The Iran War and Strategic Competition in Asia

0:00Welcome to the Asia Chesport, the podcast that examines geopolitical dynamics in Asia and takes an insight look at the making of grand strategy. I'm Mike Green of the United States Studies Center in Sydney and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Welcome back to the Asia Chesport. I'm Mike Green. I'm joined by a friend colleague, Professor Evan Maduros. We're going to talk about the Iran War, but in the larger strategic sense. What does it tell us about China's influence and interest in the Middle East? What does it tell us about the impacts on strategic competition in Asia, the impact on allies and partners of the US, energy prices, military force posture of the US? A lot to go through. We're going to keep it at a strategic high level. But in summary, I'll be able to go into detail because Evan Maduros is a real expert on Chinese defense foreign policy in particular. So Evan, thank you. Evan, people will know is the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies at the School of Foreign Service and the Clean Family Distinguished Fellow in US China Studies there at Georgetown University.

1:05He runs Asian Studies and took over that role for me three and a half years ago and is probably still cleaning up my mess. Hoya Saxa, and thanks for that. Evan served for six years on the staff of the NSC. I did almost five years in it and it almost killed me so well done. He started as Director for China Taiwan Mongolia and then was promoted as Special Assistant to President Obama and Senior Director for Asia. And I had a similar trajectory there. We compared notes a lot. I worked for Bush. He worked for Obama. A lot more similarity and continuity than difference, frankly, especially compared to the role of the NSC now. But we'll save that for another podcast. Let's talk. China, Iran, geopolitical competition in Asia. Evan, thanks. Great to have you back on the podcast. Mike, thank you. It's such a pleasure to be here. Your podcast is always at the top of my queue. I love it. And in particular, your podcast is the one that really touches on the big strategy questions in Asia. Balance of power, geography, relative military balances.

2:06You've got it all. It's great. Thanks so much for having me. Thanks. We'll try to stick to that because in the midst of this war, there's so much speculation, so much strategy about the long term consequences. When actually war is not linear, we don't know what's going to happen. And then things that may seem important now may not be in a year, but others will be. So we'll try to sort out a lot of that with a particular focus on China. Let's start with China. You wrote your first book, really good book. Looking at China's relationship with Iran, its adherence to international norms on export controls and so forth. You've been a deep observer of China's Iran relationship in particular. We'll broaden it, but let's start with Iran. Tell us a bit about China's historical relationship with Iran with the Middle East and what you think Beijing is thinking right now as they watch this war. So China's relationship with Iran, if you go back to the earliest days of the reform and opening period, the early 1980s, was largely a transactional relationship. It was largely bilateral trade, and in particular, it was bilateral arms trade.

3:09When the Iran Iraq war starts in the early 1980s, China ends up arming both sides. And this was a natural outgrowth of Dung's policies in which he put defense modernization as the last of the four modernizations and basically told the PLA, okay, you guys have to support yourselves. And so what happened was you had a combination of both the PLA selling weapons from its own stockpiles, principally through polytechnologies and a couple other interesting cutouts, and then you had the defense industry factories themselves selling stuff. So China's relationship with Iran in the reform period was very, very limited narrow. When Chinese and Iranian leaders got together, they would love to talk in sort of grand historic terms. We're both countries with thousands of years of history and deep cultural traditions, but the reality is they're overlapping interests were actually quite narrow.

4:10And it wasn't until 1987, Mike. And you'll remember this during the tanker wars in the latter stages of the Iran-Araq war. When Iran and Iraq were attacking each other's oil infrastructure, in October of 1987, an Iranian-fired Chinese-made H.Y.2, Hong Ying-2, silkworm cruise missile hit a Kuwaiti tanker that had been reflagged under the U.S. flag. This is when the U.S. was running an operation to basically take reflag tankers, principally Kuwaitian Saudi tankers, and escort them through the Gulf, so they didn't come under Iranian attacks. So it's not until October 1987, the famous silkworm Chinese cruise missile, that sort of is the first time that the China-Aran linkage becomes an issue in the U.S.-China relationship. And then subsequently you have what happens after that is the Chinese realize, hey, we have a source of leverage with the Americans,

