis of what's happening in his own country and in Europe. In fact, I wrote this book. It took a long time to get published, it's controversial. So I actually wrote it. He passed away in 2020. I wrote it in 2016, 17, thereabouts and actually sent him.

The manuscript, because I wanted to get an author blurb from him. And he did read it and did give me an author blurb also, kindly, which is on the book. And he did say, yeah, this is something new. But he wrote to me explicitly that he was convinced by my arguments, which is basically that this is not something new and in order to fully understand what it is and how it works. We actually have to understand that it's something that corresponds to human nature under certain sociohistorical circumstances, which is why we can trace it all the way back to antiquity. So it's certainly a new treatment. They're also talking greater detail than he could have done in a few pages about how also modern philosophical streams and movements play into it and how those philosophical streams have coalesced over the centuries to yield the modern iteration of Okafobia. So it's much more in detail. Yeah. Yeah. How does is one of the things that we do,

or at least I talk about a lot on this channel, is what I call the post-World War II mythology. What I mean is not that it didn't happen, but rather that a lot of modern people are forming their entire worldview on those events and they're not taking into account things that have happened before that. And what I want to ask about your book is how does the post-World War II intellectual climate, like the Frankfurt School influences, deconstruction, especially things like deconstruction, demoralization, how does that fit into the longer pattern that you described? Do you think there's a connection? I mean, I would argue yes. Yeah. Yeah. In the book, I spend a number of pages on the Frankfurt School, on French theory, and so on, not to describe those schools themselves. I'm not, you know, other people can talk about what they think about everything, but precisely, but specifically, only how they factor into Okofobia, historically and philosophically.

So I do spend some considerable space to that. Frankfurt School differently. You can essentially draw a line, which is, I do explicitly in the book, you can draw what, in order to understand modern, obviously this doesn't apply to earlier forms, but in order to understand modern Okofobia, you can basically draw a line from Marx through the Frankfurt School to French theory, of the 50s and 60s, into the 70s and 80s. A modern version, not no. I was thinking it could have started with the enlightenment, or the French Revolution, or something like that. Oh, no, sure. Of course, oh, no, I mean, that, that, I mean, since you mentioned the Frankfurt School, but yeah, no, there is, by modern, I mean, now not the modern era, as opposed to antiquity, I meant what we're experiencing right now, and the 21st century. But yeah, of course, but you're certainly right that earlier iterations as well, there are many similarities as we've discussed. But for the modern version, obviously Voltaire, one of the few things of which one cannot accuse Voltaire

is being a Marxist that was, you lived too early for that at least. But the, but so, I mean, I don't want to be too mean, by the way. A Voltaire, you think Voltaire was sort of like the... I mean, yeah, the problem is of, the problem is this kind of self-victimization and the xenophilia elevation of other cultures. There are certain, I mean, as a historian, for example, Voltaire is quite innovative, so there's certainly parts of his work that I like. But yeah, but so the kind of the Marx Frankfurt Paris axis, if you will, it's certainly one that has come to get, that has led to modern Okofo, or contributed to the current expression of Okofobia. Basically, one of the, one of the things I call it, there are basically two main things I've discussed in some detail in the book. It's the, it's the, a core lessons of relativism and positivism.

And ostensibly, relativism and positivism are opposites. Relativism being the idea that what is truth is basically subjective and different people have their own version of truth and so on. And there is nothing absolute. And positivism being the idea that as a society, we can work toward an ever-better and ever more perfect society where we eliminate injustice and everything becomes equal. And those two are actually mutually exclusive, because well, if you're a positivist, then you say, then you're saying, it puts leather, there is actually something that is the absolute and the right and the true toward which we should all strive. Whereas a relativist does not think that way, but relativism and positivism come together in modern Okofobia, because both relativism and positivism tear down previous institutions. If relativism is true, that truth doesn't matter, well, then we can reject our own truth, the truth of our own society.

And if positivism is true, then we also have to reject our old traditions because we're striving toward something new and toward something better than what used to be the case. And so positivism and relativism, while being philosophically exclusive of each other, come together in tearing down our own traditions. And the other point that I discussed in some detail is macro and micromanomanium, as I call it, which is basically the idea that everything has an essence. Macromonomania is the idea, this is my term, but it's basically on the macro level that everything is about one thing. So for Marx, everything is about class struggle. And he reads all of history that way. And micromania, micromanomania is that a particular phenomenon is about only one thing. So for example, Foucault reads everything as being about power. And so every single phenomenon that he comes across in history, he thinks doesn't say so quite explicitly,

although there are certain passages where he pretty much says so almost openly. He makes this kind of error that power, it's all about power, and that if he can say that power was involved in a particular event or the striving for power was involved in a particular event, that rules out to him all other possible motivations of that action, which is incorrect, because in many cases, at least that's incorrect, because human motivation is very complex. And we can be motivated by power and also by other things at the very same time. And Foucault rules out all of the other things. And so that's micromanomania, micromania, because it's about one particular phenomenon, as opposed to all of history as a whole. And so what I lay out in the book is basically how this micro and macro monomania come together in Marx being the first philosopher. Hegel, for example, was indulged in a lot of macro monomania, but he was not indulging in micro monomania. Marx is the first one who does both of these. And that leads that spreads then to the Frankfurt School and to French theory as well.

Because what you can do with macro and macro monomania is that you can essentially discard any explanation and any motivation that does not fit politically with the result that you wish to accomplish. And that's the biggest philosophical objection against them, at least from the point of view of an analysis of Okofobia. Yeah, yeah. Well, since we brought up Voltaire and Now Hegel, I think in one of your videos you talked also about how this happened with the Greeks was essentially like as the philosopher, and I can't remember if it was Socrates or Plato or Aristotle, but the people who came after started down this road. Do you know what I mean by that? I'm sorry. Yeah, go ahead. No, I'm sorry. I can't do that. Yeah, no, of course. Pleasure. Yeah, So Socrates was involved in a little bit like Nietzsche, for example, and criticized Socrates a lot for being subversive of tradition.

Some of his critique is fair, although I think Nietzsche goes a little too far in his attack on Socrates in certain areas. It's really mainly the generation of Socrates' students, the generation after him that where we can say, because you asked before about where do you draw the line. This is one example of where I would draw the line. I would say that Socrates offers a lot of self critique. And some of the critique I don't agree with myself, I think he's wrong about certain things, but I would not call him an orcrophobe. The actual orcrophobe I would place in the generation after Socrates. So basically Aristotle's generation, except Aristotle himself is certainly not an orcrophobe, not at all. No, not at all. Yeah, he's much more conservative. But you have certain names you could mention, Diogeny's The cynic, for example, El Sadamas and Tifan Hippias of Elis. There are a bunch of names there. Basically, that's the generation after Socrates who do engage in what is clearly orcrophobic behavior, rejecting tradition and even imitating foreign ways and so on and so forth.

So yeah, that's around there. All right. So for, let's come back to the modern day, how does the phenomenon relate to or differ from our nori area out there? Question, I'm sorry. You discussed radical left groups and countercultural movements. Do you see continuity between the 1960s radicalism and present day or a cofobia? Yeah, definitely. I mean, they were orcrophobes in the radicals of the 1960s. I think no question about that. What about the narrative that they were, for example, against the Vietnam War? And that was like a big thing. There were protest songs and stuff like this. Yeah, so I think it's worth pointing out that one can make too much of this, but I think it's worth pointing out that many of them, not all, obviously, but many of them did not turn strongly against the Vietnam War until they started getting rid of college deferments. And so when it was time for them to go and fight,

oh, then all of a sudden the war is immoral. When other people are doing, when the lower classes and the peasants are doing it, oh, then it's not so bad. Again, that doesn't apply to all of them. Some of them were consistent, but there were plenty of people for whom that was true. Yeah. So that's one point I would make. But another one is that if they were very specifically against a particular war, that certainly is not necessarily a cofobic, but they would become swept up in many other things as well. If you're carrying a sign saying Vietnam is a bad idea, let's get out of Vietnam. Okay, that in and of itself is not a cofobic, but as we, as we all know, these protest movements took place in a larger nexus of wanting to, for example, institute African studies in colleges, which is a very specific act of repudiation of traditional scholarship for a lot of disciplines that are really complete garbage.

Sure. Yeah. And the, I mean, the black panthers, this is a whole nexus, basically, of repudiating Christianity as well of experimenting with drugs and Buddhism of thinking that traditional family structure is, is to be discarded as well in favor of free love and polyamory and so on. So yeah, I would agree that if you just took a particular protest against the particular war in isolation, that would not necessarily qualify as a cofobia, but we, but we know. And so you could find, I mean, I'm not saying that every single student protestor of the 60s was an aquifo because you could have some people, some individuals for whom this really was the case that they were really just protesting against the war, which they disagreed. But as a mass movement, it was so to a cofobic because again, it was part and parcel of so many other things as well. And even, even among many who protested against the war, the way in which they protested, I remember statements like, I mean, reading obviously that wasn't around, but I remember

reading about statements like, you know, if an American and a Vietnamese face each other in the jungle, I hope the American gets killed because you know, it's the Vietnamese guy's country. Okay, if you say that you're not just protesting against the war, you're clearly giving expression to your anti-American cofobia, wishing that your fellow American is going to be killed in the jungle. Right. So, yeah, so overall, it's still a cofobia. And there's to go back to the main part of your question, basically the continuity from that to today is of course that there's a greater emphasis on race today than there was then, I guess it said there was some emphasis on race in those days as well, obviously around the same time a little bit earlier and then into this time that we're talking about, of course, there was also the protests in the south against Jim Kroloz, which is, you know, I would say more justified. But so race was also on the minds of a lot of these people and the academic institution

of these departments that I mentioned, that's also race involved. But it was more a question of, it was more a question of America, these are the other countries. But we still find that today because cofobes still want America to lose on the world stage. We're not involved in a big war right now, like obviously like in Vietnam, although our conflict with Iran, cofobes generally want the United States to be humiliated vis-à-vis Iran. That's the thing. And certain segments of the right as well, this is actually also something that I talk about in the book about how there is a reactionary or cofobia, which is also historically a test that, or I attested historically in the book about how this is also something that I agree with. I mean, is there some like the kind of accelerationists on the right? Yeah. Not so well, not exactly, but rather the kind of person, although I mean they can maybe overlap. But basically the people on the right who want, I mean, yeah, you could, I guess you could say accelerationists, although that's not the aspect I would emphasize.

