Unpacking: Ramaphosa Phala Phala case | 2026 Elections | "Big 5" cartel

0:00It was a busy day in the Western Cape High Court as lawyers for both President Ramaposa and opposition parties faced off to see whether or not the Palapalamata should make it to the impeachment committee. Let's break it down. Spread the fire and welcome back to SMWX. My name is Utsilengarimeng. And my name is Kumo Kumalo. And we are here to be breaking down what's been happening in the country today. The structure of our analysis, slash conversation, bro, is going to be first, we're going to touch on the Palapalamata situation that's going on right now in the Western Cape High Court. And then there's been some interesting polling that's come out about the composition of what the LGE election is likely to pen out like. Interesting polling around where the ANC is landing the DA, Johnisburg, the key metros. And I think the part that was very interesting for you and I that we were looking at the polling, the margins of error that actually impact where some of these parties are going to fall. But before we get into any of that, let's go back to the Western Cape High Court where the Palapalamata has been up for discussion.

1:08And I mean, we heard today continuing evidence being rendered on the part of opposition parties, pretty much making the case for why President Ramaposa should be held to account on the matter of Palapalam. But more than that, why it is silly for an order from the Western Cape High Court to be holding the impeachment committee from doing its work, given that the constitutional court was the one that rendered judgment on this. Now, I'm going to start, I hope you know, man, I'm going to start off here with just like a quick overview of some of the stages of the arguments that were laid in court today. Now, effectively, what we heard throughout today and the Western Cape High Court was the grandfather of SMWX, senior advocate, Dalimbo, talking and giving evidence about how essentially where the High Court finds itself and the impeachment committee is that you have a series of facts,

2:08series of facts relating to the Palapalamata break in and what compelled Palamant to be in a position to say, no, we as the legislative arm of government having been given certain powers by the Constitution to exercise oversight over the executive have an implicit right to have to now exercise this duty. And we have this impeachment committee that was put together by way of an order from the constitutional court. But now you have this other order coming in from the Western Cape High Court, which in effect has halted this process. Now, on the basis of the facts of this case, how exactly do you have a situation where a lower court is able to overrule the order of a much higher court? And then, if the facts of this case are such that there is evidence to suggest that the president of the republic has violated his oath of office and in so doing broken the law in South Africa, then is it the work of the High Court to then impede Palamant from exercising its duty to exercise oversight over the executive and the president?

3:23Now, more arguments were made. There were cases that were referenced back to specifically the EFF one, I believe is what it was called 2016 judgment. This was where the constitutional court compelled from a president Jacob Zuma to repay in Gangala, in Gangala funds. Now, that case established presidential accountability as a constitutional imperative. The constitutional court had ruled that in that specific case of EFF one that Palamant had failed in its obligation to create an impeachment mechanism. And then the orders were that Palamant were to adopt rules. The results being rule 129 and the 17th step process, including the composition of the Section 89 panel, which was the basis of this report, which was then the basis of the court case against Palamant's vote to strike down these. December 2022 report, when it was presented before the National Assembly. So bro, okay.

4:23This thing is, I don't even know where to start with this because when you look at it on this face, like it's very evident here that it doesn't make sense that you would have a situation where the president up to this point, up to the point where the impeachment committee was brought, had said no, let due process happen, let due process happen. And had left all of the various actors that were dissecting this entire situation to continue doing their work. Yet now when it gets to the point where an impeachment committee can actually begin to examine the facts of this matter and then determine, well, should he be removed from office or not. And in that process would give him the opportunity to give his narrative of events because mind you up to this point, we haven't heard what President Ramaposs has had to say about this entire thing. We've heard what he said in interviews, we said what he said in response to journalists, but really in response to probing on the facts of the matter, the allegations against him.

5:28Because remember, this stem from the June 1st allegations made against him by Arthur Fraser. Why? And I know we keep coming back to this, but why is President Ramaposs a so scared of having to answer? I think there's a few things. And I think the court also, to some degree, had to engage with this and the grandfather of SMW, you've tried to engage with this today as well. And I think it was core about what necessarily is the concern that is the South African concern. And that particularly raises its concern around what was the source of this money. And that's not particularly what the President is being charged for. And I think this is what's established within the court case, particularly that it's charges around precker, it's charges around whether or not he followed the right procedure. And there's two other charges that are there of reference. And I think particularly what is coming about and something that I don't think a lot of people have come to appreciate is that what I think the President's major concern is, is actually a concern around whether or not the public should know where the source of these funds are, because the Buffalo never left his farm, the money was in the couch, and clearly he bought a couch where he could put money in it.

