The Changing Face of Battle

0:00Ever notice how ads always pop up at the worst moments when the killer's identity is about to be revealed? During that perfect meditation flow, on Amazon Music, we believe in keeping you in the moment. That's why we've got millions of ad-free podcast episodes, so you can stay completely immersed in every story, every reveal, every breath. Follow the Amazon Music App and start listening to your favorite podcast ad-free, included with Prime. History as it happens, March 6, 2026. We're through the changing face of battle. Drones have become a key weapon for Russia's war strategy there, allowing them to come

1:02up mass attacks, but Kiev has become skilled at adapting on the battlefield. Known as interceptors, drones like this, destroyed more than one thousand Russian shahead and other drones in just four months. so we just move around on the battlefield. Drones are transforming the battlefield, a relatively inexpensive, remote-controlled, explosive drones. They're terrifying infantrymen in eastern Ukraine and making it close to impossible for offensives to capture more than a sliver of territory. The era of the tank appears over is the era of the robot soldier next. That's next, as we stare into the face of battle, past present and future, as we report history as it happens. I'm Martin Decarrow. This whole business of Russian human wave attacks or so-called meat attacks is absolute nonsense. Nobody, if you talk to Ukrainian veterans, they've been saying since 23, this is rubbish,

2:03this is not how the Russians operate. Because you can't, I mean, it would be suicidal. Russians have been trying to infiltrate, pushing forward, with groups as small as three men. You know, they try to get behind the Ukrainian lines and pick off the Ukrainians one by one, and of course, actors drone spotters. In the face of battle, published in 1976, a legendary military historian, John Keegan, concluded with a chapter titled, The Abolition of Battle. Decision, said Keegan, is a concept which military historians use in an ambiguous fashion by decisive battle, they can mean simply a battle which has a result, which ends in the clear-cut victory of one side over the other. But also a battle whose result causes some real shift in the direction of human affairs far away from the battlefield, bringing about the downfall of a here to four dominant power,

3:03setting the term to a hitherto irresistible tide of imperial expansion, toppling a political system, cutting short the career of a conquering hero. The military historian's search results was almost always directed at one or other of these two levels, at the intermediate effect of the battle on the strength of the army in the mind of its commander, or else at its impact on the morale and resources of the war-waging power. Yet, as I have tried to argue, said Keegan, the most important, the really decisive effects of a battle, are more immediate and personal than those belonging to these other categories. It is armies which fight battles, and armies which contain the men who in any society can and will and know how to fight. Battles, or more precisely defeats, are immediately decisive because they kill some of these men and dissuade the rest for a longer or shorter period from wanting to fight anymore. Keegan went on to say the very scale, the first and second world wars, as determined

4:04that we cannot yet categorize all those results or chart their dimensions. But one at least denies contradiction that the experience of violence and sudden death has been brought through battle into many, perhaps a majority of families, that fear of the suffering battle can cause to human societies is profound and almost universal, and that the usefulness of future battle is widely doubted. While the great armored hosts face each other across the boundary between East and West, no soldier on either side will concede that it is not believe in the function for which he plans and trains. As long as states put weapons in their hands, they will show each other the iron face of war. But the suspicion grows that battle has already abolished itself. The great John Keegan in his classic, The Face of Battle, published 50 years ago. The suspicion grows that battle is already abolished itself. The way I put it is, war does not work. We know war doesn't work, yet time and again,

5:06since it's total victory in 1945, the United States is bombed or invaded or intervened in other countries with meager results, while doing incalculable damage to the societies of others. The US military wins battles, almost all the battles, yet the United States loses the wars or fails to produce lasting peace and stability in societies transformed by the violence of battle. The desired political outcomes do not materialize, and here we are again. Flying over to Iran, flying over Iran, flying over their capital, flying over the RGC, Iranian leaders looking up and seeing only US and Israeli air power, every minute of every day until we decide it's over. And Iran will be able to do nothing about it. B2's, B52's, B1's predator drones, fighters,

6:06controlling the skies, picking targets, death and destruction from the sky, all day long. The United States and Israel started war against Iran with devastating air power, with the aim, the strategic aim of, well, that's not entirely clear, although in recent days, at least publicly, the administration seems to have settled on the goals of wrecking Iran's nuclear program, conventional missile capabilities, and its navy. But to what end, why do American presidents continue to make the mistake of believing US air supremacy might produce desired political outcomes? It is the illusion of air power, but President Trump also seems to understand the public will not tolerate high American casualties in a prolonged ground war. So there are now reports the US will arm Kurdish separatists to foment a civil war in northwestern Iran. The Kurdish fighters would be supported by US air power. You know, it wasn't that long ago