But I guess it's the same people actually. I think they like they want things to get worse because they think there's going to be, yeah, it will jar people into action or something. But it will just do more harm, right? It's like a disdainful for collateral damage of that kind of action. Right. Well, I'm thinking sort of, I don't know if he would be an accelerationist. But yeah, people like Tucker Carlson, for example, obviously being a prime example of how people they see what has happened with their own society and they start to hate what has happened to their own society. And a lot of that critique is justified. But because of what they perceive their society has become, they then start to hate their own society from that direction. And that's something that one sees in history as well, a nookofobia, a conservative backlash that becomes so angry at decadence that it actually starts to also root for one's own defeat. And like Plato, for example, is an example of how he played, oh, didn't want, Plato thought

was bad that the Greeks won the Battle of Salamis because that made the lower classes more uppity because the lower classes helped in the Greek victory. And so this kind of conservative reaction where one actually wants one's own country to lose. So one sees that on certain segments of the right as well. But it's still primarily a left wing phenomenon kind of means regular oquefobia, which is that one wants one's own country to be humiliated. And that's certainly something that oquefobia right now has in common with oquefobia in the 60s. Right. Oh, by the way, guys, I am speaking. I'm just like sort of addressing the people that are joining Dr. Benedict Beckold. He has written a book called Western Self Contempt Oquefobia in the Decline of Civilizations. And is that absolutely fascinating to see that this is being discussed? And I guess you're doing the rounds. Are you getting a lot of eyes on your book and people interviewing you and talking about

this stuff? I have done lots and lots of interviews, yes, certainly. I mean, this is an academic press book, but from Cornell University Press. And so it's for an academic press book, it's certainly getting a lot of attention. Most academic books are read by about five people and then they wither away. So that's certainly not in the case with this book. I'm happy to say. So I've gotten a lot of attention. Not as much as attention, though, perhaps from in the commercial world, as I think it merits. Obviously, I'm a little bit biased here. But basically, it is a phenomenon that you see everybody talk about. Even if they might not be using the term Oquefobia, but this idea of cultural self-faith and Westerners and Americans thinking hating their own country or their own civilization, that's something that everybody's familiar with. And so I know that it is a subject that if more people were aware of it, they would certainly be interested in understanding how it happens, what it comes about, and how it works and so on.

So I keep pushing and putting the word out there. But yeah, I give interviews very regularly. So does Oquefobia affect different Western countries in similar ways or are there meaningful national differences? There are meaningful national differences in the sense that some countries are more advanced and more co-wrong-quote advanced in this process than others. But the results, certainly in the modern world, the results tends to be the same. But some countries have just become more extreme than others in this regard. And you can kind of see the future of the less Oquefobia countries. You can see their future in the more Oquefobia countries. And so that's interesting. It's good to point that out because I'm in the United States. You're in New York. I'm sorry. It's not the United States. Yeah, there's America and there's America.

But I think, and maybe I'm wrong, but I think the United States is a little bit behind other Western countries like UK, Europe, and Canada. Is that fair to say? Yeah, absolutely. There was actually an article in the... Was it the economist or the Atlantic or something? I can't remember where about how Americans are more oquefobic than Europeans. And I published a response to that saying that that's wrong. The reason the journalist thought that was because more Europeans said that they like their country than Americans in some particular survey. And the reason that's wrong is because Europe... Oquefobia has already changed Europe to such a degree that they don't even know when they say they like their country. What they're talking about is they like the new version of their country, the oquefobic version of their country. When an American says he loves America, he talks about things like our history and George

Washington and World War II and things like that. Things that make us proud and patriotic. Whereas when a European, a German, for example, says that he loves Germany, he means like their food and their soccer team and things like that. German history or traditional ancient German history. I don't think Germans are allowed to like this. Yeah, exactly. They're in the mirror of acknowledging it. That's true. Yeah, they're all allowed to like the world. They're all allowed to like the world. But even, but the same is true, even in France or Scandinavia, other European countries as well, where they, where liking their country just means liking these fairly superficial expressions of their culture and not their more permeable traditions. And so the point about Europe, Western and Northern Europe, it's somewhat less case in Southern Europe and much less the case in Eastern Europe, but certainly Western and Northern Europe. They have become so ocofobic that they don't even realize how much they have lost. And so, and they don't realize the extent to which they're already on the brink as

we see. Whereas here, as you see in the United States, this we are less advanced. But as I mentioned, if we don't watch out, we see our own future in Europe. And so we have to watch out. Now you mentioned yourself, yeah, the United States is a large country and we have different pockets. My own city of New York, I'm obviously in a political minority here. I love New York City, but yes, we are starting to work a phobic than much of the country. No question about that. But the United States still buy in large. We're still, we're still doing, we have lots of problems in this regard, but we, we're still doing a lot better than, than Western and Northern Europe. Yeah, well, I'm with you there. I was from Chicago, but I left. But I grew up there, lived there my whole life. And yeah, it's a lot like New York in a lot of ways. What about Canada? Like right there. I think they're pretty, you know, one thing I know about Canada, and I don't want to spend too much time on this, but my wife's Canadian, and we have had conversations about this.

And I guess Canadian identity is actually, like Canadian identity itself is simply, we are not the United States. Like that's how they define themselves. So it's like, define themselves by what they are not. Now, does that count as a kind of oikofobia, or is that a stretching it or what? Well, in a way, I mean, I guess it was almost counts as a type of xenophobia if they hate their other neighbors so much. But that's, I think it's a little bit sort of the, the baby brother complex there. You know, you need to distinguish yourself from the, from the big brother and, um, from from the big boy and, and say that you're so different and you're your own thing. Um, and yeah, the Canadians, I think, have become very oikofobic. And of course, they're also victim to a vast demographic change, as is the case in West and Northern Europe. Of course, there's vast demographic change going on in the United States as well, but again, still less extremely so. There's also different kinds of demographic changes.

Having millions of Mexicans coming in through the border, obviously, I think we should have a very tightly controlled border, but it's still not the same as having millions of, um, Muslim Arabs coming in to your country. There are different degrees of, you know, different cultures are more or less removed from our own. Um, and so there are different types of demographic changes. Uh, but, uh, but in any case, yeah, I think that's a problem with Canada. They, they have suffered more than we have on that front. And it's a shame because the Canadians used to be, um, as one should point out, so also less one received too much Canadian hate mail, but, um, the Canadians used to be quite, um, quite patriotic, you know, they fought very bravely and were two and so on. There, there can be, uh, quite fierce, actually, if they want to. Uh, but I think that Canadians have been conditioned to, uh, be averse to any kind of national pride. And I think that's, that's that, I don't know if it's talked down or, you know, whatever, but that, that's just what I got from it.

Um, yeah. And I think it's an important thing to look at because, yeah, I mean, they're right there. So we're like watching them. I think it's good for every Western country to look at, uh, what direction they're going in by looking at people who are further down the line. So you know, where, where you're headed. Exactly. No. And I think, yeah, Canada is definitely also more progressed than we are, um, on that front, as well, certainly. Yeah. Uh, is there, is there a psychological or developmental dimension, like adolescents prolonged into adulthood, or status seeking through moral superiority, uh, to this? Yeah. All of the above, uh, Scrutin himself actually talks a little bit about. He has a particular phrase that, um, he used, I think in England and the need for nations where he says, I don't remember verbatim, the exact wording, but, um, to the, basically, to the extent that, um, it's, it's a common, the state of mind is common in adolescence, but it is a state of mind in which some adults become arrested effectively, uh, sort of perpetual adolescence, uh, something he talks a bit about.

Uh, and yeah, so there is, uh, there is that there is, uh, there is the vanity, the, um, the drive to distinguish oneself from one's fellow citizens and to show one's superior, um, one's superior, um, morality. Uh, vanity is really the main thing. Um, and it becomes, we all need the, one, since you mentioned psychological mechanism and so on, one thing is that we all need, um, something against which to measure ourselves. Okay, it's a human thing that we kind of compare ourselves to others in certain way. We, we need, um, we need thing external, um, objects or people, other things by which we gain our own identity and our own sense of self. Okay, that's just how we tend to operate. It's not the only thing that gives us an identity, of course, but that, that's, that's part of how we think. Uh, and so when, when, when everybody is worrying about the British invading or later on about the Russians, um, um, invading us or something like that, then the British or the Russians are the ones against whom we measure ourselves.

And so we consider ourselves as Americans superior to them. Uh, so that obviously is, uh, very anti-ocrophobic. But when all of these exterior threats have been eliminated and we basically don't have some, uh, large enemy looming on the horizon, we start then to measure ourselves against our fellow citizens. They are the ones who become the external, um, objects against which we gain our, or through which we gain our own identity. And so it becomes more important to signal your superiority to people at home. Uh, and that's not only a mechanism as well that, um, that contribution to conformity, which is why we're called forbias arises. One society has achieved the measure of, um, security. How do you respond to critics who say the concept pathologizes legitimate critique of Western history, slavery, colonialism, historical inequality, et cetera? Yeah. So the answer to that critique is that it doesn't seek to, um, uh, pathologize self-quitego. It goes back a little bit to your question, I suppose, about where you draw the line.

You can always say that self-quitek is good. And I point, um, in the book to several, um, uh, points of self-quitek that led to an advancement of some kind, uh, for that civilization. Uh, but, uh, if one looks at the particular, uh, expressions of that self-quitek, one notices that it itself, um, is a pathology because it, uh, obviously not in a psychiatric sense. That's important to point out, but it is a pathology, um, in the sense that it becomes, um, uh, it becomes almost holistic, yeah? Um, when one discusses the behavior of these people who, uh, whom I would describe as aquifobes, one sees that it's not some pinpoint, um, some pinpoint critique on a particular thing. Rather, it becomes a holistic rejection of the society as a whole because they say, again, there can be some individual exceptions. And those are people who, who indeed I would not call aquifobes. Uh, but most of them are people if, for example, you are somebody who, um,

who wants the United States to be humiliated against Iran. Um, you are probably also somebody who, uh, wants us to have, uh, open borders. You are somebody who thinks that Christianity is a system of oppression and patriarchy. You are somebody who thinks that, um, um, marriage is not a good thing for society, uh, and that the family structure should be torn down. You are somebody who thinks that the economy should be destroyed in favor of, um, uh, in favor of the environment and endangered species. So once that's the case, once you see this kind of holistic approach, then that is a pathology, uh, because you are showing that all of your answers to various social and civilizational questions, all point toward the destruction and the tearing down of your own society and of your own traditions. If you had a particular point of critique that was isolated and you thought and your opinion on other issues led in all different kinds of directions, then one could say that indeed you're an intellectually honest person and we

could agree or disagree on that particular issue. Um, but, um, but that, that is the pathology that, um, that it, uh, one point of critique leads to other points of critique and what do they all have in common? They all have in common the tearing down of one's own traditions. Um, so that is theophobia. So it's like taking, you know, every civilization, every society has its skeletons, um, in the closet and it's about taking one of those anything and then intensifying it and magnifying it and using it to essentially diagnose the entire civilization as sick beyond repair and deserving of, you know, whatever. Like they're, they're cure, whatever that is, whether that's, you know, that's tearing everything down, that kind of thing. Mm-hmm. Yeah, that's well put exactly. Yeah. Thank you. Uh, all right. So first of all, is there a relationship between oikophobia and xenophilia, which is like the love for the foreign?