5:12because the Americans do not like our relationship with Iran, so we can dial it up or dial it down with Tehran as a way to generate leverage with the Americans. And so while the proliferation issue is a very narrow issue, it was in the broader strategic context of Beijing negotiating with Washington. But the China-Aran relationship fundamentally changes in around 1993-1994 for one very significant reason. China at that time becomes a net oil importer. And China starts to meet its growing energy needs because reform and development is taking off. China starts importing oil from the region. And Iran becomes one of its principal energy sources very, very significantly. So while the relationship remains transactional, the significance of that transaction buying Iranian oil becomes much, much more important. And then of course the Chinese are supplying ballistic missiles to the region as well that adds to the drama in the U.S.-China relationship.

6:16What's interesting though is the Chinese never devoted a lot of high level political capital to the China-Aran relationship. Zhang Zemin visits in 2002 with the sort of very end of his term. And then there's no visit by a Chinese leader between 2002 until 2016. So Xi Jinping visits in 2016 just a few months after the JCPOA was signed between the United States and Iran, which is telling that the Chinese want to make sure that the JCPOA doesn't result in the sort of renaissance in U.S.-Aranian relations. But interestingly when Xi Jinping visits in 2016 and that's the only time Xi Jinping has visited since then, what was interesting Mike is Xi Jinping also visited Saudi Arabia simultaneously. And I believe also Israel, but I'd have to double check on that. But that trip by Xi Jinping in 2016, I remember I had been out of the NSC about six months at that point.

7:19It was so interesting because it demonstrated China's attempt and ability at managing the two of the biggest rivals in the Middle East, Saudi and Iran. Two of China's biggest suppliers of oil, when Xi Jinping visits the region, he visits both simultaneously. Final point I'll make is a reminder to listeners that it was in March of 2023 that the Chinese brokered an agreement for Saudi Arabia and Iran to agree to resume diplomatic relations. They reopened embassies a couple months after that agreement in March of 2023. And the Chinese effectively broker that agreement by hosting the Iranians and the Saudis. And many saw that as the opening of this new Chinese renaissance in the Middle East. It never really materialized and it turns out the Chinese didn't really, didn't play a significant role. They just hosted the talks. It was the Saudis and the Iranians that worked out the deal.

8:20So the Chinese relationship with the Middle East has grown and changed over time. But it's largely in my mind been very limited, very focused on energy and broader economic interests and ultimately transactional. And China's response to the war in Iran, I think is further evidence of that. So it is a little evocative of American diplomacy, frankly, in the 19th and early 20th centuries, which the British derisively called jackal diplomacy, basically taking no risks, letting the Royal Navy protect the sea lanes, take the risk, and then just ensuring that American economic interests were protected and that occasionally using what was called good offices, which is what you just described hosting diplomatic things, but not really breaking a sweat diplomatically. Is that a fair sort of comparison? Is Beijing basically a follower and taker of diplomacy in the Middle East on the whole? It is. When you think about the big political issues in the Middle East,

9:20it's the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Iranian nuclear issue. The Chinese were marginal bit players in both. When I was at the NSC mic, I was tangential to the JCPOA talks and occasionally the negotiators would come to us and ask us, the Chinese are doing this, the Chinese are doing that, but the Chinese didn't really drive anything. It was the Americans, the Europeans, and the Iranians that were really driving those. And of course, the Chinese have famously always stayed away from getting involved in Arab-Israel stuff. In particular, the Israelis have been very, very upset at the Chinese who have completely sided with Palestinians and the Arabs after, you know, of course, that awful October massacre a couple of years ago. So the Chinese sort of want to have their cake and eat it to play all sides off simultaneously. But the reality is they get away with it, and they've been allowed to principally focus on their economic interests.