6:37So on that basis then, there's definitely a major question to answer for, and there's a question as into why is it that you have dollars under your couch that seemingly the President is unwilling to answer and unwilling to answer in public. Because I think what's important, and I think it's important for everyone to understand is, is where we stand at this particular moment, we are at the preliminary inquiry. This is to say that there is a question into whether or not there is a need for an impeachment committee. The preliminary inquiry is still taking place, we're still having questions around who the evidence leader is at the moment. But at this particular moment, it's not to say the impeachment committee isn't taking place, it is taking place, it's just not public hearing. So similar to how we're seeing the Commission of Inquiry in public, it's just that these hearings are taking place in private. But secondly, and I think it's also important for us to appreciate this, is also to appreciate what is this case particularly about. It's a review on the particular report. It's not necessarily to say that there isn't a capacity for the impeachment committee to take place, and it isn't to say that the President has acted or hasn't acted legally.

7:44And I think this is where the major debate does take place in court, because what they prove, and at least what the opposition parties tried to argue to a great extent, is to say that actually, because it's a preliminary process, we haven't decided whether or not there is sufficient evidence, we are asking the question about whether or not there is sufficient evidence. It is particularly at this moment then that we ought to allow this process to go and proceed, because as they clearly point out, if it's the case that the President can contest every single procedural moment that takes place within this impeachment committee, we will be in court a couple of times, and it will be over a multitude of things. But secondly, and I think this is the sad part or the part of justice having to take its time and knitting it play its path, being that there's also the fact that there's likely going to be a appeal at the conclusion of this case. We've concluded all the arguments, we're likely going to wait for a judgment that we hope to get in a month or so if the courts act in a timely manner, but if not, we expect them to just carry on with their lives as we wait.

8:50But in that particular moment, once we get that report, it's likely that if it goes in favor of the President, the opposition parties are likely to appeal, and if it goes in favor of the opposition parties, the President is likely to appeal, and we're still going to hear these arguments once again at the constitutional court. So we're very much at the start of a process, we're nowhere close to the end of a process, and this is very much the extension of many legal woes. But I do think the interesting question, and I do think it's where it leaves us, and it particularly does ask what does happen at this moment. If it's the case that the President continues to delay and apply a Stalin-grad approach, and 2027 is around the corner, and for people who don't notice every time it is a new ANC President, it seems that the ANC President who's President of the state resides there, or leaves. If he makes it to that point where there is a successor, where somebody can fulfill his seat, will this impeachment even be a question of importance? Will it even matter?

9:50Because then he won't be President, and then he would have delayed the process so long, and particularly, and I think this is the most important thing, which is why impeachments are so core, what people don't appreciate about impeachments is that impeachment's a ruby of all your presidential benefits. Unlike a vote of no confidence, which simply dissolves the government, it means that you essentially lose your status, you lose your security, you lose all the benefits that have been ascribed to you as the President, so the risks are major. In this sense that if he loses, and if he gets impeached, he no longer holds his power. So I believe wholeheartedly that if you are of the Cyril Camp, to lay until forever, to lay until you're no longer in office, but if you are a South African, there's definitely a concern, there's definitely a need for urgency, and hopefully the courts get it right this time. I mean, there are a few things that you touch on there, which were very evident in the argumentation that was being made in court today. I mean, we heard Cyril Council for the Opposition Party saying that part of Ramaposs's strategy is to employ a Stalingrad tactic, delay, delay, delay, and delay again, but also arguing that the constitutional court in EFF3 argued that effectively, that the constitutional court and the majority of its justice as those being Maya and Majid had overturned a parliamentary vote which restores the panel's right,

11:15and critically to assess issues in accordance with Order 7, which directs the record straight to the impeachment committee. The constitutional court, as a result of Order 7, explicitly overturns any Stalingrad measures that could be taken on the side of the President. Now, this comes to the three reasons why the Opposition were obviously challenging this matter that the President has brought there. And that is fundamentally the first one being that this constitutional order is now a product of a constitutional order under EFF3, and therefore it carries the cloak of that order. But secondarily, that when you look at the Section 167, Subsection 4, paragraph E of the Constitution, and the Jabhat Devi Principle, this was argued to the court. And that is matters concerning obligations placed solely on the National Assembly and touching on separate powers belong exclusively in the constitutional court.