Would you, are those, are those things typically go hand in hand or can one exist on its own? The one can exist on its, on its own though, it's fairly rare, but they do typically go hand in hand and, and, um, we see this in ancient Greece as well. Um, the, um, so the, um, they, you do find individual exceptions. For example, it's, it's possible to, um, to love your own country, your own culture, but maybe you're very interested in ancient Chinese culture. For example, and you, you study Confucius and you, uh, you enjoy, um, Chinese dress and food and what have you. Um, and so your xenophile, uh, these have either Chinese, uh, while still remaining a patriot at heart. Uh, those cases are quite rare. Um, but, but there are such people. Uh, so that would be one, so they, they, they can exist independently. And it's possible also to hate your own, uh, culture and be an orca phobia. Uh, also, for example, they're, they're, uh, western women that convert to Islam. And, uh, it's, it's almost like they, they use xenophilia to fill in the

gap or the whole that oikophobia has left. That's exactly right. I was going to use a word which goes exactly in this direction, namely, uh, compensation, um, or a compensatory act. And so most of the cases I wanted to point out some exceptions, but yes, most of the cases are exactly that. Once you have, and this also goes back to, uh, what we talked about earlier in reference to Gadsad, when I said that even in those cases where you can find some genuine, uh, instances of empathy, they are nettles in a foundation of repudiation. Uh, and so when you have a western woman, for example, converting to Islam, was starting to wear a hijab and so on, um, she does this because she has already repudiated and rejected Christianity and a large part of her own traditions. And so these xenophilia becomes a compensatory act. There's a call it in the past. Basically the idea that, okay, you're no longer a nationalist for yourself. So you have to become a nationalist for somebody else. Uh, you replace one, uh, love with another love and you replace one hatred with

another hatred. Um, and, and so yeah, uh, in the overwhelming majority of cases, um, Okaphobias and Affiliate, at least some degree of xenophilia, uh, the particular civilization toward which xenophilia is directed, usually varies depending on who is the current enemy of one's own home civilization. Uh, so for example, Okaphobic xenoph, um, xenophilia X, um, during the Cold War, might have, uh, like Russia, for example. Um, and nowadays, uh, Okaphobic xenophilia X will tend to prefer Islamic culture or, or some, some things, something we'd listen. Um, so yeah, that, that is certainly a pattern. All right. Um, we've gone for about an hour, but I'd like to keep going if you're open to it because I have more questions. Yeah, really like this conversation. Um, really enjoying it. So guys, if you're watching, uh, again, uh, this is, um, my, my guess, I'm sorry. Is a Benedict Beckled and send your super chats or super chow us feed the vatua.com for slash just a tip for a super chow, ask him a question if you

wish. Um, I, I look forward to seeing your guys' thoughts on, on this discussion. So I want to ask this is something that I've actually wrestled a lot with, um, with one of my co-hosts, a man I work with who, who sort of brought the term up with me. He said, you know, he mentioned it like a phobia and it, it, it got me curious about it. Uh, shout out to Mike Stevenson, Dr. Anorakam, but, um, I want to know what is the goal? Is there a goal or a reason for oikophobia? So we, he said that oikophobia is an end, an, in and of itself. And I don't see how that could be because someone must benefit. Like there must be, and I'm not saying that it was like, there was a man behind the curtain that pushed it out there, but I do think that there must have been a goal. Is, is there a end goal of oikophobia? Does that make sense? Yeah, I would say yes and no, I'm not trying to, not trying to be diplomatic

here, but I would say that maybe you're both right, um, based on, uh, how you, um, based on your presentation of it. Um, it's a goal in and of itself. I think he's right in the sense that, um, since vanity, um, and this kind of virtue signaling that we talked about as a part of it, oikophobia is a goal in and of itself in that it gives, uh, the oikofob that sense of power and that sense of self elevation that he's looking for. Um, so in that sense, just being an oikofob and just living that out is its own reward, uh, because you do get to feel like you're better than everybody else. Uh, so, so in that sense, it, it is its own goal. Um, but it's also true that yes, I mean, uh, on the, um, on the more longer view of the matter, uh, oikofobes do, I mean, once they were to, um, once they achieved their goal, they would recognize many of them that actually was not worth striving for, but the goal is the destruction of, um, one's own tradition of one's own, um, geopolitical power and so on. That is, it also creates a vacuum for other people who are not oikofobic to

essentially seize that power. Uh, well, uh, when I mean ones, it's a destruction of their, of their own country, I'm saying as a whole. Um, so, but yeah, well, probably in there, I mean, in their imagination, they would be the ones to, to, to, to, to, example, like, like, like, for example, let's talk about the United, the United Kingdom, um, I think that they're very, very, very far down this road, uh, where they have let in countless foreigners from countries that are, they have cultures that are incompatible with Western culture and things are changing there very rapidly. Um, and so it's oikofobia that keeps that machine going, but after a while, the, the new people who have come in are not going to adopt the, the same ideals towards their own culture, they're just going to absorb that one. And now it, then it's going to become this now that made later, that may become oikofobia over time. I don't know, but I think that it will have the effect of, uh, destroying

what's there and replacing it with, you know, in this example and Islamic regime. Oh, yes. Oh no, definitely. I agree. I misunderstood you a little bit, uh, basically, um, yeah. So in, in there, of course, because they're these oikofobos who are trying to invite Islamic immigration, they're very naive, of course, and they don't, they don't understand Islam at all. I've written less people think that I'm, don't know, I've written extensively and lectured about the incompatibility of philosophical speaking between Islam and the, and the West as well. Um, so that's a whole other, uh, can of worms, but basically the people who, uh, invite Islamic immigration, um, they don't know, they don't understand Islam, they don't know what it's about. Um, and so of course, in their minds, uh, if we think what is the goal from their point of view, of course, from their point of view, it is that, um, that, uh, the UK in this case is going to turn into, um, you know, a socialist. Caliphate. Uh, so yeah, well, a socialist, um, uh, egalitarian paradise, essentially, and that, you know, Muslims and everybody else will kind of just get along and live happily next to each other and, uh, and so on.

That, that's sort of, that's their goal. So I think to go back to, to, for your original question, I think it's true that there is an external exogenous goal that they have, but also that Okofobia is its own reward. Um, but yeah, but when it comes to what will actually happen, of course, yes, you're, you're quite right. Um, what will actually happen is that the countries will turn, um, Islamic and there will be a point, uh, basically of no return. There will be a point at which either the country turns Islamic, uh, or, uh, the, uh, native population, um, grows violence. And obviously nobody wants violence. I'm not advocating for violence, just as a descriptive matter about what will happen if such a thing is to be solved. Yeah, there will lead to some people having thrown around the word, the term civil war, whether that's apt or not, because civil war kind of suggests two rival armies, you know, fighting against each other, you know, they don't have guns in the UK, um, unfortunately for them. Yeah, who made me do? But, but so I don't know if civil war is the term necessarily, but, uh,

civil unrest, um, civil infighting, uh, certainly, yes, that, that, that will happen, uh, if the country is not to become entirely Islamic. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Um, I want to, let's uh, shift gears to something else. Um, I'm wondering if there is, is possibly a relationship here. I'm not sure this is a little bit of a stretch, maybe. So I'm, I'm sure you've heard because it's been going all around all over the internet, uh, about the case of Lindsey Clancy. Mm hmm. Are you familiar with this? Yeah. Is it a woman who murdered her children? Yes. The woman who murdered her three children, um, claimed that it and attempted suicide or at least appeared to attempt suicide and then claimed that, um, you know, there were voices telling her to do it. The SSRI did it, whatever it is, the medication. So he's trying to get off for, uh, insanity. She's pleading not guilty. But that, that the case is not what I'm interested in at all. It's, it's not about that. That's going to play out the way it plays out. My interest in it is the reaction to the case, specifically from women online.

And, uh, what I've noticed a lot lately and I'm, and I'm not going to blame social media for this. I think a lot of people do and I don't think that that, I think that's a lazy way to look at it. But I've noticed that there has been one crisis after another, one event after another that, uh, where women, specifically in large numbers, go out and support, um, or, or express empathy and support for people like Lindsey Clancy. So let's looking at just this one in isolation. Do you think that there is, um, I don't know, like, do you think that there's an oikofobic angle to this because there is blaming of men, blaming of patriarchy, blaming of big pharma, blaming of these other things, but not of the woman who killed her children. Um, I don't know what you thought. Yeah, I'm not, um, I, I heard of the case, but I'm not, I haven't seen, and I'm not sufficiently familiar with what the protesters have actually been saying to probably have a

definitive opinion on that. I mean, it's different things, but there's a lot of blame going everywhere except for the woman who's. So if it is the case, and I suppose, yeah, um, if it is the case that they are sort of, um, that they're, that one reason why they're supporting this woman is because they think that motherhood is too much of a burden or, um, and that they, they reject having to be at home, raising children and so on. If that's the angle that a lot of these protesters have, then yes, that certainly is a part of that. I don't know if I would. Well, they blame patriarchy. They do. Okay. And yes, so let's let's not painting what a broad brush, but because I know there's lots of different takes, but the things I see most common is the blaming of patriarchy and the capitalist system. Oh, really? And yeah, and these, these, because the capitalist system is what enabled Big Pharma to give her medication. Oh, I see. Again, we don't know that medication did this, but it's just people speculating.