10:22One final point on this mic that's been interesting is the one area where Chinese activities and interests in the Middle East have changed in recent years has been China's security footprint. The Chinese have been greater providers of security assistance, ballistic missiles and space capabilities, especially satellites to the Saudis. They famously tried to establish a naval base in the Emirates and their providers of military technology to both. So the Chinese clearly have an expanding interest set. But when you look at how they responded to the US-Israeli bombardment of the Iranian nuclear program, and the early Trump administration, and then, of course, the most recent war started in late February, the Chinese again have really tried to stay out of it. Let's unpack a little bit what, you know, hence this gives us about the real dynamics in the crinks in the China Russia on North Korea,

11:23kind of alignment with what people call the axis of authoritarianism. Russia is doing more to help Iran, reportedly, providing targeting data. China is not doing that, it's not taking those risks. What about the kind of ideational side? So China has this global civilizational initiative, right? It strips off the tongue, doesn't it? Yeah, I know. Which basically argues that China, or presumably Iran with Persian culture, has a history of civilizational roots, very Victor Urban, which is more important than modern democratic norms. That's basically the argument. So you would think that Iran would be a sort of natural ally for China's global civilizational initiative because of this. But I suspect Beijing has real ambivalence about the mullahs and about a state that is basically, as Henry Kissinger said, about an idea not a state, because that idea could fundamentally be threatening to China's interests, definitions of territorial integrity, Xinjiang, and all the rest.

12:23Does this kind of, is this a little bit of evidence that some of these things like China's civilizational initiative are really just a line that's used to undermine democracy, and there's not actually an alignment of global civilizations, or is there more alignment than I'm saying? I mean, it's a very big, a very important question. Let me start with the sort of China-Iran angle. What's interesting to me was how China's response to the war has evolved. So China starts out by condemning the U.S. Israel military action, calling for ceasefire, which is pretty standard, unsurprising, non-exceptional. But then interestingly, it starts positioning itself as an external stabilizing power, but avoiding any kind of deliberate direct military backing for Tehran. So what you've seen is Beijing's strategy of basically protecting its larger equities in the Gulf, preserving leverage over Tehran, depending on what happens in the future, and avoiding confrontation with Washington.

13:27And so I'll give you one very specific example, Mike. Wang Yi has done two major phone calls with his Iranian counterpart. The first one was on March 2nd, a couple days after the war started, and very supportive of Iran, highlighting all the sort of civilizational things that you talked about in particular safeguarding sovereignty and non-interference. So it was very much supporting in a principled way, Iranian resistance. But what's interesting is 22 days later on March 24th, just last week, Wang Yi does his follow-up call with the Foreign Minister, and there's a pretty significant shift in tone. He sort of drops all of the language condemning the action and supporting Iran, and he basically stresses de-escalation and encourages Iran to play a careful role and encourages Iran, importantly, not to escalate horizontally to try and limit the damage to the Gulf.

14:27So shifting from solidarity with Iran to de-escalation pressure to me is really, really, really interesting. And it's the result of this extensive shuttle diplomacy that China's special envoy to the Middle East conducted from March 8th to about the 25th, in which their special envoy to the Middle East, a guy named Jai Jun, went around to all the countries. And what was interesting is the way that Jai Jun framed it publicly, and then Wang Yi subsequently framed it, was we have to protect Chinese citizens and Chinese commercial interests. We need to ensure that the strain of hormones is open, and energy security is assured, and basic condemnation. And none of that was there a call for material support for Iran. Now there have been a couple sort of random news reports about material support, so you can't rule it out.

15:28But I think the Chinese very much have shifted to a posture of preserving their larger regional equities, trying to prevent escalation. You know, it's interesting that there are two Middle Eastern countries, Saudi Arabia and Iraq are the third and fourth largest BRI construction recipients as of 2025, which is really interesting. And Chinese EV exports to the Gulf jump 71% in 2024. So I think the Chinese have sort of shifted from any kind of solidarity, common civilizational principles with Iran to their very narrow commercial interests. And I think the Chinese have on their mind the fact that the second ever China Arab States summit is scheduled for June of 2026. And then a month before that, of course, Trump famously on May 1415 is supposed to be visiting Beijing.