7:07when US leaders were wary and rightfully so, of getting bogged down in an open-ended, unwinnable war with no exit strategy. The supposed lesson of Vietnam, but some statesmen wanted to kick what was derisively called the Vietnam syndrome. In other words, Americans have to be willing to fight and win wars again. We just got to go about it the right way. In 35 years ago, President George H. W. Bush believed he'd done it. Should military action be required, this will not be another Vietnam. This will not be a protracted, drawn-out war. The first Persian Gulf War lasted six weeks. By God, we've kicked Vietnam syndrome once and for all. Thank you, ladies. All those heavy days of the early 1990s, the U.S.-led International Coalition backed by a UN Security Council quickly and decisively expelled Saddam Hussein's armies from Kuwait. But did not go all the way to Baghdad for regime change.

8:10There would be no nation building. You want me to go into Saddam, down to Baghdad and find Saddam Hussein also with whose life? Kid living over there next door in Houston? You know, whose life are we going to put into a fruitless hunt like that? That lesson was forgotten or ignored during the global war on terrorism. Regimes were changed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya with disastrous consequences. And in countries where there'd be no boots on the ground, the U.S. expanded its air war using air strikes to kill suspected terrorists or punish groups like the Houthis in Yemen. In another war, while now entering its fifth year, the air is commanded by the drone. Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In eastern Ukraine, the face of battle is soldiers running terrified from remote-controlled drones that follow them into their foxholes. Here is Security Analyst Michael Clark on Sky News explaining what happens. Those are conceptually new because they sort of dominate the air space

9:11below, say, 2,000 feet. And this is where it makes it impossible for soldiers to move around on the battlefield safely. So they're doing the same job as artillery shells pinning down an enemy. And the fact is, they're cleverer than artillery shells because an artillery shell goes where it goes and the troops on the ground take their chances. They dig in and just take their chances. Hope for the best. But if a drone picks you up and there's somebody else on the end of it who's watching, then it can follow you into your dugout. Drones have helped paralyze the front lines. Riding for ResponsibleStateCraft.org, Anatol Leven says, over the past four years, the Ukraine war has done more to change military weapons and tactics than any other conflict since 1945. The first month of the war says, Leven taught a striking lesson, a combination of Ukrainian handheld anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles nullified the Russian combination of armor, attack helicopters and ground attack aircraft that had been at the heart of Soviet, Russian, and US planning for offensive action in big wars. As the war progressed, he says,

10:13it diverged further and further from the experience of the previous century. This has been above all because of the tremendous advantages that a combination of old and new weapons gives to the defense, like satellite intelligence. Above all, says Leven, as now generally recognized, it is drones that have transformed the battlefield. Since the second half of the 19th century says, Leven increases in five power of led to a progressive thinning out of infantry on the ground. Drones have increased this to a truly revolutionary extent. The writing of Anatol Leven, or as John Keegan may have put it, the battle has abolished itself. So what is the point of continuing the war? Technologies and tactics do change, yet military advantage alone cannot produce desired political outcomes. Putin has guaranteed all of Ukraine will remain hostile to Moscow rather than greeting the Russian army as liberators. The Trump administration and its pro-war cheerleaders believe this time they're gonna get it right in Iran.

11:15That bombing will collapse the regime and something better will come after. The United States says, the strongest military the world has ever seen. I rebuilt our military in my first term. There's never been a military like we possess. And frankly, there's nobody even close, but we are now using that military for good. We want to have it for good purpose. And it's all Leven is the director of the Eurasia program in the Andrew Basavitch chair in American diplomatic history at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Our conversation next, tap subscribe now on the show notes for early access, ad-free listening and bonus content, or go to history as it happens.com. And it's all Leven, welcome back. Hello, it's very good to be back. So I take it at some point in your life, you read John Keegan's The Face of Battle. Yes. We're gonna talk about the changing face of battle, or maybe the changing tactics of battle.