12:18This comes back to the argument of does the Western Cape High Court actually have jurisdiction here, you know, are operating without a net. And the third being the certification of this case established that question with a large political implication. And that is that like the impeachment of a sitting President, should it be decided exclusively by the constitutional court or should it be cited by impeachment committee? The court obviously indicated back to the impeachment committee, back to parliament, that is where this must be taken. And so on the basis of those arguments, you know, the Oppositions Legal Council, pretty much setting to the court that, guys, you understand and agree. With these constitutional principles. So why are we here? And we heard them saying that in court, why are we here? But the point I'm getting to with all of this is that the President could be digging himself in an even deeper hole because some of the charges against him that were brought is that he was taking work outside that of him being President of the Republic, which he is not allowed to do by law.

13:30He is meant to put all of his private business interests in blind trust if he so chooses to blind trust specifically as a mechanism, one mechanism to do that so that he is not involved in commercial interests that could prove a conflict of interest to his work in office. So by way of doing this, if he can then be demonstrated that no, actually there is basis to say that he's engaged in that, albeit he said it himself, I'm a game farmer, I sell buffalo. Then he digs himself in an even deeper hole because what that does is that it demonstrates that the impeachment committee does have a reason to exist and there is beyond just the Section 89 panel report. There is on the side of not just the high court, but the constitutional court. This is if he loses this case, a reason to say that President Ramaposs has violated that part of his oath of office and that part of what he supposed to do by way of the rules that govern members of the executive. And then you could talk about the other factors, failure to report the death to the hawks and abuse of office. This is by way of instructing General Wally Rutter to conduct what was an off the books investigation that went cross borders.

14:41And obviously then coming back to that exposing himself to conflict of interest. So the reason I talk about all of this is because you said what the actual end goal for Ramaposs here, the end goal I think is to delay, but in the tactic that he's chosen should this not work out for him, he digs himself in an even deeper hole because should he decide to resign after successors appointed at the ANC's elective conference in December 2027. But parliament now has a matter here which two levels of the judiciary have said, okay, no, this thing is there's a matter and it must go to parliament to the impeachment committee. If they still don't proceed with it, even after he's left office, then it creates a political problem, a question of accountability, a question of the actual guts of some of the parties that are part of this impeachment committee to hold the executive to account. Because by that point, you've had two levels of the judiciary say to you, no, this is a matter that you must deal with in impeachment. And just because he resigns, do you just make it disappear.

15:50The point of no return for this, I think, was when the section 89, when the constitutional court ruled on the section 89 vote. That's where he really needed to introspect deeply. Okay, do I just let this thing end here? Because by then the committee hadn't been put together, they hadn't put together a chair, members of opposition party didn't know who was. He could have just said, okay, guys, this is very deep. It's going to go far to save myself and the country. I'll go. But it stuck around and now it's a problem. And Julia said it himself. Had he gone earlier, it wouldn't be a problem. But now it's a problem. I want to be very careful in the sense of how this thing has looked at. In the sense of, I think if we're being very fair, this is a man who firstly won, has indicated that he was willing to leave when the scandal did come about. He's indicated that the ANC was particularly the one. And I think it was proven Gordon at the time that convinced them to stay because they believed that he would be of use and of value to the ANC.

16:56And allegedly, Guerriem Antashe? Yes. And I think to the second part, and this is the part, and maybe to shift a bit more to elections and to talk about accountability, I think the accountability discourse in South Africa has been a false. And the reason why I say this is because let's be honest, we're governed by a GNU. And the last time I checked, no one in the GNU screaming loudly about Palo Palo. And when we particularly look at it, whether it be the DA, whether it be Ryzen Zancy, whether it be the rest of the coalition partners that exist within the GNU, they've particularly all decided that they're going to be beneficiaries of this government. They are going to be participants of this government while knowing that the head of state is implicated. And I think what's even sadder, and I think this is in the instance if the erratically big hypothetical if in the instance where a Sura Ramaposa if in the instance Sura Ramaposa is impeached. There's a particular massive question mark for the DA, because it asks the question, why is it that you are willing to go into coalition, and why is it that you are willing to go into coalition with someone who has been accused of crimes, who are the allegedly committed crimes or failed to act as an individual who is upstanding.