16:30So I think the Chinese are putting a bit of distance between themselves in the Iranians at this point. So to get to your good question as somebody that believed that there was this growing convergence among Russia China and North Korea and Iran, that we would gradually see greater degrees of coordination, certainly short of military alliances, but still posing problems, we've had two very big tests of that. You know, after the joint attack on the nuclear facilities and then, of course, the war, and China has failed both of them from Iran's perspective. I think we are, in real time, getting a stress test of the crinks and of the no-limits relationship between China and Russia. And based on what you said, when I'm seeing, I think we could say a couple things for now. And tell me if you disagree, but for Beijing, Russia's power is an essential part of their grant strategy for the overall balance of power. Iran lessso, clearly lessso. China is willing to take more risks with the U.S. to prop up Russia's wartime economy because it cannot afford that piece of the chess board to go away.

17:39But Iran, it's different, I think. And it sounds like from Beijing's perspective, there is some option in the Middle East to wait and see what happens. Because even if you have regime change in Tehran, which I think is unlikely in the near-term, they still need to export the oil, the Saudis, the Iranians. They're still going to want diverse security, diplomatic and economic relationships. There's still going to be a demand signal for Beijing to have a role. And so, in some ways, they can afford to take the posture you said, because chances are that when the pieces fall, the chips fall, China's still going to have traction. Still going to have purchase, still going to have key points of leverage with the region. Even if the U.S., and I think this is a real possibility, if we end up with a ceasefire, it's going to be a ceasefire that's not status quo anti. There's going to be a perpetual danger of the straits being closed again. The Gulf Cooperation Council States, Saudi U.A. and others are going to be much more forward leaning with collective defense and working with the U.S.

18:40So, you're going to have a more, in some ways, you're going to have greater U.S. and Israeli influence. On the other hand, these same states are going to want more diversity in their relationships. They're going to want China to be a player. So, it seems to me that Beijing does have a calculated view that no matter how this falls, China's not out of the Middle East. They're still going to be able to have leverage. And in the meantime, the most important thing is to protect their oil exports and protect a broader inflammation of global Islam and disorder. Does that sound right? It sounds right to me. At the end of the day, Mike, what does Iran really get China? Geographically, the Chinese don't really get much from it. It's principally a market where they could invest. But it's been difficult to invest in Iran because it's been such so economically underdeveloped and negotiating with the Iranians as many Chinese tell me it's an exceptionally difficult thing to do. So, do you really want to do infrastructure projects in Iran? They can't afford them, and they're hard to do. The Saudis and the Emirates are much more interested in modernization. They can work with the Iraqis now as well.

19:45And so, I think when the Chinese look at the Middle East, it's important to them in material terms. It's important to them because it's another set of countries who are skeptical of the United States and will support the United States. Chinese view of the world, which is centered on nominal multipolarity and supporting multilateralism. And then the more the Chinese can use those relationships to advance its effort to diminish American power. And then to make a very obvious point, having the US tie down in a complicated air naval and missile war in the Middle East, only redounds the China's benefit. And to Russia's benefit as well. Let's go there. Let's talk about the impact of all of this on the pivot and whether China sees advantage, as you say, and whether there's actual advantage. And a lot depends, of course, on what happens with its war, whether we actually go in on the ground, whether we actually get in, whether it's protected quite more of a ground war.

20:46But some of our close friends in Washington who were Asia experts are despondent. I think it's fair to say, despondent that the US is back in another war in the Middle East and really worry it could just kill the pivot to Asia. I always taught our students at Georgetown that as a regionalist, if you want to be strategic, you can't say all resources or the majority of resources should go to my region. The US is a global power. And what happens in the Middle East or in Europe has profound impacts on the security of the Indo-Pacific. I used to show in class a cartoon by Washington Post-Cartoonist Ferb Block from 1942 or 43. And the cartoon shows General MacArthur with George Marshall, the chief of staff of the Army. And MacArthur has a globe, and it's a cube, and Asia's on the top. And he's saying, I want all the resources for Asia. And George Marshall says, well, you know General, around here we prefer a round globe. Because he had all these fights with MacArthur who said all of the resources or the prepondents should go to him in Asia.