12:16Is today the face of battle is today the drone? Yes, the really big new thing in this war has been drones. Not drones alone. I mean, there are other older elements, some going back to the so-called revolution in military affairs in the 1980s, notably satellite intelligence, of course, and its impact on the battlefield. But on the ground, it's interesting that drones and mines work together. Mines, of course, are very old by now. You know, I've talked to veterans, Ukrainian veterans, Russian veterans, they all say that the battlefield, this, you know, so-called killing zone, no man's land, 15 miles wide, is absolutely choked with mines. You know, some of them I talked to were missing legs, you know, to demonstrate this. Now, the point is that the other effect of drones, I mean, one is anything that moves in the open, men or equipment can be destroyed. This also makes it impossible to clear minefields

13:17because, of course, that takes time in the open. And, you know, whether a piece of equipment or, you know, a man on foot basically still with a stick and a metal detector is a dead man, you know, this takes hours and with drones overhead can't be done. So all of this works together. I mean, obviously, this doesn't transform the face of guerrilla warfare, but as far as conventional, you know, warfare goes clearly, this has become quite different from, for example, the Israeli wars, which were basically still the later stages of the Second World War continued. Yeah, referring to 56, 67, 73, the smashing Israeli victories and those were short decisive wars, which is rare. And that victory is a swift, meshing, and total one. As crack air force, infantry, artillery, and tank corps combine to sweep across the Sinai Peninsula to the Suez Canal, east of the Jordan, north,

14:18in Osiria. Thousands of prisoners are taken. While Jordan announces she lost 15,000 troops in the sudden and dead. Something that your essay for responsible statecraft did was it shattered in my mind this idea that in eastern Ukraine right now, producing wave after wave after wave of infantry assault, which would explain why so many Russian soldiers are dying. I mean, the casualty figures per month are staggering. You're saying because of the drone, Russian infantry assaults are taking place in small groups. Tiny groups, tiny groups. I don't know if you've seen this brilliant, independent Russian documentary about the war in the Donbass by a Russian Canadian filmmaker. But I mean, what this brings out is that any larger group is going to be spotted. A tank is going to be spotted. Even artillery has been forced back miles and miles. You can't use mortars, you can't use light artillery, because they too will be identified by drones.

15:21But I mean, this whole business of Russian human wave attacks or so-called meat attacks is absolute nonsense. Nobody, if you talk to Ukrainian veterans, they've been saying since 23, this is rubbish, this is not how the Russians operate. Because you can't, I mean, it would be so societal. Russians have been trying to infiltrate pushing forward with groups as small as three men. You know, they try to get behind the Ukrainian lines and pick off the Ukrainians one by one and of course, actors drone spotters. But the point about this, of course, is, you know, Frederick the Great phrased it, but I'm sure it was known to every army long before that. He said, you know, to get soldiers to advance against heavy fire, they have to be more afraid of their own sergeants and officers than they are of the enemy. That was pretty much Stalin's principle in the Second World War as well. You know, yes, Soviet soldiers advanced

16:22with astonishing courage and grit. But it helped that there were lines of NKVD soldiers behind them to shoot down anyone who tried to turn back. Now the point is, you know, if you're relying on groups as small as three men, you can't do that. You can't have an officer, you know, a good officer or a tough NCO with groups as small as that because you'd soon run out of officers and NCOs. So a group of three men that comes under heavy fire is not going to advance, it's going to go to ground. So why are so many Russian infantry still being killed? I mean, the casualty numbers are outstripping recruitment. Well, we have to be a little bit careful about this because where are we getting these figures from? That was a Bloomberg News report on their recruitment. But relying to a great extent on Western intelligence which relies in turn to a great extent on Ukrainian intelligence. Now, the point is, no, I mean, the BBC has done

17:22what looks like a reliable survey. But even so, I mean, they are talking, you know, in the range of 200,000 to 300,000 dead so far, not the, you know, much, much higher casualties that have been alleged. But the point is that even with groups as small as three men, if you've watched some of these, you know, I mean, to be honest, pretty ghastly, Ukrainian drone videos on the internet, you can see, you know, drones hunting down soldiers one by one or, you know, yes, catching groups of two or three. And doing so, by the way, not just in the front line, but for miles and miles behind the lines. Obviously, casualties build up. And clearly, the side that's attacking is going to have more casualties because the Ukrainians can sit in their bunkers and direct their drones. And don't have to come out to nearly the same extent. So people who, then again, of course, the Ukrainians have, you know, a much smaller manpower pool.