18:14Because that means two things. One, as the DA, you are just as bad as all the other ANC comrades who have existed before, and cadres who have existed before, who have allowed corruption to exist at the top. But secondly, can you really claim to be the principled party that you are? Can you really claim to be the party that fights against corruption, to be the party that is so upstanding in one's good service delivery? If it's the case that you are willing to co-opt and adopt the political party that has been known and is being littered with corruption, but also co-opt and adopt an individual who is actively facing a case. But I think in that reality, in that world, it asks a bigger question about why aren't we speaking louder about our political parties, why aren't we asking a question around accountability, but also what is accountability in this country? Because it seems when we speak about it, it's a very theoretical thing. At the commission, we don't get to have it, at the executive, we don't get to have it, at the judiciary, we get to have it, but it tends to be very delayed.

19:15So when we ask about accountability, when we ask about this new election, when we ask about politics, and we ask about political leaders to be upstanding individuals, we have to ask them about the decisions they have already made, the actions that they have shown, not the words that they are going to tell us. But you have Jordan Hill Lewis, who indicates all the time that the DA is not willing to be formed part of a compromised administration, and that he would rather pull out of the GNU, then stay. So at least in the new leadership of the DA, you get that signal, but he hasn't acted on it, because I don't think anything has gotten to the point where he has to act on it, at least from his perspective. But I think the question that you asked there about how do we as a society actually interpret accountability, especially from positions of authority? Listen, it's the same thing about why people don't register to vote. I think we don't yet understand, or we haven't yet found a way to properly voice, our discontent with the way authority works in South Africa, because we've used protest, and I mean, it's been around for quite a long time.

20:23I mean, statistics even tell us that there's more protests that happen in South Africa than there are days on the actual calendar year. So, fine, that's a mechanism that we've used. And then people have opted now with seams through a myriad of reasons, either just discontent with the way the political structure in South Africa works, or just the general discontent and dislike for the people that make part of the political apparatus, to not register to vote and not participate in the political process entirely. And I'm not sure which of these is the more valid expression of discontent. It doesn't speak anything to authority, but what I do think it indicates is that people are more and more pulling their own legitimacy away from the state. It comes back to the conversation about why we need to renew the social contract, that the social compact and social contract, because we are in a space now where government, and you see this with the latest polling data coming out of Jobberg, registration data, government is now elected by people who make up less than 50% of the population of the country.

21:34And at what point can the majority then say that this is an illegitimate state? I'm not saying revolution. African countries, we've seen how this thing goes. We do not have a draure. We do not have a cagame, so let's relax. Let's breathe, breathe regular people. But it speaks to the much larger problem, which is that the quality of the people that enter politics in it of themselves is not good. Qualitatively, the sort of individuals that end up occupying the world constantly and dislike now, sort of people that end up being members of parliament, sort of people that end up in cabinet. I mean, is that a reflection of the best of what our society has to offer? And I'm not saying all the kids that were top 10 in high school should be the ones governing the country, but I'm saying that there should be a measure where we objectively say of the sorts of people who ought to put their hands up to govern. All the people who are raising their hands now, the individuals who should be leading South Africa, leading society.

22:40This is a huge segue from where the conversation went, but like the questions you ask prompt that answer though. I think that to some degree it is its own discourse entirely. And I think Jan-Jan used to say it that South Africa needs prefix, the idea of we need upstanding people to govern the people who govern, which is crazy. But I think, and I think it's the thing to where we are, I think South Africa is aware of its problem. It is aware of its political deficiencies. But being aware of something yes is positive, but the question is where to from here. Because, and I think this is even to the concern particularly around polling data and particularly towards come out. Recent polling data from Ipsos that came out in Daily Maverick on the 4th of September being today as we record this live. The following parties got the following results. The ANC were at 31%, the DA was at 25%, the MK at 14%, the EFF at 11%, Action SA at 6%, IFP at 3%, and the Patriotic Alliance at 2%.

23:50Now, I think what becomes fundamentally very interesting about those top four parties, particularly in how they exist and also in terms of how they've been raised, is that what comes about is firstly one. All of them to some degree have been implicated in wrongdoing or corruption in some capacity. If you look at the ANC of course they lit it with the commission. If you look at the DA we've heard about Berks, we've heard about Tony Leon, and particularly his lobbying capacity, which is still a form of corruption using your governmental position to self-improve yourself or benefit your position in society. That's not for the benefit of society, that is a form of corruption. The MK of course, Jacob Zuma, Head of State, Capture, we don't have to go further, and the EFF of course being linked to the commission. What becomes troubling and what's become very apparent is that none of these political parties can claim to be upstanding, none of these political parties can claim to be clean. So then what becomes the second question is, is that what particularly are we voting for?