21:46And my view is that with this regime in Tehran, there is no stable equilibrium in the Middle East. You can't skip school. You can't ignore the Middle East. There's going to be some level of error for... I think this is the reality. I mean Trump accelerated, maybe, made worse that reality, but it was the underlying reality. And I think Asian allies have got to realize that this is structural. This is partly Trump, but it's structural. There is a need for increased defense efforts because of the global responsibilities of the U.S. U.S. can't hit pause in the Middle East because it won't stay paused. On the other hand, as you point out, we're expanding munitions. There is a fear of a quagmire. And there is a reason to worry about our focus on the Indo-Pacific right now. So where do you come down on this to be? Are we killing the pivot? Should we be worried? What do you say to our good friends who I will not name? Who are so worried about this right now? Yeah, so I'm going to answer it, but I'm going to open the aperture slightly wider to contextualize my answer. So, you know, Mike, I think we're at a very unique moment in international affairs.

22:46I think we're at a reordering moment. The post-Cold War era is done. And we're now in a transitional interregnum between the Old Order and a New Order. And right now, we're going through the Order Disolution process more than we're going through an Order creation process. And I think that that Order Disolution process is especially disorienting for Asia because of the centrality of the U.S. to both the region's security and its economic development. You know, a point that you made so well in your book and you often stress is that U.S. strategy for Asia has always been a hybrid strategy. It's been part political security strategy, the alliances, but part economic strategy, having getting access to the American market, getting access to capital. Of course, now that many of the Asian economies that we work with, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, etc., are both capital exporters as well as capital importers.

23:47But the broad point in making is that this dissolution process is especially disorienting because it's coming at a time when countries are experiencing both a China shock, economic and security challenges from China, but also like a U.S. shock. And that is new and different. And the U.S. shock is the fact that they see the U.S. sort of self-marginalizing. And through its withdrawal from international institutions, the WTO, global trading system, its criticism of European allies, the criticism of NATO, and then just the sort of hyper-transactualism of Trump. And that has generated a degree of uncertainty and reliability. And so I think that we're at this moment that's not just an interregnum, it's an interregnum that is defined by countries simultaneously trying to deal with the China shock and the U.S. shock at the same time. And that's especially disorienting for Asian countries because of the nature of the U.S. involvement.

24:52And I think this war comes at a very particular time when everybody's trying to grow up with how to position themselves in this world. And what's interesting to me is we're beginning to see different strategies emerge. So you have the European response, which is self-reliance and strategic autonomy. But of course, within limits because of the nature of the NATO alliance, you have the Asian response, principally, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, which is to double down on the alliance. Pull the U.S. closer. We saw that with Takiichi's visit just a few weeks ago, right? Basically, hold on to the U.S. and the alliance and hope a better day comes. And then you sort of have the most undefined response set, which is the Karni response, which is middle powers need to find ways to come together episodically to solve problems. So I think you're beginning to see different groups of countries trying to figure out how to position themselves.

25:55So we're at this transitional interregnum. Countries are dealing with the U.S. shock and a China shock. The Asian response is to pull them closely, but they're also looking at their other Western partners, Europe in particular, their NATO allies, who are doing something different. And so the question is, are we getting to a moment where the much heralded convergence between European and Asian strategies might be fracturing a little bit because everybody's struggling to figure out how to deal with this transitional world. And then now we're at war in Iran. And like you, Mike, I mean, I don't like the diversion of Asian resources to Middle East like anybody else. But look, a bunch of launchers from a sad battery, not even launchers, interceptors, both the radar and launchers stayed in South Korea. The interceptors were shipped to the Middle East. And then of course, the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, which is naturally meant to pivot.

