Convenience, choice or necessity? Examining the case for striking Iran

0:00You can look at any war in American history, set Navy, you know, the war with Japan after Pearl Harbor, and say it was a war of choice. You're listening to the USSC Briefing Word, a podcast from the United States Studies Center at the University of Sydney, where we give you a seat at the table for a USSC briefing on the latest developments in US news and foreign policy. We'll cover what you need to know and what's beneath the surface of the news. Hello, I'm Mari Kirk, Director of Engagement Impact at the United States Studies Center. Thanks for joining us on the USSC Briefing Room today. Before we begin, I'd like to acknowledge the traditional honors of the land we're recording on. The University of Sydney is located on the land of the Gadigal of the Euro Nation and I pay my respects to their elders past, present, and future. On the morning of the 28th of February, the United States and Israel began a series of strikes on Iran, feeling Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Hamani and many of his top leaders. The strikes were more widespread than any military action the United States

1:02has taken under President Trump so far and Iran swiftly retaliated with strikes that have hit at least 11 countries in the Middle East so far. What led the United States to attack Iran now? Is this war justified? And how are US allies responding? To discuss these questions, I'm delighted to welcome Dr. Michael Greene and Jared Monshan on the podcast. Dr. Michael Greene is CEO of the United States Studies Center and he served in the National Security Council at the White House during the Iraq War and regular listeners of the USSC briefing room know Jared Monshan as our co-host, but we've got him in the hot seat today. He's our director of research at the USSC and he has specific expertise on Middle East dynamics. So Mike and Jared, thank you so much for joining me today. Thanks for having us. And at the end of the episode, we'll get you by the numbers stats. So I'm looking forward to hearing that. A lot of numbers we can look at, so this will be very interesting. I guess to kick things off, Mike, can you talk us through a bit of the history and background about what led to these attacks?

2:04What brought us to this point and what precipitated it? Well, the US and Israeli attacks on Iran began February 28th, but where to begin? I mean, we could go back to June 2025, which is when Israel and the US conducted aerial attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities. President Trump said those facilities were obliterated. They clearly weren't. Or we could go back even further. We could go back to the multiple conflicts between Iran's proxies, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis against Israel, but also Iranian terrorism against multiple democracies, not just Israel, including Axon, Australia, as we know, the Iranian ambassador was ENGED for some run grotto, sent out of the country because of the IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' support for attacks

3:04on Jewish communities in Australia, or assassination attempts in the United States. There are reports, I think credible reports, that the IRGC had plans to assassinate President Trump. I used to eat lunch in Washington, DC, with then Australian ambassador Dennis Richardson at a restaurant in Georgetown, where the Iranians were caught trying to blow up the Saudi ambassador, who see also ate lunch at this Cafe Milano in Georgetown. And Dennis Richardson used to invite me to lunch and always reserve the table. The Iranians were trying to blow up. So my point is where to begin? You could start in 1979 and the Iranian Revolution, the Iranians might say, no, no, you have to start in the 50s and CIA intervention, or maybe the early 20th century with British, or even late-night concerted British intervention, it is just a constant state of friction, conflict, terrorism.

4:05But the only thing I suppose we can say for sure is I'm probably 28th is when this round, which is the most intense, as you said, military operations against Iran. That's when that began. And so what do you think led to it now? Like why, now what precipitated an actual attack? Well, the administration has, the Trump administration has done a dreadful job. It's been roundly criticized explaining why we're doing this. There are multiple explanations we've heard from the administration. Some of them actually have some logic to them. It doesn't explain the exact timing. The explanations for the time include the effort by Iran to reconstitute nuclear weapons. Now, was that imminent? We don't know the intelligence, it's possible. I'm doubtful they were a week away from a bomb, but that's one explanation. Another explanation is that we,

5:08or perhaps the Israeli's first had intelligence that the leadership was gathering around. I don't know how many who was then, of course, killed by the bombings, so there was an opportunity to do it. It's not clear. And the administration's not done a good job explaining it, which is why, as we'll discuss, support for the war among allies in the US is somewhat weak. I personally think the logic for the attack is an extension of Israeli strategy. And I don't mean that in a prescientive way. Israel has increasingly, because this is constant. We have to remember, this is not a cold start. There's constant war between proxies, terrorism, cyber attacks, and so forth. The Israeli strategy has been what they call cutting the grass, mowing the lawn. So it never ends. So you just cut the grass, you cut them back. And there was an opportunity here to significantly defang the Iranian regime, weaken them, possibly not likely,

