Does Ranked Choice Reduce Strategic Voting?
About this episode
There’s a long standing debate in political science about the problem of strategic voting: when voters cast their ballots not in line with their true preferences, but for the candidate they hate the least whom they think is also most likely to win.
In a new paper, University of Chicago political scientist Andrew Eggers shows that a completely different system, ranked-choice voting, could reduce strategic voting and create opportunities for people to vote in line with their true preferences.
Paper link: https://www.dropbox.com/s/2komhumusf8yfr2/strategic_voting_in_AV_v29.pdf?dl=0
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