27:01Do I think that those two moves spell the death for U.S. strategy in Asia? No, I don't. But I think that what's difficult is they're occurring in a context of unique uncertainty and instability about the broader challenges to the region. And at some point in this podcast, we should talk about the energy shock that the world is experiencing and how that might affect the strategies of Asian countries. So to very specifically answer your question, Mike, I think that all these criticisms that the pivot is dead sort of missed the whole point. The pivot was an expression of a strategic intention and aspiration that was knowingly done that it would take time to achieve. And the U.S. strategy in Asia has, as its core, forward deployed forces, substantial amounts of them. 28,000 in South Korea at its peak, about 50,000 in Japan. Those numbers have not come down in any significant way.

28:03And as I said, Asian countries are so deeply invested in the United States as both a security and economic partner. Sure, they're nervous and they're concerned. But the U.S. has been in Asia for 70 years, and I don't think we're going any place any time soon. That was a really, really good framing. And I think for our listeners, it's one that would really resonate with governments in Canberra, Tokyo, Seoul, Manila. You said, this is no different. I put on my history nerd hat. It's not completely new and different for Asian allies. In the Vietnam, post-Vietnam war period, you had the Nixon shocks. You had the U.S. withdrawal of ground forces from Southeast Asia, Carter administration grew back considerably from Asia. And you had the Soviets expanding, full of, you know, in the President of the doctrine, full of hyperconfidence. And the U.S. adjusted in the late Carter period in the Navy in the 1980s with the Reagan Maritime Strike, particularly with Japan. And we pushed back.

29:03One other data point is in 1987, in the last year of the Iran-Arak war, the U.S. conducted what they called Operation Ernest Will, which was the largest naval convoy operation to escort U.S. flag vessels through the Middle East, through the Strait of Hormuz during this Iran-Arak tanker war. So I'm underscoring your point, Mike, that we've done this before without it fundamentally disrupting our global strategy. And by the way, that 87 operation happened, as Ronald Reagan and Yasuhiro Nakasone, the Prime Minister of Japan, were deploying F-16s to Mesawa, Japan, with nuclear-capable, wasn't well known by the Japanese public, but nuclear-capable bomb racks, and other things to bottle up the Soviets. So now that was arguably the easier problem than China in some ways, but I just mentioned it because I think, particularly for Japan, there is a memory for a lot of officials today of the U.S. being unreliable. I think that's different for Europe. I think this is new and different for European allies.

30:06I don't think an American administration has been, or even American politics, have been, actually an American administration has been picked this anti-Europe since before World War II. But I don't think American politics has had this level of anti-European transatlantic solidarity really since Robert Taft and the opposition to NATO early on in the late 40s or the American First Movement. So I think our European allies, this is new and different for them. They haven't seen this level of vitriol towards Europe from American political leadership in 75-80 years. And frankly, my view as a result, they're overreacting a bit. I mean, I'd be upset and angry too, but I think our Asian allies are a little bit more used to the U.S. being unreliable from time to time, because Asia has often been a secondary theater throughout the Cold War. And that's partly why you see trust levels in the U.S. at the lowest level unrecorded in Japan and Australia. 22% trust Trump in Japan and San Kei Shaman polls. Lowest polls show 35% of Australians trust the U.S., and that was before the Iran War.

31:09But support for a lands of the U.S., steady in Australia at 80%, up in Japan from Biden, which was 89% to 93%. And a new poll coming out from Korea is almost 100%. It's like within the margin of error of 100%. So I think Asian allies have often seen this play before, not like this to be sure, but they've seen this. They also have no options. They cannot maintain a balance. There is no middle power strategy that will preserve their sovereignty, economic security, deterrence, absentee U.S. And frankly, all of the very important developments in security and economic cooperation between Japan and Australia, Australia and the UK or Canada, India and Japan and so forth. Much of that on the military side is predicated on U.S. as the core for strategic lift, for satellite versus statement, all of that. So I think people are often in the Asia context overstating the degree to which middle powers are counter balancing the U.S. But you're right. They are nervous, understandably nervous, and they're expanding their playbook.