6:09but possibly leading to regime change. And because Iran was so hostile, a weakened Iran was hit to make it even weaker. And that's a hard sell to the American people, but I think that's probably what the logic was. And in a very Machiavellian way, it's where Israel now lives, that sort of Israel's world. And that probably is the best explanation for the timing and for the war overall. But the fact that we're trying to guess is a problem because usually the President of the United States speaks to the public, calls the allies and explains. Yeah, there's a lot to impact there. And so I want to get into those things, the US ally responses, this messaging that's been going on, all that, but I guess before we get there, Jared, I'm keen to hear from you kind of really what has happened in the attack so far. Can you take us through kind of the scope or the scale or how widespread has the fighting been? Yeah, I think you're going to hear a lot of numbers on the thousands of targets and what they're targeting, mainly the air defenses

7:10and missile launch sites, naval vessels and how they've taken out 90% of the Navy if not more. But I think the one thing that really helps quantify for me is that US military has said that the first 24 hours of the operation was nearly double the scale of the 2003 strikes in Iraq. And that was called shock and awe, right? So these are pretty sizable, pretty quick. And it was a unique situation in which there wasn't necessarily a coalition like we saw in Iraq. We see really just the US and Israel, which by all accounts has in many ways a larger air force than most of Europe at this point. And it's almost like a peer country in terms of what they're doing there. And where the casualty numbers are all over the place, but for the most part we're seeing estimates of around 1,200 in Iran have been killed 120 in Lebanon. Iranian strikes across the region, including,

8:11I mean, in many ways, the list that we're has a sense, projectiles of some sort is shorter than the one where they have, but the list includes Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar. It really is pretty sizable and more. And what we're seeing thus far on the US side is about six US servicemen have been killed. But I think more than anything else, we're seeing the US military and most acute level of combat we've seen in the generation. And there's good, bad, and ugly about that, right? We're seeing the US technological schools primacy in many ways over the qualitative supremacy over what Iran and its proxies can offer. But we're also seeing the limits in some ways and increasing concerns about stockpiles

9:15of being able to defend against an asymmetrical adversary. And then we're seeing all sorts of allies all over the map on how they're responding to us. And you mentioned you started listing a number of the countries that Iran has struck and hit in their retaliatory strikes. That's been one of the things that has really surprised me as how many countries they have attacked. Why do you think they've gone for this widespread attacking so many of their neighbors around the region in their retaliatory strikes? I think they tell graph that they were going to do this. They've said time and time again that they're in this for the long haul and they want to increase the costs on the US allies and partners. What they perhaps did not foresee was how much this would unite US allies and partners because at the outset, let's not forget that the UK, for example, said that they were not going to support the US on this. But then we see that the Iranians targeted some UK airbase

10:18in Cyprus and also targeted a number of Gulf countries and also in France, the UK, Greece, others have come and said actually we want to defend this as do a lot of the Gulf because they're getting attacked. And so as much as they, the Iranians are increasing costs, they are also increasing the alignment against them. I think there's a big difference between those who are willing to go on an offensive operation against Iran and that was limited to the US and Israel. And those who are willing to defend against Iranian attacks. And that is a far longer number of countries. And we've talked a little bit about comparing this with the Iraq war. So like I have to say, when I first heard about the strikes last Saturday, I was thinking I was remembering back to 2003 and kind of what it was like around the dance with war and just thinking this feels so different. And you were in the White House when the Iraq war happened. And the big thing around that was that this was a preemptive strike. And that was the term used around that.

11:20And I was just wondering, you know, was this a preemptive war like the war with Iraq or how is it different from what we saw 23 years ago? Oh gosh, it's different in a lot of ways. I mean, obviously, US had been attacked on 9-11. The intelligence was wrong. It wasn't made up as some people on the far left and far right argue. It was wrong. But the concern was that Iraq, after this had been hit so devastatingly, was sponsoring or supporting the development of weapons of mass destruction that would mean the next attack on the US would be truly catastrophic. And there were reasons to believe that given Iran, Iraq's own history of using chemical weapons and so forth turned out to be wrong. The intelligence wasn't wrong. It was just analyzed wrong. Because the US and the Allies were picking up intercepts