18:22So people who have studied the first world war, they look back on the years leading up to that war and ask, how could the warring states, the combatants, not have foreseen how barbed wire, the machine gun, rapid fire artillery, would make it a defensive war where the offensive would be futile. And even after the war started and persisted year after year after year, major offensives ran aground. We've all heard about the stories of the psalm and Verdun enormous casualties in a single battle. And people ask, you know, why didn't anyone foresee this? Today, did anyone, who do I mean by anyone? The Russians and the Ukrainians, did they foresee this change taking place that the drone would rule the battlefield and all their pre-war preparations would essentially come to naught? I mean, here we are four years later, and they're still fighting over the Donbass. No, I mean, they clearly didn't. They had begun to study the lessons of the Azerbaijan Armenian war,

19:26which the Azeris won very largely through the use of drones. But look, I mean, there is habit. There are professional interests. There are military industrial interests. The Europeans, despite all the lessons of the Ukraine war, are still planning to pump billions and billions into building tanks. This is a German, right? Proved in Ukraine, but she's useless. Now, of course, in other wars in other parts of the world, they can still be useful. In the first world war, Cavalry was totally useful on the Western front, but on the Eastern front, which was, of course, much wider, and with fewer troops per mile, Cavalry, every now and again, did play an important role, not so much as a battlefield weapon, but as a raiding weapon to cut communication. I think you meant to say that Cavalry would be useless on the Western front, useless on the Western front. Yeah, but I quote in my article, Phil Marshall Hague, the British commander on the Western front,

20:29and in the late 1920s, you know, after commanding from 1915 to 1918, and by the way, presiding over the introduction of the tank and the attack, ground-tack aircraft into warfare, he was still writing that there will always be a place in war for the well-bred horse. Look, soldiers spend the vast majority of their time, not fighting, but in peacetime, exercising, and exercising are basically pretending to fight with yourself. And, you know, Hague had spent decades living on intimate terms with horses. He was very fond of them, very understandably, I like horses. He'd only spent three years, you know, or four at modern war. Today, you have all these, you know, officers, including very senior officers, who've spent their whole life with tanks. It's very difficult to give that up. But also, you know, I think as with horses, there is the romance involved, you know, the romance of the Cavalry charge,

21:30the romance of the Blitzkrieg, you know, Hitler's panzer sweeping into France, patterns in the other direction, you know, in 1944 patterns sweeping through France, whereas, basically, uniformed tech is sitting in a whole directing drones to kill enemy soldiers one by one, not very romantic. I didn't mean to interrupt you there, but I said the Germans, I just did a show on this with Leona Fix, a historian in political science about German rearmament. Yes, they're spending a ton on tanks. Well, whereas, you know, the Europeans could defend themselves against Russia at a fraction of the cost, with belts of minefields and huge numbers of sheep drones. Yes, you need aircraft still, and of course, you need lots and lots of anti-aircraft weapons, Ukraine has also demonstrated that. But as I say, even artillery has proved less important than it seemed. I mean, the Ukraine war has gone through stages.

22:30There was a period in the middle. Russia was really, and Ukraine too, were really relying on artillery, just like in the First World War. But as I say, one's drones really kicked in, even artillery became much less important. Wanna talk about air power, the issue of air power in the context of the United States and the ongoing war in Iran in a minute, but as far as air power goes here in this war, Russia, Ukraine. It seems like it's been years since I've heard anything about the Russian air force, and why it never was able to establish air superiority over Ukraine. How important has air power been in this war or unimportant? Well, I mean, the Russians were relying on the Cold War paradigm on both sides of the combination of tanks and attack helicopters. The attack helicopters, this is before the drones really came in, they were cleared from the sky, as they had been by the way in Afghanistan, of course, by handheld, what are they called, manpads, anti-aircraft missiles. There's a stingray in Afghanistan in the 80s, the stingray. Yes, the helicopters suffered huge casualties.

23:34They're attempt to storm Kiev airport at Gostomel with helicopter-born troops was defeated by the Ukrainians. That was a key part of frustrating the Russian Blitzkrieg plan. Since then, attack helicopters have not been used at all as far as I can see. And as far as the air force is concerned, it is still being used, but it is standing, the Ukrainians are barely using it. The Russians are using their air force to fire missiles, but well, well back from the front line. They are not, once again, doing the classical thing, you know, all the way up, obviously, to Iraq in 2003, of using aircraft in a ground attack role. It's just not happening. Part in my sports metaphor here, but in the NFL, since you've been living in the United States for a while now, I take you to watching football. On Sundays, maybe not. You're probably reading books instead. The NFL's some change comes in innovation on the offensive or defensive side of the ball,

24:36and then a couple of years later, what seems so brilliant and unbeatable. Somebody else has come up with an offensive, a defensive game plan to overcome it and defeat it. Similar to chess in the days I used to play chess, I used to be told by better players. Well, that opening doesn't work anymore. What's the next thing here? Robot infantry? I think so. I think that's obviously the way to go, because, you know, you can get robots infantry to advance where human infantry will not. A human infantryman who sees that the man on either side of him have been shot down will stop. A robot will keep going, and if enough robots keep going, then they will break through eventually. So yes, I think it's clearly robots on the ground, because of course, in the end, and the present state of the Ukraine peace process demonstrates this, the Russians for a whole set of reasons. Feel or Putin feels that he has to get the whole of the Donbass. This is about territory. It's about control on the ground.