32:13How much do you worry about the challenge to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime? I mean, it would be natural for Iran to conclude from this that it definitely needs nuclear weapons now. And do we begin to see more of these kinds of conversations in Asia? And as you know, this question comes up from time to time for all of us. The alliances historically is demonstrated by our great colleague Victor Cha's wonderful book on the origins of alliances. Non-proliferation played a big role in the sustainment and evolution of these alliances over time. How do you think about that question? I struggle with it, but I feel like we have to have a better answer. Well, I think we are right to be vigilant because we are in a period of discontinuity in many ways, strategically in the international system. I don't think we need to be alarmed, and I wouldn't predict increased proliferation. The North Koreans have already left the barn, and Kim Jong-un's response to the Iran War was see. We needed it and we'll never get up nuclear weapons, but that was not because of Iran.

33:15That was a long-standing goal for Pyongyang. In South Korea, polls show support in theory for nuclear weapons, majority support. But when you kind of push on how you get there, what would that mean for the U.S. extended deterrent, which is more important? What would it mean for Korea's peaceful nuclear cooperation? What would it mean for the diplomatic position? When you start going through the costs, you find that it has very little traction. And Japan, the anti-nuclear sentiment, anti-nuclear weapon sentiment is really deep and strong. Turkey is talking about modifying the three non-nuclear principles to allow the potential for U.S. transit of tactical nukes or even potentially sending nukes. You get some interest in Korean-Japan and dual-key, sort of U.S. nukes, where there's a joint command and control, and these are all hypothetical. I think if you actually tried to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in communities in Japan and Korea, the blowback would really shock people. So we need to remain vigilant. My center here is doing a big study on this, protesting different paths to proliferation. And as our friend Victor said, the path to nuclear proliferation for Japan or Korea or Australia or U.S. ally, that path goes through extended deterrents and question the extent of deterrents.

34:24And the U.S. has many, many options along that path to tighten up the credibility of extent of deterrents. So vigilant, more concerned than two years ago, but really not a time to be alarmist. Let's kind of wrap up with the end state. Let's pause it. Look, as we're speaking, there's debate about whether Marines, 80-second, or board special forces will be inserted into Carg Island or go after the Enriched Uranium stockpiles. Personally, that is not a scenario I see happening, given the low level of support in the U.S. 75% of the public's against that. If it does, if we get it, if we're successful, that's one thing. If it's unsuccessful, that's the Quagmire everyone fears. But let's, I'm cheating a little bit. Let's just set that aside. And let's assume we are heading towards some kind of de facto ceasefire, not a big peace agreement, not a permanent opening of the Strait of Formos, higher oil prices and gas prices for a while, because of the uncertainty and the damage done, a need for a higher level of U.S. military presence and vigilance in the Middle East.

35:25All of those factors, if that's sort of the scenario for the next year or two or three, it may not be, but I think it's most likely. What does that do to the geopolitics in Asia? Can the allies adjust? Can the U.S. military adjust? Are there lessons we should be learning or allies should be learning? Are there lessons China will learn? What does that world look like? Just positing for now, that's the most likely. Yeah, that's a pretty benign world. I think it's a world in which the status quo in Asia doesn't change really dramatically. I mean, one of the things about this energy crisis is that it's a huge economic headwind to everybody in the region. It's incredibly inflationary. It's leading to spikes in fuel prices, which in Southeast Asia can prompt shortages, social instability, political instability. We haven't quite seen that yet. To me, on the energy security question, the key issue is the debate about energy security in Asia only about price. And as a result, a macroeconomic issue that central banks and finance ministers manage, or does it become about access to quantity?

36:32And I think that that is really, really important because if the situation in the Middle East gets worse, where countries are actually concerned, can I actually just get physical access to the LNGI need? To me, that starts the shape strategic behavior, but that could redound to the benefit of the United States. Because as you know, Mike, we are a net exporter of LNG, and there are all sorts of interesting LNG projects, including one in Alaska that the Japanese are interested in, the South Koreans are interested in. So that interestingly could be a strategic bank shot for the United States where energy security becomes higher on the national interest list and the United States because of its energy independence actually creates a new foundation for pulling the allies and partners in the region close. But I think fundamentally the crisis in the Middle East will be inflationary present macroeconomic challenges to Asian economies who are highly dependent on imported oil and gas, but they will manage through this.