12:23of Iraqi generals, for example, when the fighting started saying Saddam Hussein released the chemical and biological and weapons of mass destruction were under attack. So it became obvious in retrospect that Saddam had wanted his generals to think he had WMD because he was so weak and he wanted Iran to think he had WMD because he was so weak. So the actual intelligence collected was accurate but the analysis was completely wrong and there's been a whole series of retrospective mea culpas by the US intelligence community but also Australia and Britain and France and many others about how you actually analyze it. Anyway, too much on that. But there was a very strong mandate for the war because the US had been attacked and there's not this time. So that's a big difference. Also, there was a real effort to build a coalition. It was not as big a coalition as the Gulf War but it was still pretty considerable and included almost all the close key US allies.

13:24This time, it's really just Israel. And that one, the Bush administration wanted Israel to stay out because in the Iraq war, there was a worry that Israel would turn it into a problem at least where there was not about defending the US homeland from weapons of mass destruction. So lots and lots of differences, similarities. Well, we don't know what the war aims are this time but in Iraq, there was an incredible demonstration of American military power. It took a few days to knock out Saddam's army. This time, the US military and the Israeli military are just incredibly effective. The numbers you hear are that 85% of Iran's missiles have been taken out. The air defense is completely gone. Like the US and Israel aircraft can fly almost with impunity. So again, same thing in 2003, incredibly effective military operation from the air and in that case, from the ground.

14:27But fast, I'll overly optimistic assumptions about what came next. You know, Colin Powell and Secretary of State had what he called the pottery-bound rule and the pottery-bound stores in the US and I guess in Australia, they have them. If you break something, you have to buy it. So Powell kept saying, for the Iraq war, if we break it, we got to own it. But Secretary of Defense runs on the Pentagon, said, that's the State Department's problem. We just break things and it did. They broke the Iraqi army and then did not plan for the chaos that ensued. That is, is that different from this time? Well, it seems that in the current 2026 Iran conflict, there's almost zero interest in US boots on the ground or Israeli boots on the ground. There appears to be an effort by the CIA to arm the Kurds to have a domestic insurgency. That can break Iran apart maybe, but it doesn't constitute a new government in Tehran. Maybe that's a similarity that they've not thought this through. My sense is that Donald Trump's way of politics

15:31and foreign policy and terrorist and strategy is to not have a clear objective. It's all about leverage. It's all about gaining respect, gaining traction over adversaries and whatever happens, you say that's what you planned all along and you won. And so if the strategy is what the Israelis call cutting the grass, just cut them back and keep them weak, that actually suits Donald Trump's way of thinking quite well because you just sort of decide later what your objective was and then you get out. So how does this end this time? I do not see a scenario particularly given the low support for the conflict for US boots on the ground or occupation. I think regime change is unlikely, but not impossible. I think the most likely outcome is a face-saving way out for both sides, which is some kind of brokered peace agreement. The Gulf states are now under attack. That was a foolish move by Iran, but it does incentivize Qatar and others to try to create a platform for talks

16:32and Donald Trump, I think, is the kind of leader who can say, well, I prove my point and let's talk. And I could see the Iranians because they are so weak and so vulnerable, saying, well, we killed some Israelis and Americans, so we've had our revenge, let's talk. If I had to bet money, I'd say that's where we'll be in a week or two. Can't be sure, but I think the incentives are that and because neither side has an end game, what's Iran's end game, the destruction of Israel, that's not going to happen. Let's get the bomb, which is not going to happen. So I think both of them, despite brutality and the ferocity of the fighting will have reasons to try to find some kind of talks. Will the talks have significance? Probably not. It's mainly just an off-ramp. I mean, and so interesting to think about all these different aspects. So what you mentioned boots on the ground, but President Trump has not ruled out boots on the ground,

17:33which is something that's surprising. And Jared, you wrote a great op-ed on this this week that was published through the conversation, but President Trump long-campaigned against starting no new wars and he reeled against these forever wars. And now he's saying this war will go for at least weeks and he's not ruling out boots on the ground. So what has changed from campaign Trump to now where he's considering boots on the ground? And we are, he's in this conflict with Iran without this clear exit strategy. Unlike so many of his actions so far, whether it's Venezuela or the bombing last year, there are these like swift sharp attacks and then this is very different. So what's changed? Well, I think we should clarify in terms of what's making him change is what time it is. It is Friday, March 6th and 330 because by the time this is out, a lot could change. I think what hasn't changed though is the fact