And I think the speculation, the launching point for the speculation is an already existing, um, and tipathy towards the West, basically, like the always patriarchy. It's these other things. Yeah. No, it's the family unit itself, right? Like it's the problem is that there is a family unit. Yeah, no, so in that case, definitely, I would agree that that's, um, yeah, based on your presentation now of some of the things they say, yes, that, that is, uh, or at least it has an ocofobic element to it, yes. Yeah. What about the reaction, and I don't know if you've seen this too, but the reaction to the assassination of Charlie Kirk? Yeah. Yeah, that's something I'm a bit more familiar with. And yeah, the, um, I mean, the celebration of his death and so on. And I mean, yes, absolutely revolting, obviously, one doesn't have to, uh, I mean, some members of his own family saw him get shot, I think. I mean, just to celebrate that is obviously repulsive.

Uh, but it was a majority of women that did that. Was it a majority of women as well? Absolutely. I'll come to the end of that. Well, it could be because women are more likely to post on social media, but I, the overwhelming support for Lindsey Clancy came from women. They gave, they funded her about a million dollars, uh, for her, for her case, because they're certain that she's innocent because she did nothing wrong. And that's wild. And the celebration of Charlie Kirk was a lot of women too, because I think, okay, trying to be charitable, just because I don't want to, uh, get anyone thinking that I'm just here to bash women or anything. But I think that what is happening is that they think that to be a good person means to essentially support, uh, those who don't have a voice, those who, if the marginalized, it's like a motherly instinct that they're responding to. Um, the problem is it's, it's extremely misplaced. And there's a lot of, um, uh, it's like a, I don't know, like a,

a ghoulish, uh, happiness about people that they think are bad and dangerous being killed. Like Charlie Kirk, they think that he's a bad man that hurts people's feelings and that something should be done. So when that happened, I think that's what, but they were obviously celebrating that, but they were also doing it to signal to other people to say, hey, look at me, I'm, I'm saying the thing that everyone's supposed to say, because I'm, I'm going to get support. I'm going to get, you know, people are going to like my comments. They're going to, they're going to comment on it positively. They're going to support me. And so there is, if uikofobia is the idea that you, you're doing this, the motive for this is to feel good about yourself, to make yourself feel like a good person, then this is just another way of, of doing that, right? Yeah. No, I think, uh, I think that's right. And it's interesting, yeah, um, that, um, the statistic about women being more, um, posting more about the death of Charlie Kirk than others. Yeah, so, um, yeah, which, um, which I wasn't aware of. Yeah, and it's, there's the old, you know, saying that, you know, if women didn't have the vote,

we'd never again have a Democrat president with, um, we just have Republicans. So there is, there is, uh, truth to that, obviously, um, uh, or if we had a Democrat president, they would be a lot more moderate. Uh, but the, um, so yeah, I mean, there is that nurturing aspect, um, as you say, and as we've discussed, yes, that, that is certainly more feminine. But it's interesting to note how, how that nurturing aspect, um, can also lead to certain ferociousness, um, that, uh, that can also be quite feminine in the sense that, well, you, you fight to the death for your own offspring, you fight to the death for that thing, for which you are being empathetic or for which, uh, you are, um, um, that thing which you are nourishing. And so that can lead to a certain ferocity. I mean, there's been, there's plenty of psychological literature, as I'm sure you're aware of about how, um, women are more prone to mass eye causes, uh, then men. And then of course, feminists will say, well, most of those studies are written by men, weren't they? Uh, but, you know, but one can, yeah, but one one can, one can,

of course, uh, if one wants to attack the methodology of studies one can do so, but simply saying that they were offered by men is, is not an argument. Um, yeah. So, um, so I think that, I think there's a lot of truth to that, um, I'm, I'm one of those people who, um, um, I wish more public facing intellectuals would, uh, openly acknowledge when they don't know something for sure. Um, because one here's a lot of public intellectuals talk about things of which they have manifestly have no clue in its embarrassing. So in this particular case, um, I'm inclined to say that I don't want to make two categorical statements here because I'm not so familiar exactly with how, um, those things play themselves out, um, in the case of Charlie Kirkton and certainly not in this more recent case. Uh, but it sounds to me like what you're saying. I mean, what you're saying sounds, uh, quite accurate to me. Yeah, I mean, I'm looking at it in terms of, um, while I guess I'm looking at the contrast because you had said, and one of the other things that stood out to me too was, um, the, I guess it's like, uh, the,

well, how do I put it? It's like the suppression of masculinity as part of how this happened. So, of the, the, the, so in that, you know, there is the gap and I think it's being filled by, uh, a feminine way of approaching these things. And I think that's where this, this kind of oikofobia can, can grow. It can be nurtured. Uh, and I think that a lot of these women, probably most of them that were doing this were single young childless. So, um, I think that's also a big part of it as well because that the instinct, which could be useful for raising kids is not being used that way because they're not having children. And the reason why they're not having children is because they're convinced that, you know, maybe they're convinced that having children is bad for the planet, uh, because, you know, they consume resources and they've been told this over and over by people in the media and so on or they believe that, um, you know, uh, children, having children is a form of oppression because it means that you'll have to raise them, which means you can't be a girl boss somewhere and, you know, go and earn a living. You don't need a man to be

happy and all these kinds of things. Yes. No, absolutely no. That part, I think, 100% and now here I can express myself a bit more categorically. Yeah. Um, I think that's, yeah, no, I think that's exactly right. And, um, and it is, um, there's also this kind of androgenous, uh, blurring of, uh, of a distinction between this axis that we touched upon before. Um, you have, men have been emasculated, um, which means that, um, part of that, um, vacuum has been built by more masculine women, uh, to a degree. Uh, and, um, and this idea that, um, the complete rejection of the notion that we find happiness in each other, men and women, I mean, uh, and that we need each other and complement each other. Um, and which is, which is the truth, um, and, um, and the rejection of that does lead to misery on both sides. It leads to, um, uh, at least to a feminine man and to masculine women, uh, yeah. Um, I mean, kind of masculine women, not really. Yeah. Right. That's just, it just

means weaker overall, in my opinion, like, I agree, agreed. But yeah, in terms of surface, yeah, in terms of surface expression exactly. Right. But of course, the, the aim is to sort of like, make the, the categories indistinguishable, like they don't matter. And it just ends up hurting both men and women really. Of course, because a lot of these, uh, yeah, absolutely, because I'm a lot of these so-called girl bosses and so on, they themselves, I mean, deep down, of course, they're not happy with the exterior expression, um, of, uh, of their views. And many of them do come, as they get into their 40s and then 50s and, and discover that their child does, they, yeah, they might not explicitly formulate it, but, uh, but they, uh, they discover the, the paucity, um, of their earlier, um, of their earlier manner. Yeah. Um, you've spoken about the need for a balanced love of home, like, aphilia. What concrete practices or attitudes would that look like in a modern pluralistic society? So, orcafolia is, um, this is actually, yeah, also something that

Roger Scruton, who we mentioned, has written about, um, but yeah, orcafolia basically, um, in order to, um, they're basically two levels of orcafolia. Um, um, at the first level is the, the higher level patriotism and, um, um, um, and pride in, in, um, in one's country and so on. And the desire to see one's country be successful, uh, on the global stage. But that's the, um, that's the easier level, if you will. Um, it's, um, even though I wish we had more patriots, it is still relatively easy to be a patriot. It's a good thing to be a patriot, but it's not difficult. Uh, the more, um, the, the, the, the harder level, because it requires actual day-to-day work, is the more local level, the, the, the, um, the lower level, if you will, of orcafolia, which is the cultivation of, um, of family and local bonds in one's local community. And that's, uh, that's a day, you know, everybody can wave the flag on July 4th and so on. And it's good that we do that, but the, uh, the kind of day-to-day orcafolia, part of which is, of course, to build a family, um,

to, um, make sure that one's children receive, um, uh, traditional rearing and education, that they learn to appreciate, uh, their own traditions. I, which, again, the, does not exclude of, is a learning, uh, about other traditions as well, um, and, and learning about, uh, different cultures, but that they prioritize their own, uh, home, their own tradition. Um, the, uh, establishment of friendly bonds with one's fellow citizen, with one's neighbor, uh, the building of community around church or synagogue or what have you. Um, those are, that's the kind of day-to-day orcafolia, uh, that is ultimately even more important because that, of course, is the, um, that is the level that undergirds the, the larger, uh, the higher, um, level of, of, uh, nationalism, patriotism and so on. How would that, how would that, uh, I mean, I, I don't, I don't disagree with you, but how would that actually be a good bulwark against oikofobia? How does that work? How does

that play out? Um, well, so, uh, oikofilia isn't always a bulwark against oikofo, it depends. I mean, if you're, um, if you're, um, I'm talking more about people who are now already prone to, to, to do this kind of thing, what they have to do to perpetuate their oikofilia. Um, if anything, yeah, it's certainly true that the better we have it, the more, um, a certain class of society will turn against its own society. So, and that's part of the internal contradiction of oikofobia that success leads to self-hate, uh, success economically, uh, wealth, um, security vis-à-vis external threats and so on, success on all those fronts contributes to oikofobia. So, yeah, and that's, and that's part of the tragedy of history. I mean, the, in the book, um, that I wrote, it is also a lot about, uh, it kind of a tragic view of history because it's not the case that we can say, okay, well, we need to achieve this and this and this and then once we've achieved that, then we have, you know, that we have the good state, then we have, yeah, then everything is fine because it's a constantly dynamic situation and, and a success on one front, progress on one front leads to regress

on another front. Uh, so it's not that it defeats oikofobia in and of itself, but this is what we need to perpetuate oikofilia. One thing though I will say is that even people who are not naturally conservative or people who might tend somewhat toward oikofobia, uh, once they have children and this is why, uh, one of the reasons why having a family and one's, one's own family is so important, is that once you have children, they're often develops a desire to pass something down to the children and you see this a lot, people who may not have been religious, for example, maybe they were raised in a religious home and then they rejected religion as teenagers, they don't necessarily become full religious, but some, they'll often embrace certain ritual, for example, because they like they'll go to church, even if they're not religious, exactly because, exactly that kind of thing. So, um, so, so that's something that, uh, not just on the religious front, another area is as well, uh, once you have children, you want their children to learn about your parents, about their grandparents, about the great grandparents, you want them to, because you come to realize as a

parent that your children are basically your only path toward immortality. It sounds a little selfish to put it that way, but it is true. Exactly, it is true. Yeah, legacy and ancestry, like are something that we just do not value, right? In the journey. Yeah, exactly, and, and it becomes an extension of yourself, that's how your name lives on. I mean, of course, there's some people who, you know, create things that, you know, books or inventions or whatever that live on. Sure. Afterwards, but, uh, the main reason, the main way for us to achieve immortality is through our children and grandchildren and so on. Uh, and so once that is the case, then even people who are not conservative and who might be more progressive, at least they become slightly less ocofobic because they do start to see the aesthetic value if nothing else of tradition. So that's, uh, that's one aspect of ocofilia that can combat ocofobia, but, um, yeah, but certainly not all of it does. Yeah, like having skin in the game is kind of what you're getting at. Like if you're, if you remain single and childless, then you have no reason to invest