37:37You know, the big issue is whether or not it looks like the United States is going to get tied down and deploy forces on a long-term basis. The other issue of course is Ukraine, and I think Putin is an enormous, extraordinary beneficiary of this operation because of course it takes all the global attention off of Ukraine. It diverts scarce US military resources away from weapons transfers to Ukraine and more to the Middle East. It makes Putin look just as justified in his military invasion than anyone else, and so I think that that indirectly gives the Chinese further support and confidence for their view and their sort of their effort to undermine US power and the US role in the world. I think that's spot on. I would just add on Russia and Ukraine, I agree with you. I mean the Putin is a beneficiary, but international relations is like physics.

38:39You increase pressure and valves pop things move. Zelensky has any relationship with the Gulf States because he knows how to defend against drones. And so there are other things happening. Yeah, that's a good point that make it not linear. And then of Taiwan, right, we got to bring Taiwan into this equation. There's there's North China, North China's big moon that are summer disadvantages for us in our lives, summer good. The alignment energy, I think, is something to watch and maybe I'll do a future episode. In Canberra and Tokyo, you hear a lot about the need for more regional energy security cooperation, which is good. I don't want to end on a download. I would say just anecdotally living in Sydney, a large majority of Americans blamed Donald Trump's war tariffs but now war for higher prices. I am just anecdotally hearing more and more Australians blaming Donald Trump for higher energy prices in Australia. So the social license, as it's called, is going to take a hit. And we may find future polls trusting the US is even lower. I don't think that breaks alliances. I don't think that changes policies, but it's going to be, there's going to be some repair work needed in our alliances for that reason as well.

39:41People are feeling it in their lives, the consequences of the war in ways that other things Donald Trump didn't directly affect them. And that's just one more thing we're going to have to we the United States are going to have to work on. Mike, this is a topic for another podcast in the future, but one issue that we didn't go deep on is this whole issue of what I call the China shock. The economic and security challenge posed by China. Now you in your last podcast with Toshi Yoshihara did a great discussion of the China military challenge. What's interesting to me and one of the newest dimensions of the China shock in Asia is because of the growth model China is pursuing, which is focusing on investing in building out manufacturing, especially high end manufacturing and not stimulating enough consumption. The Chinese export machine is in overdrive. And so what's happening is the Chinese are becoming a source of premature deindustrialization for economies in the region.

40:41In particular, the auto sector in Thailand, a parallel textiles and steel in Indonesia e-commerce in Vietnam. Because the Chinese are just flooding these markets with exports as a way to keep their manufacturing economy alive. And so with all this sort of issues of energy security in the Middle East and the background, it's important to remember that like the China challenge is growing and evolving and the key is for the United States to make sure that it positions itself to work with allies and partners to respond to it. And going back to the most basic strategy point for the United States in Asia, our strategy for Asia has always been a hybrid strategy, right? Part security, part economic. And what the Chinese are doing is saying the flying geese model of economic development in Asia no longer works because the flying geese is no longer a geese. It's a dragon and dragons don't take everybody else along with them.

41:44Yeah, no, it is an important topic for a future podcast is Joe Biden like to say don't compare me to the Almighty compare me to the other guy. And let's just remember as much chaos as Donald Trump's approach has shown on our friends and allies, the China Shock 3.0, the PLA maneuvers, foreign interference. It's a pretty long list with many countries have to deal with and the economic security economic state craft menu is really obvious. And the Trump administration in critical minerals and some areas is doing it, but in others, it's just not on the field. Topic for future podcast seven, you do big picture stuff like me. We could probably go for 10 hours and we should let people get about their regular lives. Yeah, thanks. Thanks. Really interesting. Always great. Always great. For more on strategy and the Asia programs work, visit the CSIS website at csis.org and click on the Asia program page. And for more on the US Studies Center in Sydney, please visit ussc.edu.au