18:33that he never campaigned against targeted strikes. He never campaigned against using the US military. If anything, he campaigned on doubling down on fighting ISIS in 2016. And then once he was in office, he did a pretty brazen and surprising strike on a senior Iranian commander, so a money near Baghdad airports. And then we saw in this term the strike on Venezuela. So I think there definitely is sort of ingredients of, in my view, what makes him more likely to be open to these sorts of limited military strikes and what we have and what I wrote about is a few things. Number one, long lasting and bipartisan frustration with the adversary. And I don't think outside of maybe Cuba, any country in the world is as predicated on fighting America as Iran. Literally the three main pillars of Iranian sort of ideology is fighting America, fighting Israel and the hijab for women. And number two, support of regional US allies

19:34and partners for strike or at least toleration of it, right? I think you couldn't have had the US strikes any Iran go through without allies and partners at least tolerating it because they that you have to have just access agreements and so forth. You can see Spain didn't tolerate it. And we're seeing what's that that fight play out right now because I think according to President Trump, the US is cutting all trades with Spain. No longer we in there of terrorists were in there of just cutting trade altogether. Then number three, US capacity to mitigate potential responses. You saw this back when the protests were at their peak in January where you saw thousands in the streets in Iran and where you in a way we had never seen before. But you also saw all sorts of reports about Israel and other countries saying the US should not strike now. They are not ready for account response. One behold to aircraft carriers later, the US is more prepared for response.

20:35And you add all these three ingredients plus in my view, increasing confidence that the US military in particular has the ability to have maximum impact with minimal cost of life. And that's why we're seeing Donald Trump take this path. Now, do I think that boots on the ground are likely? No, do I think he is saying that probably more aimed towards Iran than he is the US? Yes. I think he sees his, the way he engages in international affairs, there is so much of the way he engages in real estate and he never wants to put his cars on a table. And that is very bewildering for adversaries and confusing because they don't know where he's going to go next, but it also is very bewildering and frustrating for allies as well. And some experts are calling this a war of convenience. Like, would you be able to explain some of that framing where that term comes from and does it apply here? And is that an appropriate justification for war

21:39if that is what this is? Well, I think the war of court and court convenience refers for some to this tail wags the dog argument that Trump is doing this to distract from the Epstein files. I don't buy that at all. First of all, he can't continue the war all the way through to the midterm. So eventually, people are going to start paying to the Epstein files again. But more importantly, from a political perspective, it's not popular. And it's splitting his base. The part of MAGA was attracted to Trump because of his isolationism is a position to wars in the Middle East. So politically, this is not a winner for him. It could possibly be a small plus for him if it turns out, well, we don't know yet. But the political risk is overwhelmingly negative for him, I think. And so I don't buy that.

22:40This was a convenient way to get away from the Epstein files. People are saying it's a war of choice. This is not a legal phrase. This is not an international legal construct. It's a political construct that was used to describe the Iraq war as a war of choice and the Gulf War before that is a war of necessity. But historical fact is, Mike O'Hanland and a new book on the history of American defense policy and defense strategy argues this very well. You can look at any war in American history, maybe the war with Japan after Pearl Harbor and say it was a war of choice. The colonists did not have to fight for independence. Piss! Abraham Lincoln did not have to hold forward some term. I mean, there's always an off-ramp. So I think it's just not a binary thing that's terribly useful, particularly when you consider

23:41that we have essentially been in some form of conflict with Iran, and of course Israel has even more so. Since 1979, as Jared pointed out, the entire Iranian raison d'etre is destruction of Israel, conflict with America and their job, assassination attempts, murdering of Americans, going into Iraq with assassination teams aimed at Americans, attempting to assassinate the President of the United States. I mean, it's not a binary thing. It's the judgment has to be made. And I think in an international tribunal, lawyers could argue this was a self-defense, given all that history. I think the more important judgment is not war of necessity, war of choice or convenience, but is a weighing of the pros and cons, the risks and benefits. And the political risks, I think, are considerable for President Trump. My guess is he'll come out of this eluser politically,