in the future after you're gone. So you're just there to live and, you know, get what you can out of life while you're there and then you're gone. And if you, if you are, uh, pushing your society towards that, um, it doesn't affect you as much because you're going to be gone. But if you have children, it's going to change like everything I assume, if you love them, uh, you're going to start thinking about that. And I think that that is a really good point. Um, yeah. And I can point, of course, at several, obviously, there are exceptions on both sides, but I can point that at several of the pobic politicians who are childless. Yeah. Yeah. There you go. Uh, maybe we shouldn't be voting for childless people. I don't know. Um, at least like people who are more than simply surface level patriotic. Uh, so yes, I agree with that. Um, I also think it's interesting that you brought up now, uh, uh, going to church. Now this isn't a, uh, we're not apologists here, but I am a Christian. And I have noticed that when I go, uh, it's almost like extended family, because like after the service is done, then there is a fellowship and everyone brings food and we

all sit and eat together. And, you know, we check up on each other and we look out for each other. And it does, it's like a participatory event, right? And, um, I, I would, I'll call it communion, but I don't mean it in the sense of, you know, religious community. And I mean, in the sense of community building as a way to stem that. So I don't know. I don't know if you're religious or, or what? Uh, I'm not. I was raised, I was raised religious Jewish actually. Um, I even had a black cat and everything until I was about 15 or so. And then I actually went off the path. Um, but I still, even though I was a non religious person, I very much value religion. So a lot of people, when they abandon religion, they become anti-religious. I'm the exact opposite. I'm actually, I'm actually very pro religious, even though personally, I don't, uh, personally, I don't believe. But, um, but the, um, the, and this, this is one of the things I love about the left, they will tear down religion and attack the church and then complain that, uh, we don't have any sense of

community in that world. So uprooted, and there's no proper culture here and that other, like Islamic culture is a proper culture. Well, yeah, it's a proper culture. I mean, it's a, it's a bad culture in my opinion and philosophical reasons for this. But at least it's it has cohesiveness by dent of its religion. And the left has to store the cohesiveness that is precisely provided by religion. Because as you said, there is no, uh, force for communal cohesion as strong as religion. I mean, there's no exception to this, uh, in all societies, religion is bar none the strongest element of communal cohesion. So once you tear down religion, uh, then yeah, then you tear down the most fundamental, um, um, unit, the most fundamental force for cohesion in your society. And this is something that is also, again, it's universal. Uh, this is why the first steps toward aquaphobia across societies is the questioning of one's own religious traditions. That always, that always comes early on and then, and then eventually over time that does lead to,

to, uh, to aquaphobia. I guess you said we're not apologists necessarily. I'm not religious myself, but it's simple as a descriptive historical matter. This is what happens. Evidence is absolutely clear. Uh, so, uh, yeah. So, so, and this is why it's so important to emphasize the role of religion. We mentioned the church, uh, again, as you said, even, and I tell people who said, oh, well, but I don't believe in Jesus or whatever. I said, that's fine. Um, but go to church anyway, because there's a real community there. And you could still learn more lessons. You can appreciate that there are people there who care for each other. And you can, uh, you know, there's so many aesthetic experiences of it as well. I, when I was living in Germany, I got my PhD in Germany. I'm a secular Jew, but I would sometimes go to Latin mass on Sundays, uh, simply because I loved listening to the Latin hymns. Yeah. Just the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the beautiful two. Yeah. No, some really beautiful structures for sure. Um, and so, um, yeah, one reason I, and I prefer Catholicism to, uh, say, well, it's, it's, it's a nice to go into a Luther

and the house, uh, place of worship, sorry, Catholic, um, place of worship, then a Lutheran place of worship, by and large, there are exceptions. But anyway, that's a whole other, that's a different story. Uh, but anyway, to appreciate the aesthetic aspect of it and the communal aspect of it is very important, whether you are a very, um, um, loyal religious believer or not. Yeah. Yeah. I know, um, I know that you're working on another book right now. I think it has a lot to do with aesthetics, right? Yes. Yes. And what is, uh, what is this new book about? Um, well, so, wrote it, but it's not, it's not published yet. Not published yet. Exactly. So I call it the working title is, um, um, uh, is art. Uh, what is it? Uh, art and energy. There we go. Uh, art and anarchy, um, sociopolitical reflections on aesthetics. Um, well, hopefully I'll be able to keep that title. We'll see. Um, but basically it's about, um, it's, it's a bit of use, uh, but, uh, it's essentially about how it's about the relationship between art and society, what one says about the other and also about our understanding of art, uh, basically, what it is, how we are to understand it

and how it, it also goes into, it's kind of also a philosophy about philosophy. So it's maybe a little more cerebral, but it's, um, basically how we have, how we think about these particular concepts and I suggest a particular way of thinking about them so as to open up the field for more creativity and for better scholarship for more empiricism and so on, um, is basically what the book is about. It's fascinating. These, because I do think there's a relationship there. You know, we, we're just, okay, so I, I just want to tell you what was going through my head as we were talking about, um, church and communion to essentially build stronger communities so that they can, you know, you, you basically feel as though you have more love for the people closest to you and that will hopefully, you know, stem the sort of like, what I think Oikofobia is ultimately just nihilism. I mean, it's where it, that's where it goes if anything. I think that, um, but maybe I'm wrong, but like when, when we stopped going to church as much and, you know, Marx wrote about religion

being the opiate of the masses, obviously, but when we stopped going to church as much as the society in America, we came more secular, although I think the United States is far more religious than other Western countries, but it's still more secular than it has been in the past. We look to different cultural ways to stay connected. So, you know, we watched movies together. We listened to the music together. We went to, uh, we watched television shows and then you go to work on Monday and everybody would stand around the water cooler and talk about, you know, what they saw or whatever. And it was, we were still connecting, but now that's gone too. So there is, there isn't much keeping people together and becoming more and more atomized. Um, so I thought that that was really interesting that, I don't know if that, so the relationship between this book and your book on, uh, your art stuff and also, I think, and I mean, I don't want to go too far. Maybe I'll have you back on to talk about your book when it's out, um, but like how through, because I studied art history and I watched how, uh, existentialism and

dataism and this nihilistic stuff came in and it basically stripped the beauty away and made everything political. Um, and that was like in the, you know, late 19th century, maybe before that. Yeah. And I think that was part of the demoralization process. Yeah, absolutely. And this is also a process that I talk about in one of the chapters in that book. And it even starts a little bit earlier. Um, already, uh, Hagle talks about famously in his lectures on the, um, on aesthetics. He talks about how art has become intellectualized. And, and it's not a coincidence, right? You're familiar with these things. It's not a coincidence that, um, people say, oh, he's so prescient. He saw what was going to happen later. I mean, he is, obviously, uh, he's a, uh, Highland, was a Highland intelligent man, but he's actually describing what's already going on before his time because really going back to the Enlightenment. Again, it's not a coincidence that this intellectualization of art and therefore the downgrading of beauty, of, of, of sensory beauty, these are the, um, uh, intellectual thought that that becomes

greater at a time when the Enlightenment has completed its ridicule of religion. Um, because the striving toward, um, I mean, it's going to also be an intellectual process, but the striving toward the divine is often an expression, often expresses itself aesthetically in the, in the, in the simple sense of a striving toward beauty because while wants to glorify his name, glorify his creation, God's creation. And once, uh, God has been ridiculed and killed, so to speak, uh, then what is left, well, what is left is, uh, the purely intellectual process and the, uh, fact that the artist, uh, takes over the role that used to be filled by, either by God himself or at least by the priest, uh, once the priest and, and God have been discarded, the artist becomes the new holy man, uh, which means that he becomes his own justification. And so he's no longer, yeah, so he's no longer, um, he no longer has an obligation to act morally or to, uh, or,

or to, or to beautify because, um, whatever he does by dint of being the artist is in and of itself considered good. And that's part of, obviously, this process becomes more extreme, uh, later in the 19th and then into the 20th century, but the, the seeds, if you will, of this process starts already in the 1700s and then with Hagel's observations in the early 19th century. Uh, so that, that's, that's part of it. We tend to think today, when we think of sort of the, the stereotypical, or the archetypal artist is this kind of brilliant, um, um, brilliant individual who, however, morally is, you know, not a very good person, you know, he sleeps around and he doesn't, you know, takes drugs and, uh, and so on, right, lives in a dirty attic and creates these amazing things, right? That's a very modern, uh, view of the artist, but that view of the artist really comes from this particular period from France and the Bella Peuque, which was infused with these kinds of ideas. If you look at Renaissance artists, well, before the Enlightenment, they were all expected to be

exemplars of virtue. And, and most of them were, I mean, you can find exceptions, of course, but most of them were. And it's, and it's certainly a view of the artist that would have been alien to, you know, Greek dramatists, poets, and so on. So this is, uh, recapturing, I think, different ideas of what it means to be an artist or just even just a creative person in general, even as a scholar. And I talk about how this relates to, as well, and to philosophies, obviously very close to my art. That's a big part of the book. Um, understanding that is, is, uh, is something that would actually open up to feel for more creativity, for more new things to be created. Once we kind of stop being, um, captured by this very historically limited view of what creativity and of what art is or should be. Mm, mm, that's a good point. Yeah. I, I, I noticed when I was in art school, because I am an artist, which is why I studied art history. There was, um, there were a lot of people that had no talent. Yeah. They had the correct political ideas.