24:50What particularly are we going to do and where particularly are we going to go forward as a country? And that's why I think we asked a deeper question around coalitions, because the reality of where these numbers tell us and what these numbers do really show is that the future for South Africa is coalitions. It means that likely in this coming election party leaders are going to have to align and say to us who they are likely going to be willing to be in a coalition with, and who they won't be willing to be in a coalition with. And then what Jordan Hill Lewis has particularly taken to denouncing MK is particularly a party that he would work with, and it looks like those dynamics becoming a thing. However, I also think it asks of us as voters to have a degree of maturity, to ask of our political leaders to do something a bit further. It asks us to ensure that they actually have coalition agreements, that they tell us the principles that they are governing on, and the things in which they are willing to concede on, and the principles which they aren't. And at the moment, if you look at how coalitions are formed within South Africa, particularly at a regional level, municipality level, there is no logic behind them.

25:55There is no allegiances that we can particularly tie. It's purely on the basis of individuals trying to affirm which positions that they can get. And then what I think is joining massive parties. It looks like a rise in Zanzi with less than I think 2% in the national election, still being a part of parliament, still having a seat at Scopa, and also having a seat in Kharteng. What this tends to do, it's firstly one, brings instability because you now have to please so many characters in the coalition. Secondly, and I think this is where the bigger fear also is, is that it also means that governance becomes ineffective, because every point where there is a disagreement, there is an inability to make a decision, it becomes a who-uh, and it becomes a scandal for all South Africans. We remember our budget scandals off the GNU-1. As a country, we weren't happy, it wasn't cool, it wasn't fun. If this is going to be our reality, we need to ask of our leaders to also align with that, to act with that and operate within that. So what do you make of this polling data, but also what do you think it likely says about the future of South Africa?

26:58So a few factors come out from the polling data when I see it. The principal one is that the ANC and the DA are virtually in a dead heat, almost in the key metros where they are contesting. So John is book, like what the DA 27% ANC 31, still within striking distance of the ANC, that's where the DA resides there. Twane, DA 31%, so the polling tells us that Twane is likely to go blue. Something very concerning for action essay, because if you consider where they have positioned themselves as a party in Twane, that is something that has to leave them concerned. And so the negotiations, they are going to be very interesting. And what I'm saying now is going to come back to what you said, because talks about coalition negotiations. Ekruleini, dead heat, Nalsamadella Bay, dead heat, Buffalo City, dead heat, between the ANC and the DA. All of these metros that I've just listed now, they're all within striking distance of each other.

28:00So then it brings us to the question of where will this negotiation actually happen? Because in as much as its council composition that the negotiation will be about, this is happening in the context of post 2024, where if we really think about it and listen to what a lot of DA members have said, they feel hard done by it by the way the composition of the National Executive was constructed. It's not proportional to them. Even Helen Zilicello at all the time. Proportionality, which was part of the statement of intent, was not reflected in national government. Is this then the ground on which you begin to reconfigure the National Executive as well? You say, listen, 20 hours, 31 percent, but we'll be willing to give you this much control, but you have to give this much of the National Executive. Because the ANC will be coming out of this election bruised. That is a fact. And the political dynamics of how this election negotiation plays out will affect how 2027's electoral conference works out for the ANC.

29:02Because there is a much deeper system and network that is baked in at a municipal level amongst how ANC regional branches are composed amongst which regions in certain, sorry, which branches and wards in certain regions have power. That is built on the basis of their ability to hold power in municipal councils. I mean, Echoruleini is one of the best examples of this. Johannesburg is actually an even better example of this. That's why the ANC can't choose a candidate in Georgia of the metros where they're contesting. And so they have to adopt this much larger. You know, we'll see if we announce in September or not the president was asked that by some Gellima Sego today. He didn't answer the question. But then coming back to what you said earlier about, okay, fine. So then what does this mean for how we conduct GNU and GPU and GCU coalition compositions? My concern is that we don't have yet the maturity in conducting coalitions.