25:37But with the weapons available, Russia has not been able to capture this territory. Now, this could change. The Ukrainians could collapse. The Iran war could have the effect of cutting off military supplies to Ukraine, because we just weren't enough to go around if the war goes on and on. And obviously, I mean, Russia will be strengthened economically by the war if it goes on. So I'm not saying that the Ukrainians will not collapse eventually, but I mean, you know, everyone was predicting 18 months ago that the town of Pakrovsk would fall to the Russians, and it still hasn't. So yes, I mean, you've got to have either men or machines that can capture territory on the ground. And, you know, you've got robotic drones in the air, you will have robotic soldiers on the ground. You're going to say it's a horrifying possibility. Yes, human beings won't be blown to smithereens anymore on battlefields. But if that is a check on statesmen, not sending a generation of the young to fight and die in a pointless war, well, now if you could just send machines

26:38who don't feel pain, who don't bleed, who don't have a constituency, don't have parents at home to fight wars, well, then that check is gone. I mean, we're not there yet, but you can see that future. And I find that horrifying. I won't return to history, but if you just want to remark on the ethics of warfare with robots. Well, yes. And, you know, as a journalist, a war correspondent, you know, I had the very unusual experience for a Westerner, you know, lots of Afghans and Iraqis and Syrians and others have had it, but of being not personally, of course, they had nothing against me personally. They were doubt to get leaving, but of being hunted from the air by Soviet attack helicopters and planes in Afghanistan and Chechnya. It did strike me that hardly a new thought, and of course it goes back all the way, way back, but hunting human beings with machines does give you a funny feeling if you're a human being, a very uneasy feeling, not just about yourself,

27:39but about, you know, the future of humanity. And yes, I mean, it could well encourage reckless wars, just as the overwhelming US and Israeli air superiority demonstrated, you know, by Israel over the past year and more, has clearly emboldened what I regard as both an unnecessary and a deeply reckless war against Iran. So robots on the ground could do that once more, because of course you will have a number of countries, but not just the US, not just the US, certainly China as well, which will develop these weapons. And of course beyond that, I mean, now we're talking science fiction, but of course there is the terminator scenario and the fears over AI that eventually the robots too will say, sorry mate, no, you're not getting us killed, we're turning back. You know, about the human cost of robotic warfare,

28:39there has been some work done on the PTSD suffered by American operators of predator and Reaper drones who sit in a base or an installation somewhere in the United States and they're playing a video game, controlling a missile that, you know, incinerates an alleged terrorist somewhere in Yemen or what have you. And it takes a toll on those people, even though they're just pushing a button and you're using a joystick to guide the assassination, it does take a toll. Well also because if you're an airman or an artilleryist, you don't actually see the people that you're killing as these drone videos show in Ukraine. If you're actually operating a drone, you are often hunting down enemy soldiers one by one. You can see them trying to run away. You can see their faces in some cases. That makes it personal in a certain way that we haven't seen in war since the days of hand-to-hand combat, even though it's being done from a distance. So Putin launched his war with his tanks

29:41and his helicopters, Allah World War II, if you will, hoping for the sweeping victory, the dramatic blow. Maybe one issue here and at all, and this is just speculation on my part, the fact that there wasn't a major land war in Europe since 1945. I mean, does that have anything to do with how badly Putin or others misjudge how this war would go? I mean, I think that's right. And of course, also the success at very low cost of the Soviet operations in Hungary in 56 and Czechoslovakia in 68. You know, it does look as if the Russian army was operating on a decapitation effort like Czechoslovakia, but this also does demonstrate not that the Russians are the only ones God knows, but certainly an appalling failure on the Russians at part of the Russians of planning an intelligence because there had been other lessons, including to Russia. In 1980, the Soviet Union did not invade Poland,

30:41unlike Czechoslovakia, because the polls had made clear that if they did that, the Polish army would fight. You know, the Russians did not realize that the Ukrainian army would fight. The other thing was, you know, I was actually in Chechnya in December 1994, when Yeltsin tried a blitzkrieg decapitation strike against the Chechen government of Dudaev. It was a disaster. It was a disaster, not unlike the intervention in Ukraine. Russian tanks in column drove into Grozny and were blown to pieces by people with rocket propelled grenades, failure of military planning, but also a political intelligence failure because they didn't think the Chechens would fight. Russians try to avoid criticizing Putin even in private by name, but the number of Russians who've said to me that Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff, who's still there four years later, ought to have been shot as a result of this.