24:43going into the midterms net. The risks of a broader conflict in the Middle East, well, we have it now, but as Jared pointed out, it's not a broader war in the Middle East. It's a broader coalition against Iran, which actually sort of accelerates the pressure on Iran. Casualties for Americans or terrorism other things that come out of it, we don't know yet. That other shoe hasn't dropped. So I think it has to be judged on the risks and benefits. A weaker Iran is beneficial to security. So we don't know. I think it's too early. It's a bit disappointing to me that Democrats in Congress are so united in opposing the war, because to me it looks political and I think a more nuanced set of criticisms and expectations of the administration would have been a better move for the Democrats, but I think they can see the polling numbers

25:43and see that this is going to probably be a big benefit for them going into the midterms, so they've united around opposing the president. And he brought this on himself, of course. He did not consult with the gang of haters. It's called the top intelligence chairs and ranking members in the Congress. He didn't consult with allies. He's brought this on himself. It is really unfortunate that it is such a partisan thing. The United States, that is not good. That will have long-term implications. It's not good that the same kind of dynamic clear out with allies. And for some of the allies, Spain and even Britain, there's blame to go around, frankly. But a lot of it comes out of the way that Trump administration decided to make this decision and not explain it. And we can't ignore the political factor. That is a huge role. And Mark Rubio has said, oh, we consulted, or he didn't say we consulted, but he said they spoke to the gang of hate. And there's been a lot of messaging coming from the administration kind of after the initial attack happened. There's been a lot of messaging coming out, conflicting at times.

26:44And a few Democrats stayed kind of across the aisle to join with Republicans and voting against the War Powers Act. And that would curtail some of the power of President Trump with this war. But you can't deny the political impact this will have. I mean, Jared, I know you're closely following that the midterms are coming up this year. And this is, they're always going to be a referendum on the sitting president. When someone's just won an election and then you've got the midterms afterwards, they tend to swing against the election that just happened prior. So how do you think this is likely to play out politically amongst voters in the US and the midterm elections? Yeah, I think there's a big difference in how this could play out in Iran as Mike said and how it could play out the messaging in the US and on the whole outside of the Gulf War at George H. W. Did led, I can't really see major wars

27:47of the last few decades I've gone well for US president. Americans get pretty tired of them pretty quickly and the Iranians know as much. And so I think more than seeing the destruction of Israel right now, the Iranian regime is just playing for time. That is their number one goal right now and they think time is on their side. Now, what does that look like ahead of the midterms? Yeah, it doesn't look great for President Trump. I think he's hoping that perhaps a quick end of this and negotiated outcome that sees more oil on the markets of Venezuela, a Venezuela model in Iran could be potentially good for energy prices. But yeah, at the same time, he has to come up against the reality that he can't sound like he wants that too eagerly because then he'll think it looks weak for the Iranians. So we're stuck getting these mixed messages and only compounding this is the fact that as was been said, this does not go over well with much of the megabase.

28:48We shouldn't forget when the US invaded Iraq in 23 years ago this month, the percentage of Americans in favor it was in the sort of high 70s right now what we're seeing is that most Americans are against this already and the percentage of Republicans in favor of it are in the high 70s. Now, if you only do those who lean Republican and are Republican, Benjamin goes down to the 50s, right? So what we're seeing is he's not starting off with a lot of political capital to use and he has a very short runway. I think everyone is talking about the midterms in November which are going to be pretty decisive in what happens next on a number of different issues but even before then, I have to wonder what happens the next few months as the GOP primaries start to finish up because that is where Donald Trump is most dangerous to Republicans. He obviously does not have any allegiance from Democrats

29:50but Republicans are by and large, most afraid of him for primaries and a lot of them are occurring as we speak and in two, three months from now, most of them will have a taken place and as soon as those are over and let's say some of those who may be pulling their punches on Donald Trump before, they may be a bit more willing to speak out especially on something that they think is existential for their November election. You know, the divisions over this in the US are pretty unprecedented. I was just trying to think when has the American public been more divided going into a war because usually you have the rally around the flag effect and the public's with the president and it might literally be the Mexican-American war which was quite divisive between the slave holding states in the North because Vietnam, the public and the Congress were with President Johnson,

30:53the Gulf War, Iraq, Afghanistan, Korean War, you name it. Is the president of the United States eventually and some of these wars, they lost the public, they lost the Congress, but at the outset, they endeavored to get on board a majority of the Congress and President Trump did not do that. His whole style of politics is sort of dividing and taking advantage of that and in the postwar period, getting allies and in the Iraq war, it was very important to President Bush and very significant to President Bush that not only Britain and Australia, but also countries like Korea and Japan had boots on the ground and were supportive and a lot of effort was put into that because the American public thinks something's wrong if allies are not fully on board close allies. There's some like the French you don't always expect.