30:05We don't have yet the maturity in the system to be able to put together productive councils. Now, the reason I'm saying that is that you can have a coalition at a national level. That's fine. But the individuals that are involved in putting that coalition together are very different from the individuals that will be involved in putting council compositions together when you talk about those coalitions. The stakes there are very different. We create a dysfunctional coalition in Nelson Mandela Bay. Fine, it affects you between now and possibly the next local government election. But if it's not in your interest to have a functional coalition in Nelson Mandela Bay, but it's in your interest to hold a few more positions in the executive in the lead up to 29, then that's where some people will defer to. And I know offline we have this conversation around to what extent will the coalition negotiations and the electoral outcomes of 2027 impact how parties and the public views certain individuals and certain political parties as front runners for 2029.

31:11Obviously the position you took is that you cannot use 2027 as a litmus test for 29 because fundamentally the factors are different. 24 when the G&U was put together the world was drastically different from what it is now. And also the factors of who the key role players will be in 29 will be very different from who they are now. But it doesn't stop people who are in power now choosing to exercise that ability. The political maturity to know not to do that, do we have any indication that the role players have that political maturity? I think, and I don't know how to say this nicely, but I think there's something that's a bit counter-intuitive to I think the coalition thinking that is happening in South Africa. If it's the case that the ANC is in decline and the ANC is going to be bruised, what's in their incentive to give up positions in the executive? Because it's not like they're going to get more votes in the year to come.

32:13It's not like they're going to get more seats. So if you're losing out on opportunities as a political party, it becomes very unclear as into what's your incentive to trade horses in a particular position where they isn't a capacity to trade horses. Being first. The second being, let's look at the reality of it. The ANC hasn't been in power in Jobberg since 2016. And so on there they haven't been in power. So when we particularly speak about this horse training and the politics and what's likely going to take place, I think what a lot of people don't appreciate is that actually for many of the major metros, it either doesn't concern the ANC or in the instances where it does concern the ANC, it's likely that they're not going to be playing the big partner coalition. It's likely that they're going to be playing the secondary coalition. Unless they try and negotiate and navigate their way to the top as we've seen in places like Jobberg, but then we get what we get in Jobberg which is dysfunction and ineffective governance. But lastly being, and I think this is a thing that people haven't appreciated even looking at just the formation of the GNU versus the provincial governments of unity.

33:19Take Houghteng as an example. If you look at the GNU, the ANC and the DA are willing to cooperate. But in Houghteng, that same agreement didn't come to play in our province. It was the ANC with in Houghteng that said actually we refuse to cooperate with the DA. We're going to stand with our stance and we're going to hold strong on the basis that we want to operate in this manner. And, and think this is to your point where you say, because there's so many wards and because there's so many individuals negotiating at so many different points, it becomes very unclear to me how a top level decision is going to impact. A small council-scale decision. Because if it's the case that these decisions are happening absent, the executive, absent the big lead is. And they're happening at a regional and local level, it makes no sense to then call out or outsource or do anything that would lead to you having to make massive national changes. That being the first thing. I think the second thing being that I don't also think this is going to be the same coalition forming. I think what a lot of people aren't appreciating is we've dealt with coalition 1.0.

34:22We've seen how coalitions are formed. We know there's major concerns around coalition formation and there's particularly conversations around the coalition bill that currently sits with impoliment, which is trying to extend firstly one. The negotiation timeframe from two weeks to 30 days to ensure that everyone who's allowed to join government has at least one percent. Three ensure that votes of no confidence can only happen every two years to ensure that this stability within government. But at the moment that stuff is not happening. That stuff is not taking place. And what particularly becomes the issue with that then is that instability becomes the basis for most of these governments that are being formed. But with that being the premise, it then also means that because you know it's going to be unstable, there is no incentive to provide stability. There is no incentive to make it work because if you're the ANC, it's not like you're going to be credited for that work because it's unlikely you're going to be leading that coalition. And even in the instances where you are leading that coalition, it's still that you are literally littered with your history and most of the actions that have happened historically.

35:30So I don't believe there's going to be these seismic changes that most people are talking about. I think there'll be attempts for sure. I think people will try. But I don't see a world in which the ANC is necessarily going to go, we've already lost the election. We're going to lose more by giving away positions. That doesn't seem like a good political decision. It doesn't seem like a decision that's strong for the ANC. But I think this is even further to say, I think what is likely to come about. And I think what we're likely going to start seeing is, I think people are likely going to start testing to what degree do they want to cooperate with particular political parties. And I think what we're going to start affirming is which political parties are willing to cooperate in coalition versus which political parties aren't willing to cooperate within coalition. Of course, action is saying the DA, they always have their spats, but it seems as though they're going to try and make amends and potentially try and co-govern if they can see eye to eye.