31:43On a prior era, he probably would have been by now. The conversation continues. Tap subscribe now on the show notes for ad-free listening. Supercast will set you up so you can continue to listen to history as it happens in the same place you're listening to it right now. Subscribe today. I imagine you're a business owner relying on a dozen different software programs. Each one is expensive, overly complicated, and worst of all, none of them are connected. It can be incredibly stressful, right? Now, picture O2. CRM, accounting, inventory, manufacturing, marketing, HR, and more. O2 brings all the tools your business needs into one simple platform and all seamlessly connected. Everything works together, giving you the peace of mind that your business is running smoothly from every angle. O2's open source applications are user-friendly

32:43and designed to scale with your business, saving you time and money. Say goodbye to juggling multiple platforms and hello to efficient integrated management. Stop wasting resources on complicated systems and make the switch to O2 today. Visit O2.com, O-D-O-O.com, and discover how O2 can simplify and streamline your business operations. O2, modern management, made simple. So, something else at work here. You brought up the Israeli war, short decisive wars. There was also the Iranian rock war, which was a World War II-style war, but did not end decisively. And that war also had the use of human wave attacks to clear minefield, so it wasn't exactly like World War II in that respect. Although I've read, actually Vasili Grossman wrote this about how the Soviets would use their own prisoners to clear minefields. Penal battalions. 1945, the hold that continues to have on statesmen policy makers, general soldiers,

33:45the idea that you can have total victory. Without expressing definite optimism, Allied leaders say the final curtain is about to fall on the European war. Two of our armies have driven into the Tsar, as the Russians battle just a few miles east of Berlin. The crossing in the Rhine has failed a doom of Nazi hopes of victory. Total defeat for the enemy, and then you're able to occupy the enemy's countries, Germany and Japan, and rebuild them in peace. That's an anomaly. I think we've seen, especially now, as technology is changing, as we've been discussing here, ahead is simply not how it works anymore yet. Total victory continues. 1945 has a hold on our imaginations. You're absolutely right. You know, there were two things. I mean, the first is, I mean, Japan was not invaded. Germany, of course, had to be actually invaded and completely occupied. Now, that cost hundreds of thousands of American dead

34:45and British dead, and of course millions of Soviet dead. And that, of course, is why now in Iran, the US is trying to go for regime change and effectively control of Iran purely through the air. But once again, it will be worth remembering the lessons of Afghanistan, not in quite the same way. But the US did not use ground troops at the start in Afghanistan. They used air power and the ground troops of the Northern Alliance as ground troops to overthrow the Taliban. The US air power was so overwhelming, of course, that they could achieve that. But the result was America did not control the situation on the ground. The Northern Alliance ground troops did. And that led to a political settlement which infuriated the Pashdun population who were the backbone of the, of course, had been the backbone of the Taliban. And really, I mean, initiated the entire American disaster in Afghanistan.

35:46So if you're actually going to determine the future shape of the state and political developments, you have to control places on the ground. Otherwise, things will, I mean, not just me, but undoubtedly will turn out in a way that you don't expect. The other thing, of course, I mean, going back all the way to the Second World War is that it's been proved again and again, Germany, Vietnam, that bombing alone does not break the will of a strongly nationalist population ruled by a ruthless, autocratic government. And it doesn't break the will of democratic populations, either it didn't break British will during the blitz in 40 to 41. So it could be in the case of Iran that Israel and the US have made a classical mistake from it. But why does this keep happening in your view, the idea, the overconfidence in air power? It used to be cheap. I mean, the life expectancy of a British bomber command

36:48pilots in 1942, 43, was lower than that of infantry officers in the First World War, which is really saying something. But today, of course, states with modern technology, facing states with much, much fewer weapons and weaker technology can inflict huge damage. Increasingly, what, of course, was not possible in the Second World War assassinations as the assassination of Havana and of Nazrulla in Beirut from the air, with minimal casualties to themselves. I mean, so far, how many Americans have died six? Six or so, yeah. Yeah, the idea that air war is bloodless or cheap for us. Right. Whereas so far, last count, almost 800 Iranians have died, including a very large number of leading officials. So it looks cheap. And of course, that means you do not face the domestic. It's interesting there because Trump does understand that the American people will not tolerate high casualties of our own soldiers and say a ground war in Iran.