31:54God bless them, but you expect Britain and Australia and Canada and yes, the initial statements from those governments were supportive, but now we have this spat between US and Britain over the use of Diego Garcia, the base in Indian Ocean and that's gonna affect the politics. The public is gonna send something's not right and that's the result of the way President Trump sort of does politics and I think that's why I say net net. If I'm right that this ends up with, I don't think I'd slightly disagree with Jared or maybe he meant something different when he said the Iranians think time is on their side. In one sense it's not, they're getting blasted, they're leadership getting blasted, they're navy, they're missile industries are all getting blasted, they're now faced Kurdish separatists, so they don't have forever.

32:54And so I do think there will be a move to an off ramp, probably broker by a Gulf state. If that's the outcome we see, I don't think boots on the ground, I don't think regime change. Net net, this is gonna be quite damaging for President Trump going into the midterms. I wanna talk a little bit more about the Allies because we've mentioned a number of the kind of different responses we've mentioned, Spain and Britain and France, but interestingly, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Karney is visiting Australia at the moment and Australia and Canada and their initial statements were not saying, okay, we're all in on this war with Iran, but generally supportive statements coming from both countries around what's happening. But then we've seen the UK strike of very, very different tone and then as different events of precipitated, that's changed a little bit. So can you talk us a little bit through what we're seeing

33:55on the different US Allies responses to this conflict? I'd love to hear from both of you on this. I might go to Jared first and then let Mike have the final word on it. Yeah, I think somewhere I always say that in many ways, Xi Jinping is the gift that keeps on giving to US allies and partners in Asia. Iran is the gift that keeps on giving to many of the US allies and partners in the Middle East and they really outdid themselves. As Mike said, that error of striking them in the early days of this, the fact that they basically gave them license these allies and partners to respond and we've seen them respond quite well. We've seen Jordanian air defenses intercept drones heading to Oman. We've seen Bahrain's air defense forces shoot down drones heading towards their capital, Saudi Arabia's using Patriot missiles. These are a lot of them using US kit to fight off,

34:58fight off Iranian strikes. And I don't think this is something I've been writing and talking about for a while, but people don't appreciate just how long this has been coming. This is something that David Petraeus was working on 20 years ago in building up this Allies and partners' centric mentality to the region that may not be helpful in an offensive situation. I don't think that they necessarily did any strikes on Iran enjoying the Americans and Israelis, but they did find a way, as we saw back in June of last year's well, to find a defensive sort of alignment that could deter and mitigates Iranian attacks because Iran, as we've said, really alienated everyone at this point. They have their atrocities and their proxy militias have truly done damage to practically every country in the Middle East, so one way or another. So I think, again, the Allies and Barnars

36:01are working more in tandem with each other than ever thanks to Iran's behavior. So let's look at the Gulf States that are US Allies. There's been a lot of unity happening. I guess, Mike, what about the NATO Allies? Or what are we seeing with the Europeans? Is that similar or different as we've kind of addressed? Mark Carney's in Australia, as we speak, calling on middle powers to use diplomacy and trade agreements to counter the US and China. I think it's a fair guess that none of the Gulf states are saying that's a good idea. This sort of middle power theory doesn't make sense when Iran's firing missiles at you. So I think, Jared's right on that. I think you're going to see much tighter defense and security cooperation between the Gulf States, the US and Israel. Iran has created the beginnings of a coalition that didn't want. Can I just add quickly? We shouldn't forget in the Gulf War. As you said, the US didn't want Israel involved in the first Gulf War under Georgia, should be pushed. But there was actually Israeli kit used in that first Gulf War.

37:04They literally have to shave off the star of David sides on it and just tells you that this is sort of latent and always there, but for political reasons, they couldn't actually activate it. And now they're activating it. Oh. But it's not an obstacle to the Gulf States defending themselves by doing more with the US. Frankly, I just transitioned to Europe. I'm not sure that countries like Qatar or the Saudis are going to look to Britain as an ally after this. I think Britain has heard itself in that region. In NATO, there's going to have to be some repair work. This is not in good. I think we will repair the alliance. I don't think NATO is going to fall apart. In the Vietnam War, Linda Mainz Johnson was desperate for the British to send troops. Australia and New Zealand did, of course. But he was desperate to get the British because the American people expected that. And in a famous episode, he said, just send the pipe band of the Black Watch, everyone knows them. And so Britain wasn't with us.