36:30So I know there's a bit deep because of course the political rivalry that exists between Dr. Nassipi Moyer and Celia Brings. But also, I think even for a lot of the smaller parties, it's now a question about which bigger parties are you going to align yourself with. So I think the way we very much need to view the South African political scope and standpoint. And I think even the polling day to referms this is that it's a question of ANC on one side, DA on the other side. If they can't form a coalition independently with their coalition partners to get to 50%, does the assumption always become that the ANC and the DA are likely going to come together to preserve what we know is the GNU and the environment that exists? Or does it become that because they are both big parties, they actually stopped opting for minority governments? And I think that's a world where we haven't considered the likely one. Being that, what we are technically seeing, and I would even argue to some degree the GNU operates within this capacity and environment, is a world where you don't necessarily hold the majority and you vote on an issue by issue basis.

37:34That's the way the GNU works. When it comes to the budget, when it comes to NHI, when it comes to Bella, I mean we can name a bunch of policy decisions where there's been major disagreement. Effectively what it looks like then is an instance in which the ANC is essentially setting national policy, setting out foreign policy, and now they're just looking to the DA and other actors and alliances to affirm what they are doing within government. I think that's the more likely reality for South Africa because most of the parties that we see, particularly the DA and the ANC, sit within that 30% range. They look within that range where they almost just there, but they're still very far from getting to that 50 plus 1 to hold the municipality. So that becomes particularly important. I think the last thing I do want to say, and I think this is something that I want to stress about strongly for South Africa, and I think the media doesn't do enough to have this conversation. I'd like to even potentially hear your thoughts on this, which is we need to stop ignoring rules South Africa. And what I mean by this is that at the moment the discourse is currently faced in our metros. It's faced in where people of course in abundance, where we have the most amount of people, and naturally there's a capacity to get certain data.

38:44But what's becoming apparent is that if you don't live in the city centers, it seems as though they don't care for you in the media discourse and the political discourse, and it feels as though they isn't a place for you, they isn't a political home. I mean if South said nearly 50% of people feel politically homeless, and I would argue that 50% of the people who feel as though the political system doesn't speak to them, doesn't come to them, doesn't see them, doesn't recognize where they're from, or the political system has completely just been ignorant to its failure. It looks like places like the East and Cape, it looks like places like the more rural parts of South Africa, where we don't necessarily have the capacity to always have an atonement and an attunement to one of the issues on the ground, but we're aware that there are issues. And the fact that both political parties, whether it being the DA, whether it being RISEM, Zancy, Action, SA, are not being asked about why aren't they governing in places like the East and Cape, why aren't they going to places like the Northwest, and they're being celebrated only for the instances in which they go to modern metros, or which they go to metros, not modern metros, but metros in particular, it asks a very big question about governance.

39:51Why is it the case that political parties are willing to abscond on governing for certain people when they're willing to govern for others? I think it doesn't ask a question about governance, it asks a question about politics, because it's all about where you can gain the most political dividend. If I win, and I get to govern some small municipality as a party that nobody's ever going to hear of, what's my real political dividend? But if I take Jobuk, there's attention, there's people, there's money, if I do well there, and I get something, as a party, not only do I improve a footprint, but I become one of the big dogs, which is the ultimate gain for anyone in the political system. So it's sort of the thing of the politics that we have, the policies that we have now informs itself around the system. That's why the media is easily able to service having metros as the key battlegrounds to demonstrate the strength in 2027, and not looking at how parties are going to do in your smaller municipalities.

40:55People, frankly, the perception is that people just don't care about the smaller municipalities, and that's why rural South Africa gets ignored until there is a pants on fire crisis, where a school collapses, or a bridge collapses, or a hospital is so dysfunctional that it has to stop operating and people end up dying. It's just a function of how the politics is architected itself. You go to where you can reap the most political dividend, and once you've done that, you govern. And you do well, and you reap that reward, and you move on, because there will be a reward, the DA grows significantly. The strategy for the democratic alliance to say, one, obviously they're home bases, the West and Cape, but to say we're going to take Cape Town both the city, and we're going to take the West and Cape as a province, was to say, we could take any other province, we could go for Quasilunatal if you want to. We could go for, oh yeah, OK, population, but I'm just saying, if the DA wanted to have a concerted effort outside of the West and Cape, they could try it.