And so they can put together. That's why we have so much profane art that's being hung up in museums because it has nothing to do with the beautiful and the transcendent and the divine. But it has everything to do with like, what are you saying in the moment? And most of it is very much caught. It's like in a time capsule, like it's saying something about a specific incident at a specific time. And it, so it's, it's not eternal. It's very, you know, temporally stuck. Does that make sense? Yeah. Yeah. No, absolutely. Yeah. It, it is, and which is why most of art that is celebrated today will be forgotten tomorrow. I mean, obviously, that's true of a lot of art from the past as well. That was created and that we don't remember anymore. But, uh, but it's, but it's even more. And you meant a good point. A lot of people, uh, laboring an art with absolutely no talent. Yeah. Because there's nothing exogenous against which to measure themselves. Certain people would have been kicked out of art school because the teachers are okay. You don't know how to draw. You don't like your worthless. Whereas today, of course, because the artist has become his own justification,

that leads to much higher proportion of laboring artists, having absolutely no talent whatsoever, and using art also in the broads and, you know, poetry, not just painting, all different kinds of creative endeavors, shall we say. I will say, though, I don't want people to then once you finally read the book to be disappointed. There are certain passages as well. Perhaps in the book, where conservatives will be a little upset with me. Uh, because since I'm striving for, um, and I'm not a doctorate of conservative by any means. Our audience isn't necessarily political in the, yeah, I get a lot of critique from conservatives as well because, uh, and I tell them I'm not a political activist or a pundit, which always takes one side. I'm a philosopher. And the point of genuine philosophy, the point of genuine thought is that it's a journey whose destination is unknown. And as you explore, uh, certain intellectual paths, you don't know where you're going to end up. Sometimes you end up in a different place. That's not necessarily in accordance with the doctorate of conservatism. Uh, but so, uh, I just mentioned briefly that, um, I actually, um, somewhat, there are aspects of modern art toward which I'm

friendlier than to other aspects, I guess we could say. And I explain, you know, I explain why in the book. And it's about how if we're going to open up, like, to take Roger, this is a point of rare disagreement, for example, between me and Roger Scruton, Roger Scruton in, in some of his books and also in the talk once that he, um, that he gave that I attended, he, uh, here in New York, he, he basically talks about how we should strive to reinvigorate classical music and make modern classical music. And, you know, that's sometimes done well, but the problem is that very often, that too often it leads to just being stuck in old forms and you're really not creating anything new or different. And so we have to be a little more open than a lot of us. I understand. Yeah, yeah, it's not, you can't just, oh, we're just going to go back like I can't really go back as so the hit, you know, what's happened has happened. I understand. Yeah, exactly. Is it to take exactly a colleague of mine who wrote poetry and Latin? And I told her that it's worthless because, um, because it's, you're not, you're not answering to our present moment now. Like we already have

Virgil and Horace and so on. You're not doing anything interesting. It's, yeah, it's like, uh, it's like the dark side of nostalgia. Yeah. Um, if that makes sense. Yeah. Uh, okay. So looking ahead, do you see Oikofobia intensifying, peaking or generating a meaningful backlash? And if there is a backlash, is there a aspect of that could that worries you or concerns you? Yeah. Um, so all of the above pretty much. Uh, the, um, so Oikofobia will continue to intensify, you know, after Trump's reelection, people said, woke is dead. And I, along many others said, right away, no, it's not. No, it's not. No, not, not even. It's going to become more, they're actually strongest when they're in a position of weakness. That's when they're most involved in, I think, but go on. Yeah. No, I think there's a lot of truth to that. Um, the, um, basically, you might have certain aspects of wokeism that are kind of passing fads like people putting their pronouns in their bios like that has gone down a little bit, for example. So there, there might be

certain aspects. Yes, that kind of come and go, but wokeism as a whole is kind of, um, uh, and wokeism being the most modern expression of Oikofobia. Uh, that as a whole, uh, is certainly going to continue to item to intensify. Um, and, um, so that is going to continue to intensify, um, the, uh, that's absolutely clear. The question is, uh, because it always does, I mean, historically, um, there's no point in history at which is it, is it like an inevitable thing? Like an inevitable pattern? Yeah. Yeah. I don't like the word inevitable in the sense that one will be accused of historical determinism and from taking away people's responsibility and, and, yeah, and, and, and, and freedom to act and so on. And there's a whole epilogue in the book in which I address that exact issue. But basically, if you're looking at it to starkly speaking, we shouldn't be captives to history, obviously, but there has been no society which became kind of Oikofobia up to a point. And then it's kind of said, okay, well, this is too much. Let's, let's dial it down a bit. That doesn't happen. So Oikofobia continues to intensify the more, um, important

question then becomes, um, where does it lead? Will there be a backlash? There will be a backlash. And there is a backlash. We see the backlash. Now, that's another reason why we mentioned UK a couple of times. Another reason why I think UK right now is actually very interesting because one sees more of a backlash brewing there now than for example in France or Germany on the continent. And so it'll be interesting to see what happens. And the, the backlash, so the backlash by large is a good thing and a necessary thing to the extent, the extent to which it will lead to violence, again, as an open question, we'll see. But, um, even though violence will, will, be unavoidable in, in at least some cases if some, islamization has to be stopped. Your question about whether there are aspects of the backlash that are not so good is an interesting one. And I think the answer to that is clearly yes. The question to me is whether those, whether those aspects are so great as to outweigh the goodness of the backlash as a whole. And to that, my answer is no, at least not yet. Question, question. I mean parts of the time.

No, I appreciate that answer because I, I'm not, I, I think that's where I'm at too. Like I think it's necessary. And, and I hope that it happens. And I think there probably will be some degree of over correction. But I think that will, you know, it'll like level out after I'm not that concerned. Right. Exactly. No, that, that's roughly my attitude as well. And, and I think one of the more obvious ways, um, it's to something we in the UK also, but I think especially in the United States actually, uh, in which the more negative aspect of the backlash expresses itself is through rising antisemitism on the right. The left has been antisemitic for a long time. That's nothing new. And now, of course, there was a time even earlier on where, where the right used to be more, um, antisemitic. Uh, but nowadays the rising antisemitism on the right is a problem in the sense because there is this, and you see this to some extent in Europe as well. There is sense that our civilization has been so infiltrated by foreign elements that at least to sort of

exaggerate the desire for purity so that anything that is even just a little bit different, you know, forget about the Muslims and, and the Arabs and so on. They're very different already. Of course, yeah, we're against them. But even things that are a little bit different, like, uh, like an American Jew who's been here for, uh, his family's been here for three generations. Even he is not pure enough to, uh, to correspond to what we want American society to be. And so that is no correction. Uh, that is, that is clearly negative, um, I think. Um, and, uh, so, yeah, so that is a concern. But as I said, the backlash is so necessary. Yeah. The threat from Okaphobia is so strong that I'd rather have the backlash with those couple of negative aspects than no backlash at all. And then, you know, over time, uh, that those negative aspects could be, you know, corrected as well, um, hopefully we'll see. But, um, so yeah, that's my general view on that. So, um, this is a, uh, channel where we discuss primarily, uh, men's issues, uh, legal, legislative,

and political to some degree, because it has to be, um, things like, you know, child custody and, um, uh, child abandonment, abandonment, things like that. But one of the sayings that comes up a lot. And I think that this is like, uh, going to be a little bit of a difficult thing to tackle. But there is a, an idiom that you see very often. Um, it goes something like, weak men create hard times, hard times create strong men, strong men create good times, good times create weak men. And, um, I guess I'm wondering is even though we still live in, okay, things are tough. But, men, by and large, behind the scenes are somehow managing despite all of the, um, let's say attacks on men and patriarchy and, um, their access to, uh, jobs, like, you know,

girlbossing and like all these other things, like all of the problems. Men are still going out every day and they keep everything running. Like the roads are maintained, the plumbing, the electricity, the power grids, and all that. Do you still, do you agree with that idiom that I said before? I know that we, you said that men have been domesticated. Uh, and again, I don't see that saying as necessarily an attack on men. I think that it's probably speaking more to the cycle of, you know, arise and then decadence and then a collapse and then arise and, you know, and that kind of thing. And it sounds like the patterns, it, there's like parallels between that and the pattern you described in your book about boycaphobia. Uh, so I want to know what your thoughts are on that. Yeah. No, I mean, it's basically true. The, uh, obviously, it's a great simplification and I think it's interesting to, um, to get much more into the weeds of it, which is part of the reason I wrote the book. But yes, it's, uh, that's certainly, uh, it's, it's larger, true. The, um, little, um, little, um, statements or expressions like that,

I think are good, heuristic, kind of for understanding what's going on for people who don't, um, uh, for people who are not inclined to, um, to study the matter in greater detail. Uh, I think probably a bigger problem is when there are these kind of in-between studies, uh, people who talk a little bit more about details, but who don't do the necessary work like, uh, glove, for example, glove, rodent essay, uh, that has been, being quite popular about the fall of civilizations and it's serious enough to be taken seriously, but not serious enough, not to contain a bunch of errors, uh, and, and, uh, arbitrary statements such as his notion that civilizations last for 250 years, which is rubbish, um, because if you look at how he actually writes, you see that he has an entirely arbitrary measure of what constitutes the end, the beginning and an end of the civilization. Um, and, and such statements lead to the, to some Americans saying, okay, well, we're gonna turn 250 years old, so, I guess that's, that's, that's it with, that's it with American civilization. And, oh, right. Exactly.

Well, and how is that not also part of the demoralization process? Yeah, right. Just tell people, well, this is it. This is, this is how long we last. So, I guess stop, you know, don't bother to try to make things better or change anything because your, you know, time is up. Sorry, you're born in the wrong century, right? That's right. Exactly. Yeah. So no, that's, it's, it's very demoralizing. So, uh, little, uh, as, uh, brief heuristics like that, as the one you mentioned, I think are generally good because it, it's quite accurate. It's these kind of, in between half serious studies that get all the attention, uh, such as, uh, unfortunately, get sad suicide, limply, uh, they're, they're, they're the, they're the, the, the, the, um, the efforts that I don't like because they actually teach things that are wrong. Um, so, uh, but yeah, so I agree, uh, I agree with that statement largely. Do you think that the, the idiom is meant to be accusatory like, um, like the, yeah, probably, blaming, um, yeah, I mean, it, it, it,

blames a certain man. I think it probably blames more circumstance, but, um, I mean, circumstances. Yeah. About how, but I mean, it's, it praises men, but then, yeah, one praises, one generation and attacks the next. I mean, uh, it's a common saying that the greatest generation, um, produced the worst generation, right? The, uh, the, the, the world were two generation, produced the boomers. Um, I don't, you know, I don't think that's accurate, but, but that it's a common, it's a common expression. I would still, I, obviously, I love the world were two generations, but I would still probably say the, uh, the founding generation will probably take the top spot for me. Uh, but in any case, yeah, be that, yeah, be that as it may, um, there is, it's a common feeling that that is the case. I don't think it's more, I don't think it's as much as about blaming as about simply understanding how things come about in, in historical, right? Historical cycles kind of have gone out of fashion and academic circles, which is another reason why I face some resistance, but, um, and strictly speaking, it's not a cycle. It's a spiral as I, as I explained in the book, but, um, but yeah, there's a lot of it to it. And a lot of very wise,