38:04And there have been other points of friction. This is a bad one, though. And there's going to have to be some repair work with a special relationship. And I think there's blame to go around. I didn't think Starmer handled this well. And I think President Trump set it up so it made it hard for him to handle it well. And so if you're Vladimir Putin, you think, oh, that's good. There's friction in NATO, there's distrust. On the other hand, if you're Vladimir Putin, you think my allies and proxies other than China are all getting beaten down. Syria and our Iran. I think Asian allies are going to be by whom, of course, I mean, Japan, Australia, Korea are going to be hoping for a quick resolution. Would never say this publicly, but a significantly weakened Iran would be good because then the pivot to Asia can happen.

39:05They have to worry about the impact of a conflict with the Muslim nation yet again in Southeast Asia or in domestic politics in Australia. Just I think that's a factor for Starmer. But on the whole, I think that the Japanese government, Korea, Taiwan, and I think Australia, at least within Kenbera, are going to want the US to be successful, for it to be over as quickly as possible, to send the signal to China and in North Korea that not only does the US have strong military power, but it has staying power. It's not distracted from Asia. And I think they're going to want a signal that the Asian allies are sticking with the US. They're in a different position from Europe. So none of these alliances will fall apart. They'll all be rattled in different ways. I think the transatlantic alliances already getting eaten up so much in the culture wars with Europe. It's just one more problem that the next president

40:07is probably going to have to fix. Oh. Can I just add, in addition to Syria, also a very close ally of Russia going, we shouldn't forget that Venezuela and the region of Cuba are going as well. And so that's four countries now that are closely aligned with Russia and Iran in different levels that are now being taken on by the Trump administration. But we're not seeing a lot of, in my view, a lot of analysis of the implications of that of decreasing footprint for the axis of a people or the cranks or whatever you want to call them. Last question before I get your by the number stats. You've both said that regime change is unlikely, although the Trump administration has said they would welcome it and they're trying to encourage that. But you say it seems unlikely. What do you think is a likely outcome as a result of this? Like when we get to the end of this conflict,

41:08whatever it looks like, what do you think will be different as a result of it? I personally think regime change will happen. And the Iranian people are desperate. The majority of them desperate for the opportunity to celebrate their culture for women to celebrate their potential to connect to the world. There's so many Iranian refugees living in Australia and the Canada and the US and Europe who are so hopeful right now. And it would be a good thing for the world if the regime could go away. I just think the physics of that are just not likely right now. But I do think it will happen. This is a regime that is structurally very weak right now. But as I said earlier, the most likely outcome for the near term is talks. And then, frankly, within a year or two, probably more bombing. I think this is sort of what is it? Rinse, repeat, I always get that wrong. Rinse, cycle, repeat, whatever.

42:10I think this is going to be a perennial. And I suspect that that's Israel's calculation. I think that's now the calculation shaping the administration that we will probably have to do this again. And then we'll have to do that. But each time Iran's going to be weaker, I do not think they want boots on the ground. There's just so little support right now in the US. It's in such an enormous country. And despite the overwhelming or the majority view of Iranians that we, I think people who watch Iran believe would welcome a regime change. There are plenty of pockets of support for the regime that would make the occupation of Iraq look like a cakewalk in comparison. So boots on the ground, of course, President Trump is saying, thinking of, you know, all sorts of things you would never do. But I don't think you would ever do it. And I'll, yeah, I couldn't agree more. We like that. I think the regime stays a number. We just don't know what that number is. It's unsustainable that you look at any polling,

43:10you look at even anecdotally what looking at the protest. So polling, it's hard to do polling in Iran, but still they've done so many. It looks like the regime doesn't have more than 15, 20% of the rule. So that's 80% against it. It's not like there's an undecided, it's 80% against it, 85% against it, 15, 20% approve of it. But and you look at the protest in the last, the last almost 50 years at this point in 79, we've seen the protests expand. First, it was some students. Then it was the reformers. Then it was the women. Then most recently, it was basically the people in the economy, bizarre, the basic people trying to just make a living, right? The sources of discontent in Iran are expanding rapidly. You can't actually lead a normal life there.