41:56They could try it in the free state. They could try it in other places. But where would they get a real political dividend that has a strong enough footprint to say, if we can do it here, we can do it everywhere. And the West and Cape was that for them, because it's big. There's a large economic footprint. The city of Cape Town is comparable, at least in economic scale, slightly, to the city of Johannesburg. And that is why Helen can go around Johannesburg saying, look what I did in Cape Town. I haven't heard the campaign say, look what we've done in Cucun for city. Look what we've done in Scucune. I'm just naming other places. But I'm saying the dividend that she's banking on is what they've done in the city of Cape Town. And that's what's informing a lot of people to say, hey, well, you know, they did well in Cape Town. Let's maybe see if we give them a try. And that's the reward they get. And that reward tells other parties, well, don't waste your time in small areas.

43:02Go to where you can get attention. Go to where you can actually reap a real dividend that can help you grow. I don't know. And the reason why I don't always wholeheartedly agree with this is that still to this day, and I still hold disbelief that where we are as a country is not because the DA has governed better. It's because the ANC has failed to govern. And what that particularly means is that, and we've said this before, most people would like to vote for the ANC. And even most people who are political analysts say that most ANC voters just don't show up to the polls. And so the conversation about governance, about the recognition for governance, it cannot be subject to you having capital and cash. Because the sad reality is that most South Africans don't. And if we are saying that for those who don't have capital, for those who don't have social capital, for those who aren't seen as valuable in terms of the economy of South Africa, those people aren't deserving of recognition, aren't deserving of politics, which leads to governance.

44:17That's a sad reality, a scary reality. And it's a reality that then starts to say that we govern for those who have, and we forgo those who do not. And it's an instance where you get a Google letter in Cape Town. It's the instance where you get a kaya leecher. And it's in those instances where we still celebrate and talk Cape Town as being one of the best cities in South Africa while being ignorant and ignoring the homelessness. So yes, for sure, the media can speak about Cape Town, they can celebrate these places, but I'm not blind to also what the reality is and where those things go to. And I think potentially to even close it off, and I want to pull up the margin of error, I think that's there, is for people who don't agree with what or don't necessarily have the viewpoint, if you particularly look at the margins of error and how they exist. I think firstly to premise what the margins of error are, they're just in terms of a statistical error margin that will exist for polling data. So it's plus minus 3% either way, which is to say if they say the ANC will get 30%, it could be 27%, it could be 33%.

45:29What becomes apparent is the further and further down you go that list is that when you don't live in a metro, when you live in rural South Africa, where you live with this less economic activity, they don't even care to get the statistics or the data right. I mean, in the Northern Cape, sitting at 12% of an error of margin, that implies you're essentially just guessing. I mean, 3% margin of error is what's considered reasonable when you're considering real polling data. And we can't even uphold that. And sometimes when we celebrate these statistics, when we celebrate these facts in South Africa, when we celebrate who's a winner in which municipality or which polling system is working or which polling system isn't working, it's one that doesn't acknowledge and fully recognize that part of the narrative is curated, part of the narrative isn't factual. Because look at that, Eastern Cape over 6%, in Bumalanga at 7%, nearly 8%, in Lombopo at 8.5%, and note it's only at 8.5% that we start to question whether or not there is even validity.

46:31They say indicative, creep with care, 6% to 10%, what does treat with care mean when we're talking about the state of governance, the state and future of our country? I think it's important that as South Africa, as a state, that we start to be considered of everyone, because it's in those same metros, the ANC still continues to be dominant. It's in those same metros that we say, oh no, the ANC is becoming a rural party. Why is the ANC becoming a rural party something to celebrate or something to talk of as if they're still not a party, as if they aren't governing in places where people live? We need to be serious about the conversation in South Africa, and part of our seriousness also comes from the statistics and data that we use to guide the conversations that we're going to going forward. And so if this is where we are with our statistics, if this is where we are with our data, it's beyond us saying that we need to take it with a pinch of salt. It's about us actually being realistic and recognizing the reality of that most of this data is not necessarily even a true reflection of where South Africa is. It's a gauge of where South Africa is. It's trying to be at most get some indication of where we are, but statistically they just fail at it, and we have to recognize that.

47:41Sure. Well fam, that's where it is. That's where we're going to end the conversation for now. If you really enjoyed this video, please make sure to like, share and subscribe as smwx as on its way to half a million subscribers. Until next time, let's keep spreading the fire. Ayeyeyeye.