uh, men of, uh, uh, of Greek antiquity, um, um, uh, subscribed to the cyclical views, so, uh, there is more to it than can be so easily dismissed. Okay. So, um, let me see here. Uh, some argue your term or this term is not yours. The term oicophobia is too broad or polemical. Hmm. What would falsify the oicophobia thesis for you? Um, well, the term itself, um, so, I guess, defending Roger Scruton here, but obviously it was my choice to, to, um, take that term and run with it. Um, I think for me, uh, the greatest defense of the term is that we needed an opposite of xenophobia. Uh, and, uh, xenophobia is an overused term for sure. And so, absolutely. Yeah. So it's possible to over, to overuse oicophobia as a term as well, but that's actually kind of part of the point. And, and as I've said on a number of occasions,

the fact that we had a term for xenophobia, but not a term for oicophobia was itself an expression of oicophobia because apparently the moment you criticize a foreigner or, or a foreign culture, you're a xenophob, uh, but criticizing your own culture, apparently that's not pathological in any way. That's what good people do. Exactly. Yeah. So, uh, so having a word that included the root phobia in it as a correspondence to xenophobia, I think was very important. And so I think that was a great, a very good, um, contribution on the part of, um, on the part of Scruton. Some people say you should have or comicia or something because they don't fear their home. They hate their home from the Greek root for hatred. Uh, but again, the point was to have, um, I wasn't, I mean, I wasn't in obviously, I don't know exactly what was in Scruton's head when he came up with the term, but, but the point is, uh, I think to have an opposite of xenophobia, specifically, because many times when people criticize foreigners, that's not done out of fear either, but rather out of dislike or hatred. And so, uh, in, in genuine cases of xenophobia, but we still use the term phobia.

When it comes to the falsification, um, the, uh, going back to my future book as well, that's the one that's still coming out. Um, I actually, um, since I also talk about creativity and scholarship and how to expand the borders of those things, I actually also take issue with the, in my opinion, um, um, over, uh, overestimated concept of falsification. I, uh, Karl Popper comes in for quite a lot of critique, um, in the book, uh, but, um, if we are going to use that term, what falsifies, what would falsify orophobia, but so far, no one has falsified it to me, uh, would be something like if you can point, for example, at the historical processes that I, um, describe in the book, if you can point to how, um, attacks on your own culture were perfectly common also in the earlier phases of a civilization, uh, that would go against, um, the process, uh, the historical development that I outlined, uh, but, but nobody can because the evidence just isn't there. I mean,

you may be, you can find some individual here and there's somebody making fun or whatever, um, but, by and large, the evidence just isn't there. Um, so that, that's something that falsifies the part of what I say, um, if you could do it. Yeah, yeah, I mean, that's dichronic exactly. If you take synchronic, if you, if you could point to most of these particular peep, uh, orcophobes as really just criticizing one particular aspect, again, that could also be a type of falsification, but as we've already discussed, most of them actually have a much more holistic, um, uh, uh, disdain of their own civilization than just some particular, uh, singular point of complaint. Yes, yes. Uh, so since writing the book, are there any, um, like, have you changed or shifted or, I don't know, uh, evolved any of your opinions on this? Has any, has anything changed since then? Not really, although I love the question. I've given so many interviews. I've been on so many podcasts and nobody has ever asked me that question before. Um, it's, um, great question. Not really. Um, I've maybe shifted my, I mean, I'm, um, I hate academics who spend their entire

lives working on just one thing. Um, yeah. So it's, um, there's a good German word for that fachideot, which is basically somebody just writes about one single thing is entire life. So I cast a much wider net and I like to work on different things and, and to, um, to study lots of different things, like, you know, political philosophy and philosophy of history, mostly in, in western self-contempt, and I'm more aesthetics, um, which is actually my first love in philosophy. Um, now, um, devoting myself more to that in my next book. So, um, so I shift emphasis, uh, in terms of what I work on, but in terms of my actual view on this topic of Orkophobia, no, I don't think I've changed my mind in anything because no new, no different evidence has been presented to me. I mean, I've been attacked by lots of different directions, but whenever somebody attacks me, I was just, that was going to be my next question. Oh, okay. Yeah. Whenever somebody attacks me, it's, it's just, it's not serious critique. It's just childish personal attacks and so on.

Nobody has attacked me in any serious way. Um, why do you think they're doing this? Why do you think they're doing this? They're doing this. Part of me. Why do you think they're attacked trying to discredit you? Oh, because, uh, well, so there's been from both left wing and right wing direction. From the left, I think it's easy to say because most of the people there are Orkophobes themselves, so they feel indicted by what I say. Yeah. Um, uh, from the, the critique that I've gotten from the right has most of all been along the lines of the fact that I'm explaining it and showing how it works somehow justifies it in their eyes and makes it harder to combat from their, in their opinion because they like to present Orkophobia as being just some absolutely crazy madness. And if you can dismiss it as some crazy madness, then it, then it's easier kind of to marginalize it. Okay. Well, these are just crazy people. But then you don't take it seriously. Then, then you think it's exactly. Yeah. Yeah. Exactly. And so to them, the fact that I explained it and

showed that it's actually happened before kind of somehow normalizes it. So that's a critique I've gotten from the right. But and my answer to them is, okay, your, your attack, being me as activists, you're attacking the as pandits who are trying to affect political change. And I appreciate that you're trying to affect political change, but I'm a philosopher. And my job is not to just, to say things that a particular side likes. My job is actually to explore and to take these various areas of research and examination to their ultimate conclusion. And and I also say, I mean, it's, in the book itself, I'm obviously not, I am against Orkophobia, but I also want to understand it and describe it. And that's my job. People who, so the critique from the left has just been by people who are not interested in philosophy. And that's fine. You don't have to be interested in philosophy, but, but then you also shouldn't, then you also shouldn't attack me. Yeah. No, absolutely. Um, yeah. Thank you for that. Okay. So I did get a couple of paid comments. I think they're

questions from people on our audience. So a guy send in a super chats, rumble, grants, super child, whatever. And I will be sure to read them. So one, I got from Nova fan, 21 on rumble, who gave us a dollar and said, does it say in your studies, what happens when it's too late for the strong man to protect society? It feels there is no difference between being put in jail for criticism and withdrawing from society. Um, yeah, there is, I mean, we talk, I talk about in the book about how, I mean, what comes after Orkophobia, obviously in the American case, we, we don't know yet. Although if, if past civilizations are any, are any model, which, of course they are, then it's not that pretty. We do have one, um, these are the ancient world, the advantage we have today is that we're not surrounded by, um, you know, by, um, by hostile tribes. I mean, you know, the Canadians or Mexicans aren't suddenly going to invade us, um, you know, once we become, um,

more of a phobia. In America, right. Exactly. That's being fair. Yes. We still have, obviously, we still have migrants coming in and who, um, who do not wish America. Well, I mean, you see this, especially in New York City, obviously, prime example, the mayor of my own city. Michigan. It's, yeah, Michigan is another example. My mayor, and I mean, we're still some of us here in New York in disbelief that our mayor is somebody who's not just, you know, left wing and, and has bad economic policies wherever, but he's generally somebody who hates our country. Um, that, that's the case here. So that's part of what happens except in greater degree. Now, uh, ancient civilizations, once they no longer are able to defend for themselves, you can think of Orkophobia as a destruction of the immune system, they are then no longer able to defend themselves against barbarian hordes. So we don't have foreign armies, um, um, um, invading, but, and you see this even more in Europe, we do, um, it does lead to a dilution of the culture to, uh, demographic collapse often, and, um, and ultimately to, uh, to violence. The question is simply what kind of violence, whether,

whether a society collapses through foreign invasion or whether it collapses through violent indefighting between Orkophobic and non-Orkophobic factions and, uh, and the allies of the various sites, that's something which, uh, it'll be interesting to study Europe not to see what happens in the next, um, couple of years and decades. And as we've said, I think the UK is right not the most interesting area there, uh, but yeah, that, that's essentially what happens. Yeah. All right, and I got a $5 superchallant from official reverse trade for $5 and he says, question for guests. If I hate my hometown in New York City because it's Orkophobic with regards to the national identity of American and a few similar things, am I an Orkophob for hating my home city for being Orkophobic? Um, a tricky question. Well, it's, uh, as a New Yorker myself, I, obviously, it's a question close to my heart. I know I would not say that you're Orkophobic, um, because you still, um, you still, um, love America, you were four America, if I understood the question correctly. I would say just as a, you know, as a fellow New Yorker, one thing I would say in favor of New York,

unlike places like DC or Seattle, for example, New York is at least big and diverse enough using diversity in a positive sense for once. Um, it's, um, big and diverse enough that there are pockets of sanity in New York as, as the questioner probably knows. Uh, if you know where to go, you can actually find, um, a lot of sensible people in the city unlike, unlike some other places. Um, but no, I would certainly not call somebody, um, like that an Orkophobic, although I would as, um, as a, as a selfish New Yorker, I would hope that my fellow New Yorker stays in the city and tries to improve it rather than, uh, rather than jumping ship. Just, yeah, exactly. Although, I mean, although I, I would understand it if, if he does, but, um, well, a lot of the big, the big, uh, businesses left because they didn't want to be taxed. Oh, yeah. Right. No, I mean, if you're a big business, sure, I mean, yeah, why would you say, of course, uh, I mean, it's, it's the only way to sort of like not just survive and, and preserve your, your business, but also to, I mean, I don't want to say punish, but send a message to New York, right? Yeah. Same thing happening.