44:10And that's what they say over and over again in Iran, in person, they say we just want to lead a normal life. Now, does that normal life mean a normal life like you're in Australia or in the US? Or is that a normal life like Turkey? Because those are a bit different, right? And what democracy looks like between those two countries. So I think, yeah, I fully agree, like we're going to have some talks and we very well may have more mowing of the lawn. What I would also look at is just if the sort of Kurds do have any sort of subpartist movement that gains steam, that could really change the dynamic here. Because I think there is a strong case that we made about a patriotic Iran. And as much as 80% to 85% against the regime, if Iran starts breaking up, that could change the calculation. And so what I'm concerned about a lot is sectarian violence and what that looks like. Well, very interesting. Thank you guys for taking us through this very complex, complicated topic and sharing insights

45:12on all these different points. I would love to get you by the number of stats. I might start with you, Jared. And then I'll close with Mike. Sure. I think I'll do two numbers. One, I'll just say not none is specifically number, but just a figure to watch. And that is crypto. I want to know just how much the Trump administration cracks down on crypto. Because that is a lifeline for so many of these countries and the acts of people, including Iran. And there have been some controversial partners about crypto. Because we haven't seen, in my view, the elite in Iran fracture in a way that I think you need to see actual regime change. So I'll just say that's one figure to look at. Watch the crypto, watch the finance. But the other number I'll say is 27,000. That's the number of canceled flights to the Middle East. It's surpassing that just in the last few days. And I think that that combined with oil going over $80

46:16a barrel is something that is increasing the political costs on not just the United States, but on US allies and partners. How about you, Mike? What do you have? I actually thought of another number of false can start with it just occurred to me, 3703. That was our street address on Curtis Court in Chevy Chase Maryland, right out sort of Washington, 3702, our next-door neighbor was the house of an American diplomat who was taken hostage in Iran in 1979 when I was a kid. And we had yellow ribbons around all the trees in the neighborhood. And we brought them brownies and casseroles for long, long duration. And it's worth remembering that the hostility friction is that old with Iran. And then the other number is zero. And zero is the number of American presidents who have avoided using force in the Middle East since 1979. It's something of a constant.

47:18And I think for Australia or allies in Asia, there is no status quo, anti. This is the surrounding regime is predicated, as we've been saying, on constant conflict with the United States and Israel and others. And there is no scenario. You've asked us what's going to happen. There is no scenario where the Iranian side says, let's change our raison d'etre. Let's now just be more pliable like Venezuela. That's not going to happen. So this, unfortunately, friction and conflict and war in the Middle East is a constant. And the challenge or the question for allies in Asia is how do we get to a point where it's low level again, where there can be a focus on the Indo-Pacific, but not in a way where Iran emerges as a major threat. If you look at the overall trend lines, it's quite a pessimistic discussion in some ways. But if you look at the overall trend lines

48:18of the past few years, Iran is in a downward trajectory. A few years ago, we would have been talking about, in fact, very famous book by Thomas Wright about six years ago, seven years ago, argued the big challenge for the national community is all of these challengers to American and allied control of the commons. You had the Russians, you had the Chinese, and then at North Korea and you had Iran. But in the Middle East, the major threat is Iran. And if you step back and look over several years, it's declining rapidly as a threat. So there's a little bit of a positive trend line there. I just think we have to recognize there is no status co-antied. There's no kind of happy place we go back to. Not with this regime. It's just the reality we have to live with. And, Kessinger said, Iran has to decide whether it's a country or a cause. And if it's a country, then it has a lot of shared interests

49:19with the US. But if it remains a cause, it's going to remain a probably US and Israeli policy to move along. Well, very interesting discussion. Thank you both for sharing your thoughts. And as we wrap up, I'd like to point out a couple of other podcasts that maybe have interest toward listeners. Dr. Michael Green, he's host of the Asia Test Board podcast, which is published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. And I'd also recommend checking out the USSC live podcast series that runs recordings from our major live events, including recent live events that we've had talked about issues like Taiwan and issues around the Indo-Pacific. So you can find these on our website at USSC.edu.au or wherever you got your podcast. Mike and Jared, thank you so much for joining me today. Thank you for having us.