37:50And I know you're obviously not advocating for that. But what you said is true. You're not going to get an outcome you want without being able to control events on the ground, even if we did invade Iran, which is such an insane idea. I don't even want to bring it up, but we have to. You would still face armed resistance. Iraq. Again, this is not 1945. Germany and Japan surrendered and agreed to be occupied. Well, they didn't have much of a choice there, but you know what I mean? This is not that world anymore. Well, and of course, the other question is, will the American people, all the European people, tolerate much, much higher energy prices in the long run? Because however much you degrade the Iranian armed forces, it does look as if they are still likely to have the ability to close the strait of all murs and blow up oil and gas refineries in the Gulf. Could it be that the persistence of the knockout blow, Shakin'ah was the term during the Iraq war in 2003?

38:51If you listen to Pete Hegseth and some of the others in the administration, they believe they're just going to knock Iran off its feet. Death and destruction from the sky all day long. Our war fighters have maximum authorities granted personally by the president and yours truly. Our rules of engagement are bold, precise, and designed to unleash American power, not shackle it. Those ideas are underpinned by the mere fact that conventional weaponry today is so devastating. It is, and you know, it looks very good on television. But look, we will have to see. I could be wrong, obviously, I mean, a great many Iranians very recently revolted against their government, but I mean, revolting against your government in de facto alliance with forces that are attacking your country and have already managed, I mean, inadvertently,

39:52no doubt, but to massacre something like a 150 primary schoolgirls. That is not a very attractive, you know, prospect politically. But maybe it'll work. But I mean, the other thing, of course, is it seems that the US military have the higher ranks of the military have warned against about the dangers of this war. They haven't, unfortunately, any of them resigned in order to block it. But the people are making the decisions are either simply not professionals, or like Higgseth, you know, basically former junior officers. He's just embarrassing. The dumb, politically correct wars at the past were the opposite of what we're doing here. They had vague objectives with restrictive minimalist rules of engagement, no more. So much goes into creating the outcome you want in war. It's a matter of having public support in a democracy, even in an autocracy like Russia.

40:54We know why Putin has not ordered a full scale mobilization, because he knows how unpopular that would be in his own country. But public support, having the right hardware, having real strategic thinking, there's been an absence of strategic thinking when it comes to Iran. We just hope it's going to somehow turn out into this magical outcome. We've referenced the power of conventional weapons. Yet at the same time, a $20,000 drone, this is cheap, yet effective, and has turned the Russia-Ukraine war into an endless war of attrition. So maybe that's another answer as to why wars just drag on and on and on. The Iran-Iraq war went on for so long, basically, because we, and actually the Soviet Union as well, gave Iraq modern equipment that Iran, after the revolution, had been cut off from. Otherwise, the Iranians would have overwhelmed the Iraqis. But yes, I mean, this business with cheap drones, their cheapness compared to the cost of our weapons,

41:54you know, of our Patriot weapons, you know, of our aircraft carriers. That does echo aspects of guerrilla warfare, you know the famous Kipling poem, Bridget Officer is killed by an Afghan, 2,000 pounds of education fall to a 10-repiege asile, an Afghan musket. And of course, that's how we were defeated in Afghanistan, the Taliban defeated us, or a war us down, at a cost to them, the Western intelligence estimates, were about $400 million a year. We spent how much? $3 trillion on the war in Afghanistan, and lost. Vietnamese peasants who were benefiting from Soviet weapons, of course. But still, you get the point. The most sophisticated lethal army in the world bogged down in an endless war in Southeast Asia and could not win. Even though we never lost a battle, the US never lost a battle. That's the again, bringing the political part of this. I know I'm ranging far and wide here. Sure, absolutely.

42:55How has the writing of military history changed? You know, my favorite military historians, their very first history books I ever read, were John Keegan, Anthony Beaver, and some others. How will the writing of military history change? Well, I mean, the more robotic it gets, of course, the more boring it will get from that point of one of the things that alas makes war so interesting. It is the human factor. I mean, you take people and you examine them under circumstances of extreme stress. You know, what did Hemingway say about courage, grace, under pressure? I mean, it is just psychologically intensely interesting. And also, I mean, has a real effect on your scale of values. My uncles who fought in the Second World War talked about this, and I experienced it, you know, with fellow war correspondents. It does teach you that education, money, status, all these things, degrees from universities, are not necessarily the most important things in life.