And obviously, yeah. And if, uh, if, uh, this person for example, has young children, for example, I could also understand you wouldn't want your young children to go up in a place where he's going to be indoctrinated in the public schools or the streets are going to be unsafe and so on. So, you know, so obviously everybody's situation is different, but I can certainly understand that people who want to leave, but, um, but no, not an alcohol. All right. Well, thank you for that. I'm just going to double check to make sure I did miss any, uh, comments from anybody. And I don't see anything here. So, um, I guess like, I wanted to just ask one last thing. And then I think we can, uh, wrap it up here. So I've been doing research into various, um, like, Frank for school professors, but also the, the, the people who preceded them. And, uh, I think I feel like it may have, or at least like one of the big parts of this history is, uh,

Hagle. And you mentioned Hagle, I think, when we talk today. Uh, does, would you say there's a way to connect the Hageelian dialectic to this, uh, Oikefobik? Uh, yeah, I guess it's a critique of Western civilization, or is it more, is that like a little bit of a stretch? Not really. I mean, I don't think it's that much of a stretch. I mean, you have plenty of, uh, as you know, uh, right wing Hageelians and left wing Hageelians and doing battle with each other. Uh, so, and Hagle partly also because early Hagle is such a terrible writer, it makes it easier for him to, um, lend himself to different interpretations. He does become better over time. He, he certainly, he, he becomes a better writer with age, yes. Yeah. Um, the, you compare something like the philosophy of right with the phenomenology of spirits. Um, the earlier work is, is much worse written than, than the, than the latter. Uh, but, uh, but that aside, um, yeah, I mean, the, it's the teleological aspect, if you will, of, of, of, of Hageel's philosophy of history that can become a little

dicey. Now, obviously, there are people, um, including Nietzsche, who have made fun of him to a degree that he doesn't quite deserve. Um, but, uh, and I criticize this as well, um, this aspect of his, in the book, the, the, the, the, the, the overly teleological flavor of his philosophy of history, the idea that, okay, well, if things progress toward a particular, uh, goal toward a particular point, well, then that, the end of history. Yeah. Exactly. That lends itself to, uh, this kind of positivism that I mentioned before that does, uh, to some extent seek to tear down tradition. Now, this depends a little bit which Hagle won, won reads. I mean, so, and this is part of my problem with a lot of Hagle scholarship in general. I was actually just corresponding with the colleague, the, the other week about this, that people kind of decide, this is not true, just of Hagle, it's true of many philosophers, but people kind of take their favorite philosopher Hagle in this case, and they decide, okay, this is what he thinks. And then they kind of reject everything that goes, um, in a, a bit, a bit of a different direction,

which is especially problematic in the case of such a voluminous writer and lecture as Hagle. And, and, and this is where people, um, forget the philology you mentioned in the beginning, in your introduction, my PhD is in philosophy and in classical philology, philology being the study of language and literature and so on. And I feel the, the, the philological dimension always has to inform our philosophizing. We have to pay attention to what the person actually says black and white and not just kind of have the theory in our mind, okay, Hagle says this, Mark says this, uh, and that's it. No, look carefully at what, the detail of what he actually says. And there you see that there are certain passages where Hagle certainly does go in a kind of end of history direction, which is the more teleological aspect that I find, um, bad. And then there are other passages where he does seem much more strongly to acknowledge that actually know history is not over and, uh, and it's not the kingdom of Prussia, that's the culmination of history and so on. So it depends which Hagle you reads, but there's certainly a danger or a possibility that Hagle can be used

to some extent fairly or unfairly depending on your tastes. Yeah. In an orcophobic direction. Yeah. All right. All right. Well, then I don't feel so dumb. All right. So it was more of an instinct that I saw some things, but I think that's, that's good. Thank you. Uh, I got one more super chat came in late and then we'll go from there. So Zairang gave us $10. He's, I think he's also a New Yorker. He said, came into this late, but as a fellow New Yorker, I've long said, New Yorkers are more libertarian in attitude at least. Is that correct? And how do you reconcile that with mom Donnie's election? Yeah. So I have a theory on that one, but go ahead. Okay. Yeah. Be curious to hear your theory. Um, uh, it's not complicated. It's women. Okay. I'm going to be good. We're kind of stewing in our own New York. Is it me? Yeah. So I think it's true. I when he says that we tend to be libertarian, I think there's a lot of truth to that. Um, when it comes to mom Donnie, um, his victory. Yeah. So this is it and people have talked about this, you know, when they started the electoral map of New York

City, a lot of it. Uh, and this, this goes to what we talked about before about the, the, the dilution, demographic dilution and so on and cultural dilution. A lot of his voters are, um, immigrants, uh, who came from parts of the world where they have the similar kind of attitudes toward the United States as we vote on tribal lines or. They vote on tribal lines exactly. I have an article coming out now actually, uh, just this week, um, uh, on, on, on what I call ethnic memory and, and how that operates, uh, politically. Um, so, um, basically, uh, these are people who, um, not, and even when they come from this part of the world, in some cases, it is that they actually agree with mom Donnie. And in some cases, uh, when, for example, Indians are so vote for him, it's not that they necessarily agree with everything he says. It's just this feeling that, oh, well, he's one of us. So we vote for him, uh, for that reason. That was a very significant, um, um, voting block for him. Yes. And then of course, you do have the, you know, the young, uh, communists,

a lot of people who, a lot of New Yorkers who are, um, first generation New Yorkers or, or, or who moved here from other parts of the country because they wanted to, um, imbibe New York culture and left-wing, um, urbanism and so on. Um, and that's, that's another major voting block. And most of the more traditional New Yorkers, if you go to those neighborhoods, um, where, where, um, of New Yorkers have been, um, in the city, part of the city fabric for longer, they voted for Cuomo. Um, so, um, yeah, people are older ones. They went with what they, I guess, like they tried and true. Yeah, exactly. I mean, I, I would have voted for Sleewa, but that was obviously the last cause. So I held my nose and voted for Cuomo, yeah. Um, but, um, but, um, but so, um, um, so, so yeah, uh, that's why there, it's a story of, uh, a tale of two cities, as opposed to story of two cities. Yeah, I think, I think New York, uh, the, the, the cities have very

hardy people, hardworking and, uh, they, especially New Yorkers, they, they typically are very, they feel very strongly about their home city, but, um, apparently it wasn't enough because, well, the truth is, is that yes, people, a lot of them vote along tribal lines. There was an election in Minnesota where there was a Somali and running for mayor and he lost because there were other Somalians. He, if they, if only Somalians voted for him, he would have won, but he was in a different Somalian tribe than some of the other Somalians. And that's why he lost. Right. So it was because he was the wrong Somalian for the Somalians. Yes. So, yeah, exactly. And that's that, so yeah, that's the danger of, uh, ethnic memory. Yeah, and this is, and, and this is like a thing that we have to also face as a reality, like in the United States in, in, in first world countries like this, we, people typically don't think along those lines of, I'm going to vote for the guy who is in my tribe, um, but people from the third world and,

and such, they will. They, that's like what they know. And this is, that's, yeah, that's a very important point to raise. And it's so, the reason it's so sad is because one of the major achievements of Western civilization, and this goes back already to ancient Greece as well, is the overcoming of tribalism. Basically, the invention of politics, which is effectively, um, which is effectively a Greek invention, the idea that they used to, you know, they were divided into tribes as well. And then they come together into a palace where you basically elevate the fellow citizen, the importance of citizenship, that, um, my fellow citizen doesn't have to be a part of my tribe, but he's my fellow citizen and that's what matters. And the establishment of politics, a political system over, um, on top of tribal lines and, and kind of erasing tribal lines, that is one of the core achievements of the West, and that's being completely destroyed by the influx of, of, of still tribal cultures. All right, that's great. Okay, well, um, guys, oh, first of all, uh,

uh, Benedict, thank you so much for coming on our show. Do I don't know if you, if you want to have any questions for us or, uh, our channel or anything like that, um, or any, any final words you'd like to say? Um, no, not really. I would say it might sound a little hackenate, but to combat, to combat Orkophobia, um, uh, I think it's also important to remember the good things. We have you mentioned exonerationists and, uh, and so on, I think, a gratitude to the Nileist, yeah, Nileist exactly, uh, gratitude toward the, uh, all the, uh, men who came before us, uh, is, uh, is important and to everything that they built and that we should continue to, uh, build on their foundations. Um, so I think, yeah, uh, continue to be grateful. In spite of all our problems, realize that, um, you know, there's life in the old thing yet, and, um, and she's worth fighting for. So, right, and we're still living in the most prosperous, the most safe, the most abundant, uh, time in all of human history. And if you're in the United States, even more so, uh, but yeah, you were born in, um, in the last half century and, in,

in the United States, you won the lottery. Yeah, exactly. Don't take it for granted, basically. That, that, I think that's where Orkophobia can get in. You, you, you, you, the, the peak of decadence, you take things for granted and then you start finding things to be resentful about. That's right. That's not good. So anyway, uh, I want to thank you again, um, to, uh, Benedict Beckled, the book is Western self-contempt, Orkophobia in the decline of civilizations. You can get it out of Amazon. You can do like an audio book of this for some people like to listen while they work out. Yeah, they were, um, the publisher, uh, Cornell University Press, they had offered it to audible in a couple of those different companies. And apparently we're told that it was too intellectual, for audible. What? Yeah, that's what they said. Well, if you want somebody to read the book for you, um, I, I can do it. So that's what I was told by, uh, by Cornell, but, right, exactly. Yeah. No, that would be great. So I will see. Uh, if you know, I mean, if there was enough demand for it, then I'm sure that could happen. But yeah, people would have to write to

audible or whatever and to say this is a book we want to, as an audio book. Well, you came on the right channel because even though we stay tiny, for some reason, and every time a guest comes on our show, they go on to blow up. So maybe you, we have the Midas touch, but we can't do it to ourselves. So hopefully you'll, you'll do more interviews and get out there. And I really do. And then I come back with Midas touch on you. Yes, exactly. Yeah. Thank you. We will, uh, I think this is a really important conversation. That's why I want to bring you on because I like to look at what is like at the, you know, like the most fundamental part of the problem. You know, a lot of people look at the symptoms and they're like, this is bad. This is bad. It's like, yeah, but where's that coming from? And I want to get as deep as I can. So, um, I thought this was a really good conversation. And I'm very thankful for that. Um, uh, yeah. So, and thank you guys for watching. I'm sorry. What was that? No, no, no, I was going to say, thank you as well. And it's, I'm actually glad that we went for such a long time because it allowed us to really get into the weeds of things.

Yeah, absolutely. I like that a lot. All right. So with that said, um, thank you guys for coming on the show and checking this out. Sorry for there was some little technical glitches with YouTube, but we're, we're fine that the show is running. I have a recording. We're going to make some shorts content out of it, uh, regardless. So, but it's also on rumble and, um, yeah, and, and X as well. So with all that said, thank you again, Benedict Beckle for coming on the show. And thank you guys for watching. If you guys liked this video, please hit like, subscribe if you're not already subscribed. Hit the bell for notifications. Leave us a comment. Let us know what you guys think about what we discussed in the show today and share the video because sharing is caring. Thanks so much for coming on this episode of the fireside chat. And we will talk to you guys in the next one next week. Janice Fiumengo and her new book. So see you guys then. Hi, this is Dave Roberts heading into summer without a medical emergency kit. That's a risk. Summer colds can linger and getting sick on vacation can derail everything. That's why everyone

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