43:57You know, there are other values. And much of that will go. But also, of course, this Russian documentary, sorry, I was trying to try to remember it's title, it's a brilliant one. There's also a very good Ukrainian one, 10 kilometers to FDFGO, I think it's called. It is very much about the soldiers as victims, but not even, you know, victims in the First World War sense are being moaned down in great attempts to advance. But yes, camped out there under constant threat from drones, you know, hiding in holes, coming out at night. And even, of course, that's not safe. It's, well, psychologically, it's still interesting. Yeah. But we'll think about our identity. Yeah, think about how wars, victories, defeats, indelibly shape, national narratives. That goes away when it's robots. And the last thing here, and until I brought up chess before, I used to play chess, not very well.

44:58And I would study, and I'd memorize openings, and I tried to master the end game, which, like in war, was always very, very difficult, the hardest part of chess, playing well in the end game. And I would try to, you know, memorize openings, and I'd use a computer to help me out, and I'd prepare for my matches. But then the enemy didn't do what I thought he should do. He didn't do what the book said. I think we're seeing that in warfare today, and this unfolding disaster in Iran. It is not going to go how we say the US says, the Pentagon says it should go, because the Iranian should do what we expect them to do when we begin to bomb them. You know, I think it's worse than that, because much of what the Iranians are doing in response was not just absolutely predictable, but absolutely predicted. They are closing the straits of hormones to energy traffic, and they are targeting the energy production of Gulf states with US bases on their soil.

45:59Of course, they're also trying to hit Israel with very limited success, but everybody, except presumably Trump's advisors, was saying that this is the biggest danger, that the danger to international energy supplies, and the world economy. And by the way, I mean, also the Europeans were also warning, I talked of diplomats. Of course, this is vastly strengthening the hand of Russia, both economically and diplomatically. I mean, up to this wall, the Indians were, to some extent, bowing to US pressure, not to buy Russian oil. Now, they have no choice in the matter. Iranian oil, which is their other big supply has been cut off. Where else can they go? This was predicted, is the thing. This wasn't an unexpected move on the Iranians part, or a new one. And now trapped by rhetoric. The US administration is trapped by its own rhetoric. Yeah, I mean, like Putin, we have to liberate the whole of the Donbass.

46:59Four years on, they still haven't done it. Trump now has to get regime change in Iran. If he doesn't, then this is a day facto defeat. Man, we've discussed over the years, realism and how states act upon their interests. But everyone knows, of course, that other factors influence the picture. Pride, jealousy, notions of history, national greatness, the idea that I'm a great historical actor on history's stage. I get the sense from a lot of the cheerleaders of the war in Iran right now, in the United States. They're seeking revenge for 1979, which is an absolutely terrible reason to support this war. Well, I know, you know, for God's sake, it's been what, 47 years? I mean, 47 years is the time between 1914 and the Beatles. You know, get over it for God's sake. And you know, it's not as if America does not bear, and Britain bear a share of the guilt for all this,

48:01because of the overthrow of a secular liberal nationalist regime in Iran in 1953, which was insanely labeled as communist. Yes, it's revenge. It's like France pursuing a vendetta with Germany over Alsace, Lorraine, but with far less reason. But, you know, as far as Trump is concerned, you know, it's been often said of Putin, and even I think his foreign minister is supposed to have said this, a key problem for Putin is that his chief advisors are Peter the Great, and Catherine the Great, and he wants to be like them. Well, it seems that Trump, too, is dreaming of great military glories. We're undertaking this massive operation, not merely to ensure security for our own time and place, but for our children and their children, just as our ancestors have done for us many, many years ago. So this is the duty and the burden of a free people. These actions are right, and they are necessary to ensure that Americans will never have to face

49:06a radical bloodthirsty terrorist regime armed with nuclear weapons and lots of threats. For almost 50 years, these wicked extremists have been attacking the United States while chanting the slogan, death to America, or death to Israel, or both. They are the world's number one state sponsor of terror. We are the world's greatest and most powerful nation, so we can do something about what they do. On upcoming episodes of History As It Happens, we're going to be speaking to historian Nelson Lichtenstein about neo-liberalism, and author Jack L. High about the book he wrote upon which the new Nuremberg movie was based, about the psychiatrist Douglas Kelly. And because of the ongoing war in Iran, I plan more episodes on the origins of this moment. If you have an idea for a show you'd like to hear, let me know at martinj de caro at gmail.com

50:08or search for history as it happens